

Nation-Building and Stability Operations

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Nation-Building and Stability Operations

A Reference Handbook

Cynthia A. Watson

Contemporary Military, Strategic, and Security Issues



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For Ryan and Christine Crocker,
professionals who are the best of what
this country offers the world in its National Security Corps,
and the thousands of others who selflessly engage
in security, stability, reconstructions, and transitions,
day in and day out,
in places near and far,
regardless of either the personal costs or the threats.

Thank you.

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Preface

There are hundreds of students from whom I have learned in fifteen years at the National War College and I am grateful for the opportunity to teach these individual men and women. My experience with nation-building goes back more than forty years to arriving in Bogotá and Bangkok as a kid where I learned more than books could ever tell me about how people react to U.S. power and assistance. All of this has profoundly affected my thinking and reaction to the concept of nation-building.

Many individuals also deserve mention in the preparation of this particular volume. I was delighted when Alicia Merritt, now associated with Praeger International, invited me to do this volume. She has been wonderful to work with, over the past six years. Adam Kane has been patient as I waited for the final pieces of the Administration's thoughts but knew when to tell me "Enough!" Bonnie and Scott Nordstrom have understood when I disappeared to write. Saloni Jain helped too, with production.

My superb colleagues at the National War College have been tremendous, as usual. MG Marne Peterson, USAF, makes the College an environment where we can not only accomplish our major mission of teaching the future national security strategists of the United States but also allowing those of us who want to engage in writing to promote public policy debate to do so. MG Robert Steel, USAF, has taken over as our new commandant but also heartily supports our ability to teach, write, research, and think. Ms. Susan Sherwood is always good about asking questions that drill to the heart of whatever I'm thinking about. CAPT Steve Camacho, USN, is the finest department chairperson I can imagine in Military Strategy and Operations; I cannot thank him enough for the support and friendship. Dr. Joe Collins always throws out fascinating ideas that invariably lead me to think along a different path than what I anticipate. Ms. Lisa Bronson has brought her finely honed skills of analysis and openness to discussion from the Pentagon to the War College and I invariably enjoy our conversations on how all this stuff means something in practice. Drs. Roy Stafford and Imam O'Neill

have been fine colleagues over many years. Dr. Bud Cole teaches me all the time and I cannot thank him enough.

The views here are purely personal and do not represent those of any agency of the U.S. Government.

Introduction

Toward the end of preparing this book, two exceptionally well-respected journalists of military affairs made comments that indicate how difficult this topic is for all of us to grasp fully in our society, even though we confront this topic almost daily as we look at the world. On November 2, 2006, at a CATO Institute forum on Iraq and Afghanistan, *Washington Post* journalist Tom Ricks, author of *Fiasco*, noted that the U.S. Army has been fighting to stabilize Iraq while the administration, in Ricks' opinion, sought to revolutionize Iraq, a fundamentally different concept from that of the Army leadership.¹ In fact, embedded in Ricks' observation is an absolute contradiction in goals. Stabilization is a status quo action while revolution seeks to build something quite different.

Later the same month, appearing on C-SPAN'S *Morning Journal* with Brian Lamb on November 24, *New York Times* reporter Michael Gordon noted that the United States misunderstood its task in nation-building efforts in Iraq, with L. Paul Bremer arriving in the country prepared to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Iraq while the need was actually to "patch together a state."² This incisive observation lays out the depth of the differences between the anticipated task and on-the-ground conditions and requirements.

These observations are not cataclysmic in and of themselves but they speak of the challenge, complexity, and contradictions that exist between the goals policymakers have in mind and the actual execution of the mission. Additionally, in today's environment where the military, the civilian government officials, and the not-for-profits from outside the government or even the nation must work together even when their obvious missions contradict those of the other partners, the increased number of instances where the operations occur seem to rise inversely to the popular interest or commitment to the massive undertaking.

The work in either Iraq or Afghanistan or Indonesia or Colombia is not exclusively nation-building; the individual scenarios often also include peacekeeping, peacemaking, stability operations, as well as transition operations as developments progress along with the need for reconstruction—the final requirement in

virtually each and every conflict around the world where nation-building is also required. So, how does one label this volume?

Simply naming this volume provided trade-offs I did not anticipate. Having penned a volume on nation-building in 2004 and having grown up in a family where “development,” hence nation-building, was the profession, I instinctively defaulted to that topic. My daily interactions with U.S. and international military officers and civilians doing the job, however, reminded that nation-building wasn’t enough. I settled upon peace and relief operations because it explains the range of activities as fully as any set of words I could find. Each of the three primary words in the definition is meant as fully as possible in its definition.

Nation-building and stability operations are topics that appear in our newspapers and public discourse almost daily, as the nation increasingly seeks to understand its commitment to both issues while weighing the risks to sailors, soldiers, airmen, and marines. The United States has had involvement in the topics for much of the past hundred years but the incidents of involvement have increasingly been fraught with disapproval as the society understands the trade-offs involved.

The focus of this book is not, however, exclusively the nation-building that is now underway in the former Yugoslavia, for example. The concerns of the volume are more inclusive, seeking to include the definitions the United States has used at various points to include stability operations, mootw (pronounced “moot-wah” and meaning “military operations other than war”), peacekeeping, peace operations, peace maintenance, reconstruction operations, institution-building, and even counterinsurgency operations.

What has become frighteningly obvious to many in the United States and the global community is that the topic of SSRTOs, which will be the general term used in this book, is much harder and controversial than it appears on the surface. SSRTO means stability, security, reconstruction, and transition operations to include the range of issues facing civilian and military officials from the United States and around the world. This is a new, admittedly awkward amalgamation of a range of different requirements that in aggregate provide the basis to nation-building as this overall effort was known in the past.

It has become clear that to accomplish SSRTOs requires some tolerance by those about to be “helped” or affected. Additionally, it appears that some entities on the map have no basic conditions in place to lead to nation-building; Somalia immediately comes to mind, even fifteen years after the world community tried to end a famine and tribal warfare.

The Department of Defense has, in fact, no uniform view of whether it wants to engage in these lower intensity operations. Even that is a misnomer as they may be lower intensity than the continuing barrages of guns in a ground war or a naval battle but these “lower intensity” operations tend to last longer and require a longer commitment and more force to achieve the objectives since much of the effort requires human presence on the ground to have people interact with people. Lower intensity operations clearly belie the question that former United

Nations Ambassador (and later Secretary of State) Madeleine K. Albright when she allegedly asked then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and also subsequently Secretary of State) Army General Colin L. Powell what the point was in having a marvelous military if the United States was not going to use it. The use of the armed forces is not quite as simple as Dr. Albright believed since the armed services prepare for each and every mission in a different manner, not always a single, set method.

Indeed, in late 2005, the Pentagon issued a new defense statement outlining the decision to engage U.S. military in these specialized operations. Department of Defense Directive 3000.5, dated November 28, 2005, defines Stability Operations as “military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.” It goes on to note that “[M]ilitary support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction” includes “Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.”³

Stability operations may include providing assistance in

- rebuilding indigenous institutions including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems to secure and stabilize the environment;
- reviving or building the private sector, including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity, and constructing necessary infrastructure; and
- developing representative governmental institutions.

In a fundamental shift from the self-assessment of many who wear military uniforms or those who view the military’s actions, the Directive notes that the Department of Defense’s policy is that “stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support.” Many in the U.S. armed forces have long prided themselves on providing the instrument of national power that was based on the capacity to respond to national security threats with overwhelming violence. A commonly used term by those in uniform is that their job is to “break things and kill people” to make absolute certain that civilians understand the lethality of the process.

Many military officers and enlisted personnel are the first to admit that they often have little, if any, sustained experience in this type of endeavor. The military has always had “civil affairs” units dedicated to some aspects of these operations but rarely did the military, particularly in the modern era, worry wholesale about such vast efforts. The efforts these units engaged in and the specific operations requiring stability, security, reconstruction, or transition activities were seen as occasional missions, not the core of their jobs.

The Department of Defense Directive, however, clearly envisions something quite different. While acknowledging that many tasks can best be accomplished by the native population in any state or by civilians specializing in the field, it notes that “U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary

to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.” Fascinating is the assumption that military involvement in these operations is done *after civilians fail* at the tasks needed for any society.

What these terms mean is that they do not embrace traditional conflict operations, the type that President George W. Bush referred to as being concluded in Iraq when he spoke on the flight deck of the USS *Abraham Lincoln* on May 1, 2003. While the soldiers and Marines, who have served in Iraq after May 1, 2003, wonder whether “major combat operations” are indeed over, the civilian and military leadership *assume* that these are different from traditional force-on-force warfare.

One of the greatest difficulties for U.S. strategists and planners has been the growing reality that few items have been clearly divided into “war” and “nonwar” over the past two decades. To a great extent, this volume will examine these challenges as well as the basic issues that were “nation-building” in the past.

These activities are crucial to the United States today as it envisions the requirements facing the countries around the world. While no one doubts that more traditional forms of warfare could appear in the international system in a number of locations, the questions of the transformation of societies or putting a halt to conflicts internal to a society appear to be the phenomena likely to crop up for U.S. forces to address.

Also, clear in this field is the need for the Department of Defense to work hand-in-glove with the Department of State and other civilian agencies dedicated to these efforts. Many of the criticisms of efforts in Iraq in the first three to four years of the post-Saddam Hussein era revolved around the nature of the entirely Department of Defense efforts versus traditional sharing with civilian specialists from other branches. According to many interviews with those involved in the decision making process that went into the Iraq effort, the senior Department of Defense leadership under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld did not trust civilians to engage in appropriate approaches to these reconstruction needs.⁴

The early February 2007 call by military officials for more support from their civilian counterparts across the U.S. government in SSRTTO is a measure of the changes that this growing responsibility is creating for the overall national security community. While indications are that the administration of George W. Bush’s Pentagon, with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, did not see the civilians as creative enough in their approach to many of the challenges of the early 2000s, the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, four and six years, respectively, into their operations, indicate the crucial nexus between all forces in the U.S. national security field to achieve the overarching goal. The call for more civilian support does not mean that there are unanimous approaches to solving the problems these operations pose but the range and frequency of these operations are clear.

This volume will explore the reasons that these wide-ranging operations have become more important than they were in the past but two other outstanding points are clear. First, these SSRTTOs are often not merely U.S. operations but

are likely to be multinational in nature, meaning all sorts of cooperation and coordination that was never required in the past. Second, these operations occur because the world is concerned with nontraditional threats, such as terrorism, piracy, insurgency, and fragile states. Each of these is quite different from prior periods.

By the nature of the Praeger Security International Series, this volume will concentrate heavily on the U.S. government aspects to these missions rather than the entire global range of them. The reconstruction operations, peacekeeping, peace maintenance, stability operations, and nation-building emphases will have a military and governmental flavor rather than an all-encompassing one. Other sources cover the nongovernmental aspects to these operations but, in the emerging security environment which is calling so frequently upon peace operators, the public needs to grasp how these operations relate to those asked to execute them.

The purpose of this volume is to discuss this military and civilian activity, whether labeled nation-building, reconstruction operations, peacekeeping, or stabilization operations, in the era of combating global terrorism. This complication has made the challenges for an already unpopular U.S. government response more unpopular because of the physical and financial costs involved, as well as the question of whether the United States can meaningfully affect the long-term development choices of another state, makes this rife for public policy debate.

The layout is to discuss the historical experiences prior to the beginning of the twentieth century (chapter 2), followed by the post-9/11 experience in SSR-TOs around the world. The remaining chapters discuss the chronology relating to these operations, individual personalities engaged in these operations and the associated decision making, documents, and a bibliographical chapter on resources in print, online, and in the broadcast media that consider these issues.

For the foreseeable future, nation-building will probably revolve around Iraq and Afghanistan because the stakes are so high. It would be irresponsible, however, not to consider the problems, opportunities, and contexts for other conflicts around the world.

Many questions remain about the future of these operations.

- Would another administration retain the high profile commitment to reconstructing governments around the world in our democratic image as directly as has the Bush administration?
- Will budgetary constraints thwart these efforts? Original estimates that Iraq could pay for its own reconstruction have proven woefully incorrect with no end in sight to the recurring supplemental and regular budget requests.
- Will the public tire of these activities?
- Will Security/Stability/Reconstruction/Transition Operations adversely affect the warfighters' ability to be primed for a traditional conflict?
- How can the U.S. government best create a genuine interagency approach to these problems?

- What is the best way to use U.S. forces—civilian and military—in coalition with partners abroad?
- What is the correct balance between government workers and civilian contractors in these efforts?
- In a reconstruction effort, is the military subject to the control of the ambassador in country or is the military chain-of-command outside of traditional relationships overseas?
- Is the military the best tool of statecraft for these activities or is some other government agency better?
- Can SSRTOs be introduced from outside a state or do the changes require coming from within a state at the behest of the native populations?

These are only a few of the questions the public policy debate on these operations may address. More thought on the complex issues is bound to be needed.

The volume discusses the traditional nation-building experiences of the U.S. military as well as the effects that the 9/11 attacks and reorientation of priorities has had on the decision making. Several of the key documents in the field of Security/Stability/Reconstruction/Transition Operations are shown in full or excerpted to show the official government policies on these questions. Personalities who have been or remain pivotal in these operations are discussed in chapter six. Finally, a chapter discusses of the rapidly evolving literature on this field. It lists websites, blogs, online resources, studies from within and outside of the government, and monographs and publications.

Notes

1. Tom Ricks, in panel discussion with Jeffrey Record, Christopher Preble, and Conrad Crane, at CATO Institute in Washington, DC, November 2, 2006.
2. Michael Gordon, appearing on *Morning Journal* on C-SPAN, November 24, 2006.
3. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, November 28, 2005, available at <http://www.dtic.mil>.
4. A raft of books have appeared on Iraq, many of them extraordinarily critical of the actions. Most useful detailed studies of the decision making on the stability, security, reconstruction, and transition activities include Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Life Inside the Green Zone* (New York: Knopf, 2006); Thomas Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006); T. Christian Miller, *Blood Money: Wasted Billions, Lost Lives, and Corporate Greed in Iraq* (Boston: Back Bay Books, 2006); and Bob Woodward, *State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).

Historical Incidents of Stability, Security, Reconstruction, and Transition Operations Prior to the Twenty-First Century

One of the greatest difficulties with this general type of governmental—military or in conjunction with civilian peers—operations is the diversity of terms used to describe the activities involved. As noted in the Introduction, the range of activities considered under this rubric is more easily defined by what it does not include: traditional military operations and large-scale and concerted activities by huge numbers of deployed forces. The type of warfare so often associated with former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Colin L. Powell, as he led U.S. forces in the Operations *Desert Shield/Desert Storm* in 1990–1991 was that most associated with traditional military operations.

It is folly, however, to assert that U.S. forces have engaged predominantly in that sort of military activity. For most of the founding century of this nation, smaller-unit conflict, such as nation-building, was the primary responsibility of the services. With the defeat of Spain in 1898, the military took on new tasks overseas and the United States took control over the Philippine Islands as a colony. At that point, the U.S. military became enmeshed in several activities.

Nation-building has been one of the longest-running behaviors but various administrations have used different terms to differentiate from their predecessors. Counterinsurgency was the Kennedy-era term but Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush preferred low-intensity operations. Under Bill Clinton, “mootw” was an awkward term for “military operations other than war.”

President George W. Bush, again distancing himself from a prior administration, preferred to bash “nation-building” in the 2000 presidential campaign but that certainly appeared to be the case in Afghanistan and Iraq. U.S. forces rushed to engage in humanitarian operations after the tragic December 2004 Indian Ocean *tsunami* but that was only one more burden for the U.S. forces. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld rejected insurgency questions during the Iraq conflict yet Central Command head Army General John Abizaid began using the

term “insurgency” in 2004. The Army Military History Institute rewrote the “Counterinsurgency” doctrine in 2006. The bottom line is that the activity is so diverse that it remains difficult to categorize with a single term. Yet, these are the broad requirements laid upon the U.S. military forces involved in various locations around the world.

In the twentieth century, particularly prominently after the end of the Cold War, the United States also asked its forces to provide humanitarian assistance and peace operations writ large. Some of the peace operations took the label peacekeeping while others were expected to be peacemaking or reconstruction operations.

Many articles and scholarly dissertations are written yearly on each of the theoretical aspects of nation-building, stability operations, and the associated tasks covered in this chapter. This chapter cannot adequately discuss each and every aspect of the issues, but this discussion will touch upon how the various approaches to the broad nontraditional military activities have developed over two hundred years. They often group into activities under various presidents and are presented as such to provide some chronological context where possible, but it is not correct for anyone to assume that the military’s use of the various types of nontraditional warfare is brand new to any particular time period.

Struggle and Debate in Founding this Republic: The Jurisprudence and Political Philosophy of the Founders as well on the Role of the Armed Forces

The founders, that generation of brilliant, highly capable innovators, who managed to create an entity unique in the world, had a range of views on what an armed force should do. Many founders preferred the view of many in seventeenth-century Britain where the idea of a standing military was anathema because it would lead to an overly strong central government which could repress the rights of the many in society. Those who held this perspective certainly would not agree with the idea that the military could be trusted with something as valuable as nation-building.

Others believed the standing armed forces was a crucial institution to supporting the integrity of the new nation. These individuals concurred that the military provided not only technical skills, as became apparent over the decades of the nineteenth century as the country expanded from coast to coast, but could also become an institution of professionalism that would serve the nation in the capacity it required. This belief about the military as an extension of the elected government made the use of this tool of the state for nation-building or stability operations, along with traditional warfighting, a logical extension of using the implements of the state. It was this second political philosophy that won out in the U.S. system, thus beginning the path of using the military as an extension of the national government to accomplish missions best suited to the techniques and specialties of the armed services.

One remaining, but important, controversy related to whether the military could be used for domestic law enforcement efforts. Under the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, the role of the military does not include a role in internal law enforcement. The reason this has relevance to this volume is that law enforcement is not a specialty of the armed services, except for those occasions where it is required for peace and order within the force. Because many peace operations, nation-building, or reconstruction efforts require a law enforcement function for U.S. services, this is a tricky issue requiring considerably more debate and thought than normally the case.

Nation-Building

Nation-building was far from a new activity for the U.S. forces in the post–Cold War era or even in the twentieth century: U.S. military operations have included this vital aspect of defending national security since the inception of the Republic in the late eighteenth century. President Thomas Jefferson created the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, along the banks of the Hudson River, north of New York City, at least partially as a method of guaranteeing the quality of officers for the Army but also to standardize beliefs in national goals and to produce engineers for various national activities under Army control. The Army played a crucial part in seizure of lands from native populations from coast to coast. In doing so, the Army acted as an extension of national government, hence popular, desire. The Army Corps of Engineers, a foundational portion of the U.S. Army, has always had the responsibility of helping with the physical aspects of engineering required to build the nation, from east to west, north to south. The importance and the particulars of nation-building, however, have both changed dramatically.

Self-Assessment of Our Role in the World

The United States, as true for any state, has its national self-understanding. Most people in this country grow up with the belief that the nation was exceptionally isolationist throughout its history until the attack on Pearl Harbor required the nation to ask the military to defend us. While this is oversimplifying the national mythology, it is not a major stretch from cherished ideas. Mexicans and Cubans, if not even our close Canadian allies, however, would probably remember nineteenth-century history rather differently. U.S. desire for “manifest destiny” of a nation stretching from the Atlantic coast to the Pacific coast required considerable effort in the realms of physical construction efforts (the Erie Canal was a perfect example, although done by a commercial enterprise rather than by the state).

Nation-Building in Other Forms: China and Proselytizing and Business

The philosophy that eventually won out in the United States entailed the belief that a society could be “won over” to a particular perspective or governing style.

This was accomplished through transforming the U.S. society to achieving certain norms. At times, historically, the United States has tried to accomplish nation-building through other means. In the case of China, in the period before the Communists took power in October 1949, the United States in the preceding century used techniques, tools, and strategies different from what we did in our own country and in states such as Afghanistan or Iraq.

In trying to encourage China to transform itself from a highly hierarchical dynastic society as the Qing dynasty deteriorated, the United States used two major tools to change China: business engagement and proselytizing for Christianity. This was not an explicit national goal but U.S. support for the agents of change operating in China was significant.

U.S. businessmen were involved in business in the “treaty ports” where the Chinese had agreed, through treaties imposed after the British defeated the Chinese in the Opium Wars of the 1840s, foreigners could operate. These activities frequently incurred the wrath of Chinese citizens who believed the foreign businesses were seizing their national patrimony and engendering Chinese national humiliation. At various points, U.S. military troops were deployed to protect U.S. nationals and assets held by those nationals, especially during the 1920s and 1930s when U.S. Marines patrolled the riverine areas of China to protect citizens.¹ The desire to penetrate the Chinese economy dates to the nineteenth century as much as in the twenty-first century. Opening the Chinese economy to foreign business was a classic goal of U.S. foreign policy in this period to transform the basis of the society beyond its traditional closed tendencies.

Similarly, the idea of bringing western religion to the Chinese people was a major goal of many in the nation as it is today. With a belief that either Protestant or Catholic religious orientation would bring “religion” or peace to the people of the Middle Kingdom, U.S. missionaries sought to recreate a nation built upon the religious orientation of the United States. The irony for the many supporters of this approach was that the secularism of the United States was the antithesis of the nation-building goals that were set indirectly for China.

Nation-Building After the Spanish-American War of 1898: Colonial Rule

The United States proudly remembers its history with only a single colonial experience, unlike the British contest with France for virtually the entire African continent or the carving up of the expired Ottoman Empire in the Middle East after World War I. While virtually no one in the United States describes U.S. relations with Puerto Rico as colonial, the U.S. experience with the Philippines after the Spanish-American War was one of colonial master and subject until 1946. The United States took control over the former Spanish colonies after the War ended in 1898, with Puerto Rico becoming a territory of the United States, Cuba achieving independence at the turn of the century, and the Philippines coming under colonial rule.

The Philippines represented a crucial foothold for the United States as it expanded its presence in the western Pacific. The disappointment of the Philippine people was strong, as they had anticipated that liberation from long-term ruler Spain would ensure liberation and independence. The United States, however, refused such an assertion by the Filipinos.

As a colonial power, the U.S. government guaranteed that the new property had a civil governor, William Taft, first holding the position. However, the United States had to address the inherent contradiction in its arguments that it did not conduct imperialist seizures through taking a state like the Philippines. As a result, the United States set out to help the Filipinos build their nation through gradual steps. The United States was to teach the Filipinos to develop its representational government, which occurred as an island legislature developed, and to cultivate political parties and other structures.

In the course of this evolution, the Philippine population did not entirely concur with the timeline the United States gradually developed. Instead of supporting the education that would make them into a full-fledged nation-state, a noteworthy portion of the people of the Philippines engaged in an insurgency against U.S. rule.

For the U.S. military, this particular nation-building experience was seen as completely in accord with national goals and military because it was one under colonial auspices. Nation-building, later in the century, became a far more controversial use of military resources because many believed that this endeavor sapped resources and capability that might be needed for more traditional military efforts elsewhere. The change in view of nation-building coincided directly with the disappointment and questioning resulting from the Southeast Asia experience of the 1950s through 1970s.

Nation-Building After World War II: The Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, and Eisenhower's Admonition

The end of World War II left the international community as a radically different place than it had been in 1941. The Soviet Union, as noted former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in a March 1946 speech, looked increasingly like a long-term adversary instead of a continued ally, as had been true through World War II after 1941. The United States had an unmatched status as the sole state with a strong economy, with Western Europe, China, and Japan in devastated condition. The United States, which had long been convinced of its propensity to engage almost overseas exclusively in the western hemisphere (the Philippine colonial experience from 1898 to 1946 notwithstanding), began to look toward a major move into the international community.

In 1947, three major events occurred that led the United States into its broadest nation-building activities. Foreign Service Officer George F. Kennan argued in various writings that the best response to the worrisome trends underway was to "contain" Josef Stalin's Soviet Union by forcing it to wither under the weight

of its nonfunctioning political system. The “Mr. X” article in *Foreign Affairs* magazine led to a foreign affairs strategy lasting five decades until the Soviet empire collapsed in 1989. A few weeks later, President Harry S Truman answered the challenge of British failure to respond to a growing procommunist movement in Greece and Turkey, making a speech that became known as the “Truman Doctrine.” This declaration opened the door to U.S. actions aimed to prevent any state deemed not seeking communism from assuming that form of government. Finally, in June, at Harvard University, Secretary of State and former Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall enunciated a goal of rebuilding our western European allies (even those such as West Germany and Italy who had been Axis powers who we had defeated) to prevent them from becoming pro-Soviet or allowing communist regimes to come to power in the area. The Marshall Plan, as it became known, was a massive program of unprecedented spending in an activity that the United States had never supported in the past.

The Marshall Plan required not merely military participation but also significant civilian activities. Some of the work involved the physical reconstruction of European damage to businesses and homes but it also included providing medicines, shipping food stuffs being provided by private voluntary organizations in the United States, sending transportation such as cars and trucks, and rebuilding airports and railroads. The \$13 billion plan, in 2006 costs amounting to about \$100 billion, was officially the European Recovery Program, with its years of implementation from 1948 to 1951.

As the Truman administration transitioned to that of former Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, Dwight D. Eisenhower, in 1953, U.S. concerns had spread from reconstructing Europe to preventing Soviet gains in Asia. The Korean War, from June 1950 through the armistice thirty-seven months later, illustrated the U.S. determination to prevent expansion of communism anywhere the perceived threat grew. During Eisenhower’s government, U.S. concerns about Soviet expansionism grew, including Guatemala in 1954 and in both Egypt and increasingly Southeast Asia through the 1950s.

Dwight Eisenhower decided in 1958 to use U.S. forces for peacekeeping operations in Lebanon. This country, which had long been a split society where a Muslim minority in the Middle East chafed under the Maronite Christian majority with its party called the Phalangists, was unique in this largely Muslim region. As true through much of its history, the religious divisions of the nation threatened to pull apart in 1985 the democratically elected regime that of President Camille Chamoun. President Eisenhower deployed U.S. peacekeepers, a term not used at the time, to prevent feared subversion by Syrian and Egyptian opponents resulting from Chamoun’s decision, in 1956, not to sever ties with U.S. and European states over the Suez Crisis. The fourteen thousand U.S. ground forces withdrew relatively quickly and with virtually no casualties. Eisenhower’s goal, to assist Chamoun in protecting the safety and openness of ports and the national airport, were met relatively easily and clearly. The mission, begun in July 1958, lasted for five months. As one scholar noted, “[T]his use of force by President Dwight D.

Eisenhower was widely viewed as a successful example of furthering American objectives by power projection.”²

At the same time, President Eisenhower proved a savvy analyst of other dynamics which might affect the nation in its nation-building and associated tasks. He left office in January 1961 after eight years as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive. In the days before retiring, the president gave one of the most frequently cited admonitions to the nation in the twentieth century. President Eisenhower advised against the continuation of a “military–industrial complex” which could perpetuate spending “in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific technological elite.”³ Almost fifty years later, Eisenhower’s admonition remains not far below the surface as people evaluate the interactions between the armed forces, civilian contractors, and the government policymakers. Some critics of the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan have resurrected Eisenhower’s concerns.

Kennedy’s Expansion of Tasks: The Peace Corps, USAID, and Counterinsurgency Doctrines

Under President John F. Kennedy, citizens responded to his call to make any sacrifice. Kennedy’s world was not one of reconstructing Europe after the massive effects of World War II but one of worrying about “missile gaps” and Soviet beachheads ninety miles off the coast of Florida. Kennedy’s accession to power also coincided with the arrival of several newly independent states in Africa and the continued governmental upheavals of the states that had become independent after World War II across the globe, from Congo to Laos to Argentina to Iraq.

John Kennedy’s government pursued two distinctly different yet entirely complementary, in U.S. eyes, objectives. At the University of Michigan in 1960, the president enunciated a program to use the enthusiasm and energy of U.S. youth under the Peace Corps. This youth-oriented program would send volunteers to places few U.S. citizens could place on a map, such as Colombia, Niger, or Indonesia to provide technical assistance to people trying to learn English, to develop fisheries, and to promote better environmental conditions. The theory behind Kennedy’s Corps was that these young, informal ambassadors could show the commitment the United States had to the rest of the world, to provide them the opportunities that nature might not have given them. In many ways, the Peace Corps was a new form of public relations to mirror the young president’s enthusiasm, commitment, and younger voice in a world long characterized by older, more seasoned men. This enterprise was intended to illustrate a new, fresh approach to problems and commitments around the world.

A further example of this orientation was the creation of a federal agency, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), to help systematically create balanced, functioning economies in recently independent areas or areas where the United States feared that communism might take root. USAID was engaged in what became known as the “third world,” not Europe or the Soviet

Eastern block. It accentuated agricultural development with technical assistance programs as well as public administration to make the governments in these states more efficient, less corrupt, and more open to democratic governments. This was a new use of the economic tool of statecraft, specifically the financial assistance method. The agency's goal was to help these states achieve the strengthened institutions that would address pleas from leaders around the world as well as prevent the types of subversions that led to Fidel Castro Ruz's ability to seize power in 1959.

In Latin America, the USAID experience had a particular term: the Alliance for Progress, or *Alianza Para El Progreso* in the region. The Alliance showcased answers to the charges that Fidel Castro Ruz's revolution in Cuba had raised as he took power so close to U.S. shores. Castro Ruz had ousted a long-term but shady ally of the United States, Fulgencio Batista, who had prolonged the half century of disappointment and exploitation of the Cuban people. While the original intention of Castro Ruz's ten-year movement may not have been tied to the Soviet Union, his gradual move to an overtly pro-Soviet ideology, threatening the integrity of the Monroe Doctrine and putting a Soviet ally in the western hemisphere, appeared to Washington as a direct threat against the United States. As a result, nations across the region received significant U.S. assistance to lead to reconstructing these governments in ways that would prevent Soviet appeal and to address the antigovernment insurgent movements cropping up in the region.

At the same time, the Kennedy administration used the military to engage in what became known as counterinsurgency operations as well. Also known as "counterguerrilla" operations, counterinsurgency will forever be linked with a particular part of the U.S. military: the Green Berets. The Green Berets, while created as an Army organizational unit of Special Forces troops in the final year of the Truman administration, took on their distinctive headwear under President Kennedy when he spoke at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in his first year in office.

U.S. conflicts had historically been major wars in the twentieth century, although the Philippine experience had opened the door to different types of conflict. The activities of the military during the westward expansion of the nation in the late nineteenth century were not major wars but the military simply did this activity without major debate. Once warfare changed in the era surrounding World War I, a war of major battles and known adversaries, the idea of smaller, hit-and-miss skirmishes was not the focus of military planning. World War II, with its two major theater conflict, only reinforced the view that big battles across known theaters were the likely adversaries for which the national defense should plan.

What Kennedy saw upon entering office looked quite different. The conflict that followed World War II, Kennedy's war where he served as an officer in the Navy in Pacific, was murkier, less defined, and thus less easily addressed. The Cold War never resulted directly in the United States confronting the Soviet Union, although the two came close in 1962. Instead, the Cold War was seen as a "proxy war," where assumed Soviet-led allies were acting on Moscow's behalf

as Washington hoped its allies would do similarly on its behalf. As a result, there were few, if any actions, viewed by Washington as either insignificant or independent of some larger Soviet goal. The assumption underlying the need for counterinsurgency operations was that communism was monolithic, under Moscow's exclusive control. By extension, all guerrilla movements thus became implements of Moscow's control.

Counterinsurgency operations occurred in "third world" areas, those states that were developing or trying to shake off their colonial masters. These states, the assumptions went, had to be led by Moscow instead of the nationalism that provided a reason for states seeking to assert their own futures. The superiority that U.S. military forces, even in the lower-intensity counterinsurgency operations, had over the fledgling militaries of the states of Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America was expected to defeat these states handily.

Nation-Building and Counterinsurgency Simultaneously? Vietnam and Southeast Asia

The most sustained period of U.S. nation-building and stability operations outside of creating the United States as it currently stands was in the Philippines from 1898 through 1946; the efforts in Southeast Asia between 1959 and 1975 were the second longest.

President Kennedy's increased use of U.S. "advisors" in Vietnam beginning in the early 1960s left counterinsurgency in progress when he died in November 1963. Kennedy had deployed advisors to help the Vietnamese and Laotians develop their own capabilities to defend against organized efforts to oust them. The difficulty for each state, as became clear over time, was that the legitimacy of these governments—and dozens others around the world as became clear over the following decades—was seriously questioned by their own people. In Vietnam, President Kennedy's goal of not involving U.S. regular troops proved unsuccessful when his successor, President Lyndon B. Johnson, began deploying Marines to Vietnam in March 1965. This initial deployment specifically aimed to preclude the Marines from having to engage in counterinsurgency since their mission was to protect an airbase near Da Nang. As the decade and the conflict proceeded, U.S. involvement became increasingly difficult because each of the services had its own counterinsurgency operations and the context became even harder for the average soldier to grasp.

As became clear repeatedly from Vietnam to Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States became enmeshed in fighting where the enemy and the "friendly" were harder to distinguish. Counterinsurgency assumes that the central government has a legitimacy granted by the population which seeks to have the adversaries defeated for the sake of the survival of the nation. In Vietnam, it was not at the time nor is it in retrospect obvious that those ruling in Saigon held the respect of its people required to give a government legitimacy. In Vietnam, it often appeared that the Saigon regime and its supporters from the United States were acting on their own behalf, stifling the nationalist, anti-imperialist goals of the

communists under North Vietnamese leadership. The citizens often worked to thwart the outsiders instead of supporting their efforts to liberate South Vietnam from communist aggression or to build institutions to help support the Saigon government. If the South Vietnamese citizens were ever going to support the pro-Western leadership in Saigon, they turned away from French and U.S. support as the outsiders interrupted their basic levels of survival. The rural and urban South Vietnamese gradually became every bit the enemy that Hanoi's allies were. As a result, instead of getting the Vietnamese to see the reasons for the sweeps to oust the Viet Cong embedded within the villages, the Marines and Army had to react warily to all locals.

In Southeast Asia, the U.S. forces, primarily Marines and Army, had to operate to clean out enemy forces through military means. These often required painstaking physical reconnaissance and destruction of enemy positions. Unlike many of the aspects of U.S. military doctrine which were modernizing to address the "higher tech" nuclear world, counterinsurgency and nation-building required on-the-ground, lower tech, labor-intensive activities. Both nation-building and counterinsurgency operations require an intense understanding of the contexts in which forces operate, often the opposite of the remote character of modern, high technology warfare.

The aspects of nation-building, so important to its use in Vietnam and subsequent conflicts, included getting to know the local leaders in a village, thus trying to establish a rapport and ultimately trust. This required individuals familiar with the culture, language, customs, legal mores, and other relevant specifics that apply to each and every context important to the citizens. These requirements fueled an extended and a more pervasive study of languages and comparative government institutions. Helping locals to both work through governmental problems and provide their security was a major goal but proved much more difficult than originally envisioned in the 1960s. It also proved to be completely situation-dependent rather than universally applicable. As General David Petraeus illustrated forty years later in Iraq, these street-by-street acquaintances and commitments built a trust which has proven fundamental to the success of the countering of insurgence and a basic building block of counterinsurgency operations.

The military officers who "came of age" during the Vietnam war period worked to prevent a repeat of the frustrating conditions that counterinsurgency operations created, a topic beyond the scope of this book. These officers wanted to utilize sufficient force to accomplish an overall national goal, rather than asking the military to operate "with one hand tied behind its back." The military largely dropped study of this subset of warfare in the years after Vietnam because it had been an extraordinarily painful concept that the military hoped would not be necessary again in future operations.

There were a relatively small number of U.S. forces deployed prior to the 1980s in operations around the globe that would now be called "peacekeeping," such as the Sinai after the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Accord. In that agreement, Israel agreed to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, an Egyptian possession prior to the

1967 war when Israelis seized it for more than a decade. Peacekeepers from the international community deployed in an effort to keep Israelis and Egyptians apart through a gradual process of withdrawal and adjustment to a nonmilitarized and nonconflictual border. These types of actions by U.S. peacekeepers differed from later events or from the 1958 Lebanon operation, which were often U.S.-centered and much larger in number of participants.

Reagan and “Peace Through Strength” in the 1980s: Central American Counterinsurgency and Lebanon’s Peacekeeping

One of the major issues the administration of Ronald Reagan most feared was that the Soviet Union had penetrated U.S. allies throughout Central America. The administration used counterinsurgency to try to rollback Soviet involvement in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras, although each in a different way. In Nicaragua, the *contrarevolucionarios*, or counterrevolutionaries (since the Sandinista government was Marxist–Leninist and attempted to revolutionize the Nicaraguan nation in the early 1980s), acted with significant training and support of U.S. military advisors. Ultimately, the Sandinista regime fell at the ballot box rather than because of military activities.

Further north in both El Salvador and Honduras, the United States assisted government soldiers in their efforts to root out the pro-Soviet guerrillas. The efforts led to significant upheaval in the society, as true in Vietnam, but proved the need again to end the turbulence through political negotiations rather than strictly military victory.

In both instances, the Reagan administration believed the message of their reactions was that threats would be met with strength and forceful reactions. The military operations were classic advisory, counterinsurgency, intended to stabilize a deteriorating context believed to be moving toward the United States. The emphasis was on stopping the activities of U.S. adversaries through trying to train Latin American allies to defend themselves, much as true in the Colombian case a quarter of a century later.

Additionally, the Reagan administration began using U.S. military forces in a somewhat new activity. President Dwight Eisenhower sent U.S. forces into Lebanon in 1958 to provide stability to a highly charged political crisis in the Middle Eastern state. Eisenhower’s decision provided, as noted in the preface to the Marine history to the incident “... the U.S. Marine Corps [is] carrying out American foreign policy and the pacification of a country through a successful show of force.”⁴ Unlike many recent operations, the Marines entered Lebanon in the summer of 1958, exiting a few months later.

The Reagan Era Debate

Deploying military forces in “peacekeeping” operations has not been uniformly accepted as a mission for the United States in the modern era. For example, during

President Ronald Reagan's government, the secretaries of state and defense argued internally and often rather publicly about the 1982 deployment to Lebanon.

In June 2002, Israel invaded Lebanon to oust Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) *guerrillas* from their ensconced position in Lebanon. While the Israelis had periodically gone into Lebanon over the years since the founding of the Jewish state in 1948, those operations had always ended at the Litani River from which the Israeli Defense Force would then retract. In 1982, Israel, under Defense Minister General Ariel Sharon, drove into Beirut itself. The Lebanese capital, along with the nation as a whole, had been undergoing a brutal civil war for the better part of a decade, which had allowed the PLO to operate on Lebanese territory with virtual impunity. As a result, the PLO leadership fled to Tunisia, while the Israelis hoped to solidify the government of their Phalangist, Christian allies under the government of Bechir Gemayal. The city became the target of innumerable aerial bombs, setting up a siege of several weeks. Lebanon remained, unsurprisingly, a highly fractured society with the Christian Phalangists under constant siege. Palestinians remained in the southern area, often attacking northern Israeli villages. Always sitting to the east was Syria under President Hafez al-Assad, ready to absorb anything he could get out of the land Syrians had long coveted. In the summer of 1982, Syrian troops were also deployed on Lebanon's eastern Bekaa Valley.

In the late summer of 1982, the Reagan administration underwent a tremendous debate about the utility and efficacy of sending U.S. peacekeepers to Lebanon. Secretary of State George P. Shultz firmly believed that the United States had the responsibility to show strength which deploying Marines under the U.S. flag indicated, even if in a peacemaking situation. Shultz saw this effort as a furthering of U.S. power because it projected military power.

The Defense Secretary, Caspar Weinberger, differed dramatically with Shultz. Weinberger argued forcefully that military forces, when deployed in situations anywhere around the world, should go only with adequate force to beat off any adversary. The secretary of defense did not agree with putting U.S. forces in a position where they basically were "sitting ducks" without a clear enemy, hampered by strange rules of engagement, and thoroughly vulnerable.

After a public row within the administration, President Reagan sided with Secretary Schultz, deploying eight hundred troops for a length of no more than thirty days in a multinational peacekeeping force that explicitly was not to be put in a warfighting position. They left Beirut on September 10, 1982.

Within three days, assassins killed Gemayel through a massive explosion, prior to his formal assumption of the presidency. The affiliation of the assassins remains unclear to this day. The Christians, however, blamed Palestinians for the attack. The Palestinian population living in two refugee camps, Shatilla and Sabra, became the target of Phalangist retaliation between September 16 and 18. The Israeli military, nominally in control of Beirut, either chose not to or could not stop the Phalangists from massacring Palestinians in the camps over a three-day period; many international critics charged the Israelis with setting the scene by moving

into positions over which they could control the camps, thus protecting the Phalangists. While the number of violent deaths remains undetermined, they range between a few hundred and more than thirty-five hundred.

President Reagan, merely ten days after their withdrawal, ordered U.S. military troops back into Lebanon. Secretary Weinberger still opposed the deployment, fearing that the reasoning was vague, but Secretary Shultz argued that this major power projection would lead to the Lebanese government being able to reestablish some control over its territory. By the end of September 1982, U.S. Marines numbered almost two thousand in the Beirut area. As would happen a decade later in Mogadishu, Somalia, the mission began evolving into something even less defined than the peacekeeping operation they originally entered. This instance of "mission creep" became deadly over the next twelve months.

Rather than acting as peacekeepers, the Marines increasingly became a pawn in the conflict that characterized Lebanon in the early 1980s. The United States believed that it could have a say in the negotiations between the Lebanese government of Amin Gemayel, the Israelis, the Palestinians, and the Syrians who all maneuvered in the small nation-state. Additionally, a new presence gradually became clear in Lebanon, adding to the destabilized atmosphere: Iranian-backed Hezbollah, which became an unintended consequence for both the Christian government and the Israelis to confront in southern Lebanon.

In October 1983, U.S. forces still resided at Marine Corps barracks near the airport. U.S. actions in Lebanon were not uniformly welcomed as the April bombing of the embassy indicated. The months prior to October had seen a series of incidents with various small parties in the Beirut area that appeared to indicate that the United States was there to support the Lebanese government rather than to act as impartial peacekeepers. On Sunday, October 23, a terrorist drove a truck filled with explosives into the Marine Barracks, killing 241. Recriminations abounded; Congress held hearings; the administration continued its heated debate; and the Marine Corps contingent left Lebanon almost four months to the day after the bombing.

Secretary of Defense Weinberger remained avowedly skeptical of calls for U.S. armed forces to be deployed as peacekeepers. In 1984, Weinberger offered a list of six "tests," later supported by his onetime aide and later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell, for operations for U.S. forces abroad. Known as the "Weinberger Doctrine," these questions for policymakers noted

- (1) ... The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. ...
- (2) ... If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all. ...

- (3) ... If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. . . .
- (4) ... The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed—their size, composition and disposition—must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. . . .
- (5) ... Before the U.S. commits forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. . . .
- (6) ... The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.⁵

On balance, the debate on peacekeeping was far from over.

The End of the Cold War: Unipolarity, the “Agenda for Peace,” and Peacekeeping Operations

Few people, ironically, foresaw the end of the Cold War in November 1989. While the process of dissolution of the adversary took another two years ultimately to melt away, the Soviet empire ended rather abruptly with a single state in place to succeed it: the United States. While much of the world was not entirely happy about it, the United States was entering its “unipolar” moment.

The unipolarity meant a single state had the power to address the woes and successes of the world. In what are now SSRTOs, the United States with its highly capable, developed armed forces could address humanitarian crises (such as the Kurds stranded in the mountains of northern Iraq after the end of the 1991 Gulf War against Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait or the flood damages caused by typhoons in the Bangladesh river deltas barely inches above sea level), security situations (such as seemingly perpetual turmoil in Liberia), stability operations (in places like the disintegrating Yugoslavia), and similar circumstances.

Many in the United States demurred from these responsibilities, arguing that the nation had fought the Cold War so the population of the United States deserved a “peace dividend” from the long, exhausting efforts. The challenges of the real world and the continuing rise of crises, conflicts, and unanticipated events rapidly erased this idea, illustrated by the need to send troops to the Middle East against Saddam.

The former Egyptian foreign minister turned Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, unveiled a dare to the developed world with his “Agenda for Peace” in June of 1992.⁶ Among its many facets, Boutros-Ghali argued that the developed world had a responsibility to provide peacekeeping and reconstruction forces for the benefit of the entire world. Rejecting the line of reasoning that peace operations of any type only benefited the specific state where the operations were needed, Boutros-Ghali argued that peacekeeping and peacemaking created tremendous spin-offs for the entire world.

The George H.W. Bush administration (1989–1993) and, to a lesser extent, that of Bill Clinton (1993–2001) were uncomfortable with this view. Bush I, as it is known, was an administration that believed the United States had already

carried enough of a burden for ending world conflict and should not be asked to deploy U.S. forces again. Instead, the United States should seek the work of others in carrying out the peace operations. The U.S. forces were a finely tuned machine to *fight wars*, not fight for peace through less-defined operations. The armed forces' terminology for this belief, held by those in uniform and many in the civilian national security sector, was that the U.S. military "kills people and breaks things" instead of doing nontraditional activities that others, less well-prepared for war, could do. Somalia provided a case for both sides, looking back a decade after the fact.

Humanitarian Operations in 1993: Somalia and Haiti

Somalia and Haiti spanned both the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton governments although each is usually seen as Clinton's error. The Somalia imbroglio began with the overthrow of long-time, Cold War era dictator Muhammed Siad Barre in 1991. The Marine Corps conducted an evacuation of U.S. citizens from the capital, Mogadishu, when street violence threatened those westerners in the city. Mogadishu and most of Somalia devolved into a war zone with a series of tribal warlords who cut off food supplies coincident with a famine caused partially by the use of food as a weapon in the domestic conflict. In the summer and autumn of 1992, conditions worsened and international press accounts pressured the United States, the only state with the strategic lift to provide assistance, to aid the Somali citizens desperate for food.

The Bush administration and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Colin L. Powell, tried to deflect the mounting criticism of their reluctance to intervene. The Bush administration, Republican Internationalists in their approach to the global system, preferred to intervene only where U.S. national interests were directly threatened by a defined adversary; Somalia seemed peripheral to this formula. General Powell, a veteran of the conflict in Vietnam and its devastating effect on the armed forces when the public support waned, hesitated to commit U.S. troops in any scenario where the Weinberger Doctrine was not involved. That doctrine tried to set a limit on U.S. force deployment to those that were an unassailable number of forces with clear orders and a sense of mission. At the same time the Somalia famine escalated, so did pressure on the United States to intervene in an even messier conflict in the dissolving Yugoslavia.

Both the Administration and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs eventually relented over Thanksgiving weekend in 1992 when President Bush ordered the deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia. These troops, from the immediate moment the operation was announced, were going for the purpose of creating a security level that would allow the delivery of food to starving, desperate people. President George H.W. Bush signed off on Operation *Restore Hope* in early December 1992, after his defeat in the presidential election. In conjunction with the United Nations peace forces, envisioned by Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*,

who were helping desperate people. This commitment of U.S. forces shifted the mission from United Nations Operations in Somalia I (UNISOM I) to Unified Task Force (UNITAF). The mission, to make a safe environment for humanitarian delivery of food, was relatively straightforward. It consisted of twenty-eight thousand Central Command forces in support of seventeen thousand UNITAF troops from Morocco, New Zealand, Kuwait, Zimbabwe, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Norway, Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Italy, India, and the United Arab Emirates.

With President Bill Clinton's assumption of the White House in January 1993, the mission continued. The formal title shifted from UNITAF to United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNISOM II) on March 3, 1993, although the formal constituting of the operations did not occur until later in the month. Over the summer of that year, however, conditions on the ground in Mogadishu deteriorated and twenty-four Pakistani peacekeepers, "blue helmets" in United Nations vernacular, died. The Marines and Army forces who had gone into Mogadishu as an impartial force *aimed at supporting the formal peacekeeping operation* gradually received the task of becoming more involved in catching the perpetrators of violence against the peacekeepers. This mission creep had deadly consequences.

As clearly told by Mark Bowden in *Black Hawk Down*, the U.S. force morphed into a much less clearly defined mission by late September of that year. The United States sought to pay the major Somali warlord, believed to be the perpetrator of murder of the peacekeepers, and the United Nations concurred with this goal. U.S. forces began to take on the task of catching Mohammed Farah Aideed, considered the major threat to peace in the Somali capital.

U.S. military leadership in Washington sent messages to the White House that the troops on the ground, elite as they were, in Mogadishu were inadequately armed for the urban scenario where they were operating. This concern arose simultaneously with the doubts about Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, a former Democratic Congressman from southern Wisconsin and a defense "intellectual" who was running into problems with the uniformed military over President Clinton's desire to allow gays in the armed forces.

Additionally, Clinton's personal desire to avoid military service during the Vietnam period had raised serious opposition from within the ranks of the uniformed military. The president's desire to add gays to the Services, in direct contradiction to the military's belief that this would adversely affect morale, only added fuel to a nasty fire. While the U.S. armed services proudly adhered to a nonpartisan, apolitical support for the commander-in-chief, some officers were actually vocally coming forth with public challenges to the president. After reports of an incident where a four-star general was sassed by a young White House staffer, relations between Clinton and the uniformed military were pretty low.

On October 3, 1993, Somali armed bandits wounded a Black Hawk helicopter, forcing it to the ground in a heavily populated area of a city with boiling political

activities. Eighteen Army Rangers died in the crash and one body was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu as international television captured the image. A Black Hawk crewmember was captured, again in front of the media. Cheering crowds, who had months earlier been starving but now saw the United States as the enemy to be defeated, came out for these events in the packed city. President Clinton's policy and relations with the armed forces were in shambles, the United Nations was impotent, and peacekeeping operations' critics felt vindicated.

Similarly, a week after the horrible turn of events in Mogadishu, the U.S. president sent the USS *Harlan County* to show the flag in the stalemate in Haiti. The long family dictatorship under the Duvalier clan ended with the younger "Baby Doc" falling from power in February 1986. After his fleeing to France, Haiti then began yet another spiral down into virtual chaos as various groups, largely tied to the military but without integrity or concern about its population, sought to rule the poverty-stricken island. Periodically, Haitians tried to get to southern Florida on ramshackle boats that were not only hazardous but also increased concerns on the mainland about stopping the growing number of people seeking asylum in Florida. Many died en route.

By 1993, President Clinton faced a government utterly uninterested in placing the duly-elected president of Haiti, priest Jean Bertrand Aristide, back into power. Figures criticizing the nominal government faced assassination, and Haiti appeared to descend further into lawlessness and hopelessness. The United Nations called for a technical program to aid in educating the military, police, and construction assistance, and President Clinton sent the *Harlan County* to begin the U.S. contribution to this U.N. effort. Rampaging crowds along the docks prevented the disembarkation of forces from the *Harlan County*. This relatively small event symbolized U.S. impotency and futility in the aftermath of the Somalia debacle the prior week.

The chaos in Port-au-Prince could not be ignored for long. Eventually, the United States made clear its impatience for this behavior. The final events that led to ouster of the offending rulers in Haiti did not occur until September 1994 but did lead to peacekeeping. At that time, President Clinton acquiesced to a triumvirate of former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, retired General Colin L. Powell, former President Jimmy Carter, and former Senator Sam Nunn going to Port-au-Prince to utter an ultimatum to the junta. Rather than misunderstand that what had happened the prior year would occur again, this delegation of influential former government officials sent the word to the Haitians that the Clinton administration would use force to reimpose Aristide into his elected position. After tense discussions, the Haitian leadership, with General Raoul Cedras in the lead, recognized this reality and the junta departed the island.

In the aftermath of the Powell-Carter-Nunn visit to the Caribbean Island, the Clinton government agreed to ease Aristide's transition back into power by deploying fifteen thousand U.S. ground troops to maintain peace while helping in the national reconstruction efforts to recreate a democracy-based state. These

forces, working alongside many U.N.-based troops, sought to create an environment that would allow Aristide's supporters to come forward and at the same time those who were unclear about democracy could test it. The U.S. peacekeeping/stability operations lasted until 1995 when the mission moved to an entirely United Nations base.

The Haiti operations of 1990s raised a new set of questions. While the U.S. force never encountered the resistance that occurred in Somalia at the same time or in Iraq the following decade, the questions relating to Haiti centered around whether these operations made any difference in the attempts to create a civil society in that island nation. A decade after Aristide returned to power through the goodwill of the international community seeking to uphold a democratic election, the former Haitian priest was in power as a democratically elected civilian again. As a result of charges of mismanagement and tremendous civic unrest that spread across the island, Aristide was again forced from office, in this case by the very people who had sought to return him to power in 1993/94. The overall impression, however, was that Haiti was a place that no amount of foreign intervention could make into a democratic system or even a functioning government. In the era of constrained resources that appear likely ahead, it bears asking whether the United States will want to engage in SSRTOs that do not produce clear-cut results.

Southeast Europe in the 1990s: Peace Operations

The problems that resulted from the breakup of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s led to the need for stability operations and peacekeeping in waves across the emerging entities. The government of President George H.W. Bush made clear, immediately upon the collapse of the Berlin Wall, that it was not particularly willing to engage in any changes in the status quo ante of the international community. Secretary of State, James Baker, spoke in Belgrade days before the original mobilization of Serbian elements to keep Croatia and Slovenia in the former Yugoslav federation but proved unsuccessful at convincing President Slobodan Milosevic to allow these states greater freedoms. Along with other remarks by U.S. officials in Europe at roughly the same time, the message many took was that Washington would not do anything to upset the balance of independent, sovereign states in place when the Soviet Union ended in on December 31, 1991.

Rapidly, the most developed, non-Slavic portions of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Slovenia, began taking steps to declare and achieve independence. The events in the years 1991 and 1992 were violent but not compared with the events later in the decade. With the departure of these two relatively affluent portions of the former Yugoslav Republic, the future for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and other non-Serb regions was unclear.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is a mixed religion area, with Bosnian Muslims, Serb Eastern Orthodox Christians, and enclaves of other regional minorities throughout

the small, mountainous region. In 1992, Bosnians sought to pursue the path of sovereignty but the Serb minority within the aspiring nation-state proved difficult and determined partners for Milosevic who sought to retain the remnants of the Yugoslav society under his control. Bosnia's goal of independence led to a significant number of deaths in all groups.

Particularly troubling to the international community, however, was the ethnic cleansing of various groups, but particularly Bosnian Muslim men. The Muslim community of Bosnia resulted from Ottoman Turk sovereignty over the Balkans in the middle of the last millennium. This Muslim community has never been a particularly radical one nor especially "observant" but was definitely not an Orthodox Christian group, separating it from the Serbs who felt under siege by the global community. Instances of ethnic cleansing appeared sporadically in the period of 1992–1995 but the number of instances grew dramatically in 1995, uncomfortably reminding the West of the "Final Solution" carried out against Jews by Nazi Germany.

Europe and the United States did not seek to engage yet another mission in the post–Cold War period. The Clinton administration waged a public argument about involvement in this problem, with European-born Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright advocating use of military power to deter the Serbs from perpetrating these atrocities while others, particularly in the Pentagon, preferred to remain out of this remote conflict.

The final straw was a mid-1995 incident in Srebrenica, in eastern Bosnia, where Muslim men were rounded up only to later appear in mass graves. The United States, with a range of people across the political spectrum supporting the idea, finally told the Milosevic government in Belgrade that it would not tolerate this genocide. Feeble attempts at diplomacy changed into pushing the Serbs and Bosnians to attend talks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in west central Ohio where, by December 1995, an agreement emerged whereby the international community, with a strong U.S. part, would place peacekeepers on the ground in Bosnia. This began a period of peacekeeping that continues more than a decade later but has led to virtually no deaths of U.S. peacekeepers caught in the middle and a period of relative calm and reconciliation in a place that only a generation ago appeared impossibly fragmented.

Two years after the Bosnian breakaway from Serbia, the tiny Albanian enclave of Kosovo in the southwestern Balkans sought to assert at least some autonomy within the area, if not achieve outright sovereignty. Again, Serbs under Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade opposed such moves by threatening ethnic cleansing against the Kosovars. This time, however, the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) responded more rapidly by initiating air operations against Belgrade. NATO forces launched a six-week campaign, including bombings of the Serbian capital, until the Milosevic government acquiesced to international peacekeepers protecting the Kosovars without intimidation as had occurred for so long in Bosnia. Not all of the international community or even NATO agreed with this strategy but the Clinton administration made clear its

desire to nip this problem in the bud and its European allies in the Atlantic Alliance concurred. This particular activity showed the delicate line between a peacekeeping goal and an active, traditional military response embedded within that goal.

A Mixture of Drugs and Insurgents: Plan Colombia, 1999–2006

Arguably the final pre-9/11 SSRT0 was Plan Colombia. This northwest South American nation has an unenviable history of repeated civil war to resolve conflicts. In the 1990s, the civil conflict added massive drug production and trafficking and right-wing paramilitary violence to its mix in a location a mere two hours' flight from Miami. Oddly enough, Colombia retained the designation of a "democratic" government which tugged on the heart strings of northern neighbors to help the country.

Back to the late 1980s, when President Virgilio Barco asked President George H.W. Bush for help with the narcoterrorism that killed five presidential candidates in the run up to the 1990 election, the United States sought to advise Colombians in their fight against *guerrilleros* of the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas* (FARC) and *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN) of the left as well as the proliferating drug traffickers of the right. With the end of the Soviet assistance in 1991, long funneled into Latin America by Fidel Castro, narcotrafficking became lucrative for all sectors of the Colombian conflict, only exacerbating fears in the United States of more drugs without end.

In the late 1990s after a duly elected Colombian president became the target of U.S. efforts to isolate him because of fears of drug money infiltration into his campaign, the United States and Colombia crafted "Plan Colombia" to address to social, military, political, criminal, and overall problems of the nation. This seven-year program, buttressed by significant U.S. military and financial assistance, aimed to put Colombia on a path to genuine democracy instead of the bifurcated state that existed there: an urban Colombia where life seemed relatively normal and crime consisted of street violence but life continued apace versus a rural Colombia where *guerrillas* and self-defense groups sought to wipe out each other and anyone who got in the way. Plan Colombia was estimated to cost roughly \$7 billion over a seven-year period.

In 2002, Álvaro Uribe Vélez, a former governor of Antioquia province and a victim of left-wing violence when the *guerrillas* killed his father, won the presidency, breaking the centuries long hold by the two traditional parties. He sought much more aggressively to combat the violence, although his initial statements seemed to target the left more than the paramilitary right. His strong personal relationship that developed with President George W. Bush, both aiming to wipe out terrorism, made him Washington's favorite and often sole ally in the Latin American region as relations between the United States and Latin American states deteriorated over the intervention in Iraq in 2003.

U.S. assistance to Plan Colombia amounted to almost \$5 billion between 2000 and 2006 when the plan expired. The overwhelming majority of U.S. assistance targeted reform and enhancement of the military capacity of the state. Colombians needed to make their military more professional and to enhance its ability to deploy to the remote regions of the country that were about 40 percent of the national territory that Bogotá had never controlled. U.S. advisors deployed with their Colombian allies and U.S. military sales of helicopters and other assorted technology for counterinsurgency operations were major parts of this effort. By the middle of the plan, assistance to Colombia was their third highest for any state around the world, behind Israel and Egypt.

Colombia posed problems for some in the United States, however. The human rights questions that had plagued the nation for many decades continued as repeated instances of the Colombian military turning its head to paramilitary activities arose. Some human rights groups in Colombia and around the world claimed that the paramilitaries were not self-generated groups to defend the people but had formal ties to the Colombian military itself.

Plan Colombia had portions of its funding dedicated to civil society or traditional nation-building. One of the greatest challenges for the Republic had always been the independence and integrity of the judiciary and police systems. Plan Colombia addressed these issues, and the United States provided help, but this was not the focus of the aid. Many in the region and within the United States feared that the Colombian Republic was being militarized by the overwhelming emphasis on “kinetic” approaches to the conflict.

President Uribe Vélez maintained popular support at the end of his first term to rewrite the Constitution for a second term in office. His strong personal commitment to changing Colombian society did not die but the questions about his decision to grant the paramilitaries on the right a demobilization plan led many to wonder if he was giving these vicious groups a free pass for their activities. In a personal discussion with the author, the president bristled at charges that he was going easy on the right, noting that he would put Colombia's record of justice up against anyone else's in the world.⁷ Yet, five days later, Colombia's Foreign Minister, María Consuelo Araujo, resigned because her brother, a prominent senator, was in jail for collaborating with the paramilitaries in a growing scandal that the demobilization had unveiled. Colombian politicians were cooperating and protecting the paramilitaries instead of holding them to the same account as the *guerrillas* on the left, calling into question the fidelity of Plan Colombia and the massive amount of U.S. assistance.

President Uribe Vélez has put his reform in the hands of the United States because he hopes to continue U.S. support through a free trade agreement and post-Plan Colombia support. The Bush administration, like the Clinton administration before, has put its hopes for Colombia and the region as a whole in the hands of a political system that has proven remarkably stubborn about serious, structural reform. U.S. efforts at SSRTOs run the gambit in Colombia and the jury remains out on their long-term success.

Recoiling after Clinton: The Traditionalists Rejected Nontraditional Endeavors

Presidential candidate George W. Bush strongly criticized the Clinton administration and his 2000 opponent Vice President Al Gore for engaging in nation-building efforts. Much as traditional U.S. military views opposed nation-building for being something the United States forces did not do, the then-Governor Bush argued that asking the military to engage in these missions around the world undercut their readiness to do what the United States excelled at doing: fighting traditional wars. In speeches and debates during the run up to the 2000 vote, candidate Bush repeatedly downplayed any notion that nation-building benefited the United States, relying on the idea that states around the world could do it their way. Tied to this view was the unstated assumption that nation-building and what is today called governance or state capacity were incidental issues that really did not matter much to the United States.

All of that changed one crisp, clear September morning in 2001. The pre-9/11 world looked different to the White House and much of the U.S. public and military than did the post-9/11 world. Nation-building, security operations, reconstruction efforts, stability operations, and transition efforts are now much closer to the heart of U.S. efforts overseas. These SSRTOs are coequal to traditional efforts to “break things and kill people,” as many in the armed forces refer to their traditional missions. The point of this chapter, however, is to question whether SSRTOs have not always been a major, sustained mission of the United States at home and abroad.

On August 22, 2007, President Bush appeared before the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Kansas City, discussing why the U.S. efforts must continue in Iraq while noting that the controversial Shi’ite prime minister in Baghdad, Nouri al-Malicki, deserves U.S. support in the face of growing criticism in the United States. The president hopes that al-Malicki can turn around a volatile political situation as he hopes that General David Petraeus’ September 2007 report on Iraq will show marked progress resulting from the troop “surge.” The controversy within the United States and abroad regarding the nation-building, stabilization, security, and reconstruction efforts in Iraq will continue, regardless of the Petraeus report because the nation is uncomfortable with the conditions it sees on the ground. Whether U.S. troops withdraw expeditiously or remain on the ground in high numbers for a significant portion of time does not negate the fact that SSRT Operations require a sustained, expensive commitment for an enduring period. The United States is only recognizing this in the early twenty-first century even though the lessons abound.

Notes

1. Bernard D. Cole, *Gunboats and Marines: The United States Navy in China, 1925–1928*. Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 1983, is a study on this topic.

2. John H. Kelly, "Lebanon: 1982–1984," available at www.rand.org/pubs/conference_proceedings/CF129/CF-129.chapter6.html.
3. Dwight David Eisenhower, "Military Industrial Speech," January 17, 1961.
4. Jack Shulimson, *Marines in Lebanon 1958*, Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, n.d., preface.
5. www.defenselink.mil/special/secdef_histories/bios/weinberger.html.
6. "An Agenda for Peace, Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping," June 17, 1982, available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/SC/agpeace.html>.
7. Discussion with President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, Casa Nariño, Bogotá, Colombia, February 13, 2007.

Security, Stability, Reconstruction, and Transition Operations in the New Era

President George W. Bush famously announced several times during debates leading to the 2000 presidential election the reasons he opposed the United States sending its fine military force to engage in nation-building or stability operations. President Bush's second Secretary of State and first National Security Advisor, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, outlined the candidate's views in an oft-cited article in *Foreign Affairs* early in 2000.¹ Yet, fewer than ten months after assuming the reins of power, President Bush was deploying U.S. forces for the tasks he had opposed merely a year earlier. What changed in the meantime was the perceived environment in which he was forced to operate as the commander-in-chief: the 9/11 attacks were a stark break for many in how they saw the world, the opportunities ahead, and the treats to address. In remarks soon after the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, the president enunciated a "global war on terrorism" as the focus of U.S. efforts. Soon nation-building became an instrument in the arsenal seeking to defeat the enemy at home and abroad. Had the president completely forgotten? Were his campaign comments misleading? Was the constellation of instruments available upon assuming office different than what he had anticipated?

At least in the views of the George W. Bush administration, the causes for terrorism require that nation-building and associated operations lead to a better governance around the world so that the regimes tolerating terrorists will disappear. The cataclysm of the 9/11 attacks illustrated the dangers that "ungoverned spaces" and nondemocratic governments pose to the normal states of the international system.

Prior to the attacks in 2001, most policymakers assumed that the type of government in a state was really pretty isolated to that state, with few, if any, cross-border ramifications. The post-World War II rebuilding efforts in Europe and Asia had sought to prevent the rise of communism, but that was an ideological problem rather than a governance question. It did not seem to matter which

governments were in place, although the United States preferred that states not engage in human rights abuses or other undesirable policies, but the governance issues were thought to be relatively self-contained to a nation-state.

Afghanistan, and later more famously Iraq, changed that belief. The Taliban government, sought to return to a government supportive of *Shari'a* and associated social, economic, and political beliefs. Tolerating the *Al-Qaeda* activists such as Usama Bin Laden and others was an outgrowth of the inability of the Taliban to grasp the need to participate fully in the global system as a responsible state. Activities within Afghanistan suddenly and starkly appeared to affect citizens of another country or continent thousands of miles away. Tolerating an incompetent or malignant government in Kabul seemed, as a result of technology and transportation that had gone global, could affect the world, not just the small Afghan population.

Nation-building, or reconstruction operations, or stability and security meant a great deal more than they ever had before because they were essential aspects to preventing the creation of similar malevolent regimes.

With the advent of the global war on terrorism, the Bush administration believed the United States needed to take aggressive steps to promote democracy and good governance. The variety of steps that would accomplish this was much broader than had ever been true before. One effect was that the terminology for these amorphous activities of the U.S. and its partners had moved to a more comprehensive one to try to address the range and complexity of the interoperable activities necessary to help with this issue. Simply stating nation-building is not sufficient to encapsulate the range of actions. Instead, this has evolved into a cumbersome title that may not yet fully capture the activities.

Similarly, the U.S. military, particularly the Army, wracked by terrible divisions and frustration because of the war in Southeast Asia between 1960 and 1975, believed that the requirement for sufficient force, in the vein of Reagan Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army General Colin L. Powell, would preclude the need for counterinsurgency operations. These operations are, according to the Department of Defense, "those political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency" while insurgency is the organized operation by a movement to oust an elected government.²

Yet, much of the early years of the twentieth century have concentrated military (particularly Army and Marine Corps') efforts on counterinsurgency as well as SSRTOs. The release of the new *Counterinsurgency Manual FM3*, the supervision of its writing under the leadership of the new military commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, indicated the importance of the concept of this subset of general warfare in the approach to the new international environment. The result is that the U.S. government is requiring its forces to prepare for traditional conflict, counterinsurgency operations, and stability/security/reconstruction/transition operations to virtually equal levels. These represent three distinctly different aspects of conflict operations.

The 9/11 Effects on Stability/Security/Reconstruction/Transition Operations

Virtually no one in the United States over the age of seven will probably forget where she/he was on Tuesday, September 11, 2001, when the planes hit the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field outside Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The shock of an attack on the territory of the United States led the country to reevaluate many common wisdoms. More than five years later, the country has returned to a more normal wariness about terror attacks, but the effects on the senior leadership of George W. Bush's government are clearly profound.

The president, within days of the attacks, declared a "global war on terrorism" to open the scope of responses to the range of issues and people who had allowed the attacks to transpire. Almost immediately, administration officials homed in on Usama Bin Laden as the mastermind of the plot. Usama Bin Laden, a forty-ish, shadowy Saudi-born religious zealot, had first come to considerable attention in August 1998 after bombings at U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. Bin Laden became the target after the 9/11 attacks for forces seeking to wipe out terrorism. The international intelligence community had been watching his operations in Afghanistan, northwest Pakistan, and similar places where his fuzzy *Al-Qaeda* movement had been allowed to operate unimpeded by governments or norms of western behavior. The administration of Bill Clinton tried to retaliate against the embassy bombings with air strikes in Sudan, where Bin Laden had lived with governmental protection in the 1990s, and Afghanistan, where he also received protection from a controversial regime, but neither attack got the elusive figure.

Within days, government officials drew the bewildered U.S. public's attention toward Afghanistan and its anti-Western, antimodern Taliban government. The Taliban had seized power in Kabul after a multiyear struggle with the remnants of the *mujahadeen*, which had earlier managed to oust the Soviet Union from the mountainous central Asian state. As people began piecing together the Afghan link to Bin Laden and his band of zealots that had become *Al-Qaeda*, a series of interesting facts emerged.

The Soviet Union, in the aftermath of the chaos characterizing the first year of the Iranian Revolution (beginning with the Shah's ouster in 1978 and arrival of Shi'ite Ayatollah Khomeini early the following year), had invaded Afghanistan to take control of this highly regionalized, underdeveloped state. As part of the Reagan administration's desire to rollback Soviet imperialism anywhere around the world, the United States, through the Central Intelligence Agency and its operatives, had funded the Islam-based resistance movement that fought the Red Army with an asymmetric warfare that eventually drove the Soviets out a decade after the December 1978 invasion. The *mujahadeen* were not particularly pro-Western but were definitely anti-Soviet because of their desire to keep the nation under Afghani control as well as because the Soviets were strong atheist in the face of an Islamic population in Afghanistan. With massive U.S. financial and arms assistance, the Soviets became bogged down in Afghanistan and finally chose to

withdraw in 1988, at the same time that other parts of the vaunted Soviet empire were collapsing prior to the public acknowledgment of that fact in November 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down. Those who had worked to oust the Taliban, such as Bin Laden, became heroes to some in Afghanistan. The Red Army virtually broke at the relatively small, lower-tech adversary that had received considerable assistance such as shoulder-carried missiles, and thus the *mujahadeen* was victorious in liberating Afghanistan from its communist yoke.

The United States assumed that the post-Soviet Afghanistan was a solved problem. Afghanistan, in fact, devolved back into a series of warlord areas with a limited role for any central government in the country. Warlords had distinct religious positions, often ethnic ties to states surrounding Afghanistan, such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and some ties with foreigners interested in making mischief in Central Asia, such as Iran. The various leaders of the regions allied and battled, depending on the individuals and circumstances, making Afghanistan an unpredictable place. The warlords engaged in a violent series of actions that often involved common Afghans who had little interest in the struggles but sought to survive. The result was a country with little central control and few tenets moving it forward toward the new millennium.

Out of the debris of the Soviet period also emerged a group called the Taliban, “Students of Islamic Knowledge Movement”; this group began to battle the various warlords with a promise to bring Islamic core values and religious relevance to the country. Pakistan, with its growing number of Saudi-financed *madrassas* to educate disillusioned young Islamic men, had significant supporters of the Taliban-style, fundamental regime seeking to return Afghanistan to a “purer” form of government and life.³ The Taliban blamed anti-Islamic forces for most of the problems confronting them and their society and sought to end whatever contacts those outside the pure Islamic world had with the country. They defeated the Western Alliance and other warlords to control Afghanistan, in a brutal faction, from 1996 to 2001. The Taliban also gave Usama Bin Laden freedom to come and go from Afghani soil at his will.

All of this background became relevant to the administration’s views on why Afghanistan became a launching pad for Usama Bin Laden and *Al-Qaeda*’s attacks: the lack of good governance and poor relations with the reasonable states of the international system. President George W. Bush noted, on October 7, 2001, that he had given the Taliban a series of “clear and specific demands” regarding the terrorists operating in the country. He went on

Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broader. Every nation has to make its choice. In this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers, themselves.

And they take that path at their own peril. . . .

Today, those sacrifices are being made by members of our Armed Forces who now defend us so far from home, and by their proud and worried

families... To all the men and women in our military—every sailor, every soldier, every airman, every coastguardsman, and every marine—I say this: Your mission is defined; your objectives are clear; your goal is just. You have my full confidence, and you will have every tool you need to carry out your duty.⁴

Without a doubt, the administration saw the role of what they had originally disparagingly labeled nation-building as a key to creating an international system that would prevent another regime like the Taliban, which tolerated gross abuse of human rights through terrorism. Nation-building became as vital to fighting the war on terrorism as the troops on the ground who were searching for Bin Laden.

Over the months after 9/11 and after the 2001 move into Afghanistan, the vision of nation-building in Afghanistan took on a much wider vision of moving the international system to a democracy-based globe. The president's 2002 State of the Union address received considerable attention, along with his 2002 remarks at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, which became known as the "pre-emption speech," in the administration's quest to alter the global context.⁵ At West Point, President Bush noted

As we defend the peace, we also have an historic opportunity to preserve the peace. We have our best chance since the rise of the nation state in the 17th century to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war. The history of the last century, in particular, was dominated by a series of destructive national rivalries that left battlefields and graveyards across the Earth. Germany fought France, the Axis fought the Allies, and then the East fought the West, in proxy wars and tense standoffs, against a backdrop of nuclear Armageddon.

Competition between great nations is inevitable, but armed conflict in our world is not. More and more, civilized nations find ourselves on the same side—united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos. America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge—(applause)—thereby, making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.

Today the great powers are also increasingly united by common values, instead of divided by conflicting ideologies. The United States, Japan and our Pacific friends, and now all of Europe, share a deep commitment to human freedom, embodied in strong alliances such as NATO. And the tide of liberty is rising in many other nations.

The regimes that were nondemocratic became problematic and intolerable. This became a difference between the administration and prior visions of the world and created a need to reconstruct the world along different lines than prior to September 11.

The battle for Afghanistan was considered over in late 2001 when the Taliban fled the capital city of Kabul. The forces that had ousted the Taliban were sufficient to assure most people that the conflict was over, largely because the new government in Kabul welcomed a new face from the United States to bring about the new future for his country. Hamid Karzai was a U.S.-educated figure who Washington felt represented the future of the Afghan people because he had been outside of the country where he had lobbied against the Taliban in the late 1990s. Karzai became interim president, upon returning to Afghanistan, in December 2001 but assumed formal powers upon his election by the *Loya Jirga*, a traditional Afghan tribal body, in the spring of 2002. He was reelected as president in 2004, but many critics believe his control over the nation is exceptionally limited.

Within days after the president's 2002 State of the Union address, many signs indicated the Bush administration had retargeted its concerns from Afghanistan to Iraq. The long-term Saddam Hussein dictatorship embodied the type of regime that many administration officials believed was crucial to threatening the international system and allowing both the spread of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. The Bush family had long harbored heartburn over Saddam's continuation in office after being forced from Kuwait in February and March 1991, but the Iraqi dictator had been only one of a series of irritations facing the United States during the Clinton period. President George W. Bush started his presidency with concerns about Saddam but the evidence of his containment by the international sanctions regime precluded any further action. Anecdotes about persisting concerns have appeared repeatedly in the years after the 2003 decision to invade Iraq.⁶

President George W. Bush repeatedly and aggressively argued that the threats posed by Saddam Hussein were a growing one against the United States. As the arguments continued and conflict appeared imminent, the idea that emerged was the need to create a democratic Iraq as part of democratizing the region and world. The difficulty, as has become clear over the past four years, is that the concept of nation-building was not as thoroughly understood as the administration might have believed. The administration officials took for granted that the process of democratization would occur automatically once the perpetrator of the antidemocracy disappeared. In response to a question asked of him before the Congress in late February before the March 2003 intervention, Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki had opined that "several hundred thousand" troops were needed to stabilize the situation in Baghdad and Iraq, instead of the relatively small number of just over a hundred thousand that the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and President Bush thought necessary.⁷ Secretary Rumsfeld had argued throughout his tenure that the military needed to be more agile and able to cope rapidly with problems and so the desire to send a smaller force than the conventional military thinking was not surprising. Questions, however, of whether the administration had listened carefully enough to an entire range of opinions on a post-Saddam environment have persisted. Several subsequent accounts of the decisions to go into Iraq have shown a propensity to choose best-case scenarios for many of

the various branches and sequels of events in Iraq rather than to look at the range of possible outcomes.

The preparations for war did not include sufficient planning to prevent a series of problems that started out the post-Saddam era with tremendous obstacles. The immediate aftermath of Saddam's overthrow on April 9, 2003, included looting, general upheaval, and various other forms of civil unrest for which the United States did not have sufficient troops to prevent. Simultaneously, the U.S. occupation encountered tremendous infrastructure failures including inability to produce electricity, failure of water systems, problems of sewage, and other general difficulties. Within weeks of these difficulties, President Bush declared that major combat operations had concluded, which was a logical assessment for the *phase of ousting Saddam Hussein*, but nation-building is a far more prolonged, detailed commitment with nuances that required careful attention to civilian and military interaction and cooperation to accomplish the goal. Additionally, some theorists of democracy ask whether any state can achieve democracy through outside intervention, implying—if not insisting—that the task requires changes coming entirely from within any nation-state.

Iraq's problems of nation-building, stability, security, reconstruction, and transformation do not have a zero-sum nature. Iraq's difficulties revolve around the Sunni-Shi'ite differences as well as subdivisions within those groups, Kurdish aspirations in the north, Ba'athists versus religious groups in the country, Iraqi nationalists versus foreigners, and foreign involvement from Iran, *Al-Qaeda* groups, and other interested parties in the Middle East. Trying to sort through and then prioritizing these issues within the context of creating a democratic regime has proven virtually impossible because of the pressing issues.

The Second Bush Term

The president's 2005 inaugural address beginning his second term stated forthrightly that the United States, under his vision, had no option but to push the world to accept democratic governments and the associated beliefs pursued by that form of government. His remarks indicated the depth of commitment his administration would make to changing governments around the world, even if it meant violating the sovereignty of those regimes on the ground that promoting democratic governments would ultimately enhance world security since non-democratic governments were blamed for the state of affairs leading to terrorism and dangerous behavior. President Bush mentioned the need to foster freedom and self-rule through democracy throughout his remarks, such as

We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.

America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one. From the day of our Founding, we have proclaimed that every man and woman on this earth has rights, and dignity, and matchless value, because they bear the image of the Maker of Heaven and Earth. Across the generations we have proclaimed the imperative of self-government, because no one is fit to be a master, and no one deserves to be a slave. Advancing these ideals is the mission that created our Nation. It is the honorable achievement of our fathers. Now it is the urgent requirement of our nation's security, and the calling of our time.

So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.

This is not primarily the task of arms, though we will defend ourselves and our friends by force of arms when necessary. Freedom, by its nature, must be chosen, and defended by citizens, and sustained by the rule of law and the protection of minorities. And when the soul of a nation finally speaks, the institutions that arise may reflect customs and traditions very different from our own. America will not impose our own style of government on the unwilling. Our goal instead is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way.

The great objective of ending tyranny is the concentrated work of generations. The difficulty of the task is no excuse for avoiding it. America's influence is not unlimited, but fortunately for the oppressed, America's influence is considerable, and we will use it confidently in freedom's cause.

My most solemn duty is to protect this nation and its people against further attacks and emerging threats. Some have unwisely chosen to test America's resolve, and have found it firm.

We will persistently clarify the choice before every ruler and every nation: The moral choice between oppression, which is always wrong, and freedom, which is eternally right. America will not pretend that jailed dissidents prefer their chains, or that women welcome humiliation and servitude, or that any human being aspires to live at the mercy of bullies.

We will encourage reform in other governments by making clear that success in our relations will require the decent treatment of their own people. America's belief in human dignity will guide our policies, yet rights must be more than the grudging concessions of dictators; they are secured by free dissent and the participation of the governed. In the long run, there is no justice without freedom, and there can be no human rights without human liberty.

Some, I know, have questioned the global appeal of liberty—though this time in history, four decades defined by the swiftest advance of freedom ever seen, is an odd time for doubt. Americans, of all people, should never be surprised by the power of our ideals. Eventually, the call of freedom comes to every mind and every soul. We do not accept the existence of permanent tyranny because we do not accept the possibility of permanent slavery. Liberty will come to those who love it.

Today, America speaks anew to the peoples of the world:

All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know: the United States will not ignore your oppression, or excuse your oppressors. When you stand for your liberty, we will stand with you.

Democratic reformers facing repression, prison, or exile can know: America sees you for who you are: the future leaders of your free country.

The rulers of outlaw regimes can know that we still believe as Abraham Lincoln did: "Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves; and, under the rule of a just God, cannot long retain it."⁸

The second inaugural was a shift in U.S. policy toward a further role for preemption but also indicated the strong need for security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations of all kinds in the future for the United States. Several clear examples of SSRTOs merit consideration.

Iraq

Upon entering Iraq in mid-March 2003, U.S. civilian leadership talked about the need to oust Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athist regime, with the strong belief that the Iraqi population would welcome the action. In now frequently repeated words, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz indicated his conviction that this would be a relatively easy activity which would include the average Iraqi welcoming the forces as liberators. Vice President Richard Cheney voiced similar sentiments in the few weeks leading to the invasion on March 19, 2003.

Both of these analyses focused on what were known as traditional warfighting activities. What was either ignored or not understood was what went beyond that traditional force-on-force confrontation. As noted clearly by some authors in books such as *Fiasco* by Tom Ricks, *Cobra II* by Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, or either *State of Denial* or *Plan of Attack* by Bob Woodward, the grasp of the requirements to rebuild, stabilize, or provide security in Iraq was sadly misunderstood.

One of the most obvious problems appeared in the first days *after* the ouster of the Iraqi dictator when looting took on mammoth proportions in public buildings such as the National Museum where the patrimony of seven thousand years of Iraqi history disappeared or was strewn about, as a young child leaves toys broken after use. Similarly, other government buildings proved lucrative targets for the limited computers and other goods which could have been sold on the black market or used for personal benefit. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's April 12, 2003 statement that "freedom's untied and free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things"⁹ did not give confidence that U.S. leadership grasped what they had unleashed in Iraq. Many contrasted the "untidy" nature of the streets of Baghdad with the strict control that U.S. troops exercised on access to the Ministry of Petroleum, fueling international criticism that the United States only sought to change the regime to impose a pro-U.S. petroleum government in Iraq.

More enduring was the problem of addressing the infrastructure in Iraq. With the conviction that Saddam Hussein had an ability to ignore the financial realities of the thirteen years of international sanctions in the aftermath of the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the Bush administration did not focus on the state of virtual collapse of much of the Iraqi infrastructure. Examples included the inability of the electrical power grid to provide daily, reliable supplies of power for a city of more than four million. Similarly, providing the accessible gasoline and water for the city was a much greater challenge than the planners apparently realized.

According to subsequent studies and memoirs,¹⁰ the military had to figure out how to address these problems. To an extent, confronting the looting problems of the earliest days in April 2003 was the easiest issue. But, the overall question of what has become known as “Phase IV planning” or the lack of it. The State Department had been running the “Future of Iraq Project” to consider this type of concern but the Department of Defense leadership was highly skeptical that the State Department understood the need to change Iraq as fundamentally as defense sought and so it decided to move all control over Iraq into the Pentagon’s orbit. This meant not only excluding Arabic-speaking specialists with varying degrees of experience in this highly fragmented society but also people with the reconstruction efforts characteristic of the Agency for International Development as its role as an adjunct to the Department of State was seen as a “suspect” position in the eyes of the Department of Defense.¹¹ This lack of practical experience in reconstruction efforts proved highly damaging to providing Iraqis with a necessary confidence that helps to get the nation back on its feet—either after decades of brutal dictatorship or the aftermath of the invasion itself.

In the four years since the invasion, the problems of establishing a functioning infrastructure have proven exceptionally challenging. For much of the time since March 2003, the *New York Times* has published quarterly updates on the state of various categories of infrastructure in Iraq. The Bush administration has frequently cited statistics of completed infrastructure improvements to indicate its successes in the country. Yet by most indicators, the problems of providing electricity, sanitation, water, and other basic requirements remain seriously challenged.

The most fundamental problem confronting Iraq today in reconstruction, stability, security, and transition operations remains basic security. The acceleration and proliferation in bombings, improvised explosive device placements, kidnappings, assassinations, sectarian violence, common crime, and other associated problems characterizing Iraq today indicate the profound difficulties in reconstructing a civil society. Iraq’s problems may not be entirely unique in the world (Colombia has similar difficulties with endemic violence), but the difficulties in bringing a peaceful solution to the tripartite division of the entity (into Kurdish, Shi’ite, and Sunni divisions) and the long-running historical hatreds between the sectors of society remain exceedingly far from being solved.

The challenges in seeing Iraq create its own society have been open-ended as it works toward a Western-style representative system, often envisioned to be

democracy. This highly fractured society is not rebuilding democracy, as much of the lead up to the 2003 invasion seemed to stress, but is a fundamental and absolute state in collapse. The process of trying to reconstruct all of the essentials to the society and also providing transitional political and economic assistance while raising standards of security and ensuring stability is one of, if not the, greatest single set of challenges to the stability, security, reconstruction, and transition operations of the United States in Iraq.

In January 2007, President George W. Bush decided to reinforce troop strength with five brigades' worth of fresh soldiers and Marines. The need for greater numbers of people to provide stability and security in Iraq, much less attempt to reconstruct while working for transition toward a democratic, unified country. Serious questions about whether this is an achievable or successful goal have remained in the minds of many citizens and even within the national security community itself. Even within the leadership that had supported President Bush during the first four years of the war, this escalation had its critics. Former commander of multinational ground forces in Iraq, General George Casey, Jr., noted in his nomination hearing before the Senate that he thought the size of the troop deployment supported by the president was too high, even though he had several years' evidence that the troop strength he had available when deployed in the theater between 2004 and 2006 was insufficient to curb the violence in the Iraqi capital.¹²

One of the most fundamental issues is the best approach to achieving these goals. The debate about whether Iraq in early 2007 is in the midst of a civil war, near a civil war, undergoing an insurgency, or subjected to grand terrorist aspirations is ongoing. The use of the various methods to achieve a resolution is increasingly open to debate. One of the reasons that the president supposedly chose Lieutenant General David Petraeus to head the ground forces in Iraq was the latter's use of counterinsurgency operations in portions of the country during his prior tours there since 2003.

The post-Saddam Hussein era has also evolved into a dynamic insurgency with multiple sources of conflict. Initially, the Bush administration preferred not to use the term "insurgency", arguing that the periodic violence was that of Ba'athist discontents seeking to return Saddam to power. The December 2003 capture of Saddam eliminated that line of argument, however, since it became immediately obvious that Saddam was unlikely ever to return to power. The December 2006 hanging of the former dictator again did not end the insurgency.

Instead, tensions between various groups, none of whom trusted the elections that have been held nor the governments resulting in Iraq, have escalated. The new commander for forces in 2007 Iraq, Army General David H. Petraeus, had served prior tours in the conflict but is probably best known for his overseeing of the drafting of the *Counterinsurgency Manual*, FM 3-24, issued in December 2006. Petraeus, with a doctorate in political science from Princeton, had long advocated greater hands on operations with the Iraqi population rather than relying on high tech, more remote interactions with Iraqis.

Counterinsurgency, defined by the Army's *Counterinsurgency Manual*, is "those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency."¹³ As noted in the introduction for the final draft, a counterinsurgency strategy requires "Soldiers and Marines to employ a mix of both familiar combat tasks and skills more often associated with non-military agencies, with the balance between them varying depending on the local situation."¹⁴ Yet, many question, as did candidate George W. Bush, whether the United States had a military prepared for such activities since most of the preparation has been for major combat operations along the lines of World War II. Counterinsurgency operations, a subset of the SSRTOs necessary for the changes in the society that will be absolutely essential to the reconstruction of Iraq and many other places in the world, have yet to prove that they can meet the goals that individuals seek to achieve. Technically, counterinsurgency is considered along the spectrum of conflict as different from SSRTOs when those operations are providing security and stability, but the reality is that counterinsurgency operations are another vital portion of the activities in both Iraq and Afghanistan as well as in Colombia.

Ironically, as the president decided to send an additional twenty-one thousand troops into Iraq to assist General Petraeus in subduing the insurgency, Afghanistan again appears to pose major problems on the horizon. The Taliban, dormant in the mountains along the southeast border with Waziristan in northwest Pakistan, continues asserting its ability to return to wage war against the west. The departing U.S. commander in theater, Army Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, noted in testimony before the Congress that the possibility of the Taliban pushing back against western forces in Afghanistan was clear and that more military assistance was needed.¹⁵ The following week, just after announcing that he is withdrawing a third of British forces deployed to Iraq, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced that he is deploying more troops to Afghanistan to assist the multinational NATO force there. The nature of the conflict in country, six years into the nation-building and reconstruction, leads to questions of whether nation-building efforts are succeeding outside of the Kabul area.

The Palestinian Question

The Palestinian problem is, for many people around the world, an equally important but increasingly unsettling quandary. For more than six decades, Palestinians have had no official homeland but have been shunted from place to place in the world and as a political entity. Some groups have argued for much of the period since the 9/11 attacks that the Palestinian plight, in the face of strong Israeli discomfort about a Palestinian state of legal equality to that of Israel as a sovereign entity, remains the most pressing issue in the Middle East, even to the exclusion of the Iraq conundrum.

For the international community, much of the issue in the Palestinian case relates to what can be termed reconstruction or transition efforts. The bulk of the

security and stability issues facing the Palestinian Authority, as the rump government for the West Bank and Gaza areas under its control is known, are handled by the Palestinians themselves, although periodic involvement by Israeli Defense Forces seeking to protect what they believe are legitimate Israeli interests do occur. The Palestinians have been nominally able to turn various "militia" groups into a Palestinian force to work toward security and stability.

The basic needs of the Palestinian community are not being met, however. As far back as the Palestinian *diaspora* began in the late 1940s, Palestinians have found employment a severe challenge. While as a community they historically had a relatively high level of education (the late Palestinian Yasser Arafat, for example, was an engineer by profession and training), they have found it virtually impossible to create stable, sustainable jobs in the territories under their control. Similarly, the basis to the Palestinian societies is a refugee mentality, instead of that looking to build a new society, not surprisingly.

Historically, the efforts of the type needed in the Palestine Authority have been those of the Agency for International Development. These grants, loans, technical services, partnerships with local entrepreneurs, and the like were a manner of spreading U.S. influence while not making the direct ties to some in the Palestinian community that made a number of U.S. citizens (and Israel) uncomfortable because of the Palestinian historical ties to the international terrorist communities of the 1960s and 1970s.

Today, after Arafat's death, things have become more complicated, not less, with the Hamas role in the Palestinian state. Hamas, a grassroots group from 1987 which sought to resist Israeli occupation, has never renounced some of the earliest tenets of anti-Israeli policies and as such is still considered a terrorist organization by President George W. Bush. In the months after Hamas did so well in the 2006 elections in the Palestinian areas to challenge the leadership of more pro-Western Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, the Bush administration has sought to penalize the Palestinian community to force Hamas to change or to step aside. Abbas, unable to get much traction as Head of State, was left in the quandary of having virtually no international aid to run is poverty-stricken state.

As long as Hamas maintains its strident anti-Israeli stance, the international community in the west, led by the firm opposition of the Bush administration, will keep from engaging in the activities to develop the Palestinian areas as potentially democratic or representative states. Further, the distinction between the West and the Arab world on the legitimacy of Hamas grows wider. Hamas has become a source of great pride in standing up to the Israeli state, especially relevant at a time of frustration and humiliation for Arab people who feel unable to take an equal role in the international community to that of Israel and other states.

The needs of the Palestinians are vast yet overwhelmingly unmet because of the political challenges the issue poses. They require infrastructure development, political transformation, security at all levels, and basic stability across the society. The contingency operations facing anyone attempting to build a democratic

or even minimal civic society in the Palestinian community are complex and extensive.

The Nagging Embarrassment of Darfur: Geostrategy versus the Need for Humanitarian Relief

Many people, listening to candidate George W. Bush's campaign promises before November 2000, probably believed that the end of the Bill Clinton's presidency coincided with a dramatic decrease in military and civilian deployments overseas to solve problems others faced. Many inside and outside of government in 2000 criticized the Clinton determination to send U.S. forces out to improve the world, regardless of the obvious direct effects on the homeland of the United States. During Clinton's two terms at the White House, the discussion of U.S. engagements in peace operators and providers of humanitarian relief, in varying deployments of varying lengths of time, included a long list of places: Haiti, Somalia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, the West Bank, East Timor, Western Sahara, Georgia, Côte d'Ivoire, the Golan Heights, Liberia, southern Lebanon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Jammu Kashmir, among others. Notably lacking from this group was arguably the most brutal event of the Clinton administration when the U.S. government chose to ignore the Rwandan genocide of April/May 1994. Many people wondered how far the president could push U.S. forces to do a mission that wasn't thought natural or normal for them but deemed by its critics as a waste of a highly tuned resource.

As the United States and its closest ally, Great Britain, worry about nation-building efforts ebbing and flowing in Afghanistan and Iraq, the majority of the world turns away from the abusive situation in the Darfur region of Sudan in north central Africa. In this particular conflict, poor black Africans become the target of rapes and murders by the government-sponsored militia which are Arab. The "ethnic cleansing" that the *Janjaweed*, government-tolerated militia groups empowered by the government's unwillingness to stop them, began in 2003 started because black Sudanese argued that the central government in Khartoum was deliberately ignoring their plight as drought and starvation spread across western Sudan, the region known as Darfur. The international community has taken virtually no steps to intervene in the emergency, except for African Union troops deployed in the area for a part of 2006. The estimates are that two hundred thousand Sudanese blacks have found a safe haven in neighboring Chad but across an exceptionally porous border which could be vulnerable to an expansion of the conflict across international borders.

Many people blame China for the inactivity because it has shown interest in Sudanese petroleum resources. China's traditional reluctance to intervene in the affairs of another sovereign state offers one possible alternate reason for Beijing not to push the government in Khartoum to stop abusing its black population. At the same time, China's growing interest in taking a role as a "responsible stakeholder" raises pressures on the Beijing government to abandon its traditional

nonintervention position in favor of shouldering greater commitment to help struggling states in the focus of world attention.

Others charge that Darfur exemplifies the West's obsession with protecting "whites" around the world while callously ignoring the plight of blacks as occurred in Rwanda in the 1990s.

The case merits consideration for several reasons. It exemplifies the types of unpredictable requirements for peacekeepers that may arise simultaneously with other, ongoing activities elsewhere. Darfur also indicates the brutality that increasingly confronts the international system as the inequality grows between those armed and those vulnerable. Finally, the racial issue is likely to arise again in some part of the globe. As international telecommunications accelerate knowledge of these crises around the world, pressures increase on the U.S. government to participate in the efforts to stop them. Darfur appears unlikely the last of these cases.

Indonesia and Tsunami Relief

On December 26, 2004, an earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale shook the area northwest of Aceh, the province at the westernmost tip of the Indonesian archipelago. This natural disaster set off a massive underwater tidal wave, known as a *tsunami*, which moved swiftly and relentlessly across the Indian Ocean basin from Indonesia up into the Bay of Bengal but also as far as the eastern coast of Africa. Measurements of the event actually occurred in the opposite direction across the Pacific Ocean, according to monitoring equipment along the coast of the South American state of Chile.

The *tsunami* caused massive damage in all states in its immediate path. Ultimately, the officials around the Indian Ocean acknowledged that the wave cost more than 230,000 people their lives and destroyed many areas in its wake. The number of deaths virtually doubled all day each time the press reports were heard. The number of villages wiped out by the power of the wave was high, particularly in Indonesia, Thailand, and Sri Lanka, three of the areas most immediately in the *tsunami's* path.

One of the finest moments for U.S. nation builders was the massive, immediate response for the millions living along the rim of the Indian Ocean. With the vast effects in often inaccessible parts of the region, only the United States had the military capability to respond to such a massive tragedy. Assets were moved rapidly from around the world to provide the basic assistance that would simply help many people survive, much less go along toward helping to reconstruct the devastated areas.

The most obvious units were medical units but sixteen thousand U.S. forces participated in total. While these units moved rapidly to the Indian Ocean, especially Indonesia, Thailand, and Sri Lanka which were hit exceptionally hard, there was a small portion of the U.S. military that had been deployed in other activities for national security in the Asia-Pacific and Persian Gulf regions. The *tsunami*

relief efforts were lifesaving for many people affected by the devastation and, as a subsidiary effect, improved the view of the United States in this volatile part of the world.¹⁶ Polling by the Pew Center, however, indicated that the long-term effects of this humanitarian assistance were somewhat fleeting with late 2006 results showing that skepticism about U.S. motivations in the region had returned.

Pakistan: An Al-Qaeda Base or Earthquake-Ravaged Disaster Zone?

In October 2005, a huge earthquake affected some of the most remote areas of Pakistan, a country already plagued by tremendous poverty, inequality, and strife. The death count ultimately reached seventy thousand but the number of people displaced was in the millions.¹⁷ The Pakistani government acknowledged early on that it was not able to address the humanitarian requirements this quake raised. The international community, still saddled with reconstruction efforts in the Indian Ocean region after the *tsunami* several months earlier, offered what assistance it could but the bulk of the initial rescue operations, followed by re-supply in humanitarian activities, fell to the United States and its military forces. Because of the timing of the earthquake itself, occurring in the late autumn in a high, mountainous region where winter comes early and is harsh, the need to provide basic amenities to the population, such as housing, food, medicines, and others, was immense.

As true with the Indian Ocean efforts months earlier, another benefit for the United States from its efforts to help those so desperately in need was to promote a more positive understanding of U.S. involvements around the world. At a point where most of the Islam-based community around the world views the United States with strong skepticism, if not overt hostility, U.S. assistance acts—all done without any international requirement to do so but because of the overwhelming desire to address basic human suffering—raise the view of U.S. military actions. These actions showed that the U.S. armed forces have and exercise a capability to address problems beyond using arms and “military” responses to everything.

In Pakistan, this distinction is particularly important because that nation, with its strong Islamist population, appears to hold a significant pro-*Al-Qaeda* bias, if not overt support for the anti-U.S. organization. Proving that the United States would support Pakistanis, regardless of their faith, beliefs, or actions, who have a humanitarian need indicated that the perceived bias against Islamic adherents was incorrect. The persistent efforts, which lasted for several weeks as the rescuers and reconstructors tried to beat out the winter’s arrival, proved that the United States had a long-term commitment to the most disadvantaged in Pakistan’s mountainous interior.

Missions Today

As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan prove that conflict can endure far longer than anticipated, SSRTOs remain a growing part of U.S. government activities

overseas. The late 2005 Department of Defense policy guidance on these activities recognizes this reality. While the defense community still debates whether this is the correct use of military forces, juxtaposed against traditional military conflicts such as heavy war, the civilian decision to raise SSRTOs to a core responsibility establishes a new policy priority for the present.

This decision to list SSRTOs as a core U.S. Defense activity, long already true for other parts of the U.S. Government such as Department of State and the Agency for International Development, shifts the concerns to a broader range of activities and possible scenarios as a permanent activity rather than in answering to crises. The widespread use of Commanders' Emergency Response Teams to evaluate conditions in situations where SSRTOs are ongoing is one indication of the shifting role that these activities have for Defense operations.

The possible scenarios for SSRTOs in the new era of globalism and countering terrorism are important. The possible uses for U.S. forces are listed below. The list is not exhaustive but includes only the most obvious possibilities.

Confronting Fragile States and Governance. As noted in several policy statements by senior Bush administration officials, the concerns about governance and fragile states have grown tremendously since 2001. The stark reality of weakness in Afghanistan during the post-Soviet era of the early 1990s leading to a Taliban, thus pro-*Al-Qaeda* regime, became a strong indicator to administration officials that the era of ignoring regime types was over.

The difficulties of establishing enduring governments have proven a major challenge, however. While the initial stages of President Bush's actions in Iraq included discussions of transforming the Middle East into a region full of democratic states, the problems and horrors of sectarian violence in Iraq have shown how profoundly challenging it is to both occupy and transform any society. The evidence after four years is that the Iraqi regime was extraordinarily weak, in institutional terms, and could not provide the basis to help create any subsequent robust political regime. Afghanistan has proven similarly fragile with President Hamid Karzai duly elected but highly dependent upon multinational troops providing the basic security for his regime as well as trying to kill off a resilient insurgency by the Taliban and pro-*Al-Qaeda* elements. Democracy and representative, strong governance appear distant.

Instead, the first decade of the twenty-first century has proven a warning on the obstacles to preventing and replacing fragile governments. Somalia has proven no better off than it was fifteen years earlier when the United Nations had to intervene to a sad conclusion. Liberia has also shown itself weak with an elected government in place in 2007 but with tremendous long-term challenges to institutionalize that governance. Other governments in Central Asia and the former Eastern Europe have undergone "revolutions" but have returned, more often than not, to dictatorships obviating political participation and reinforcing fragility.

SSRTOs require that the United States work toward providing significantly enhanced capabilities in these states. Governance-building, like institution-building,

must be context-specific and requires a long-term commitment to make certain that changes in any society are not merely those of an individual but those that are long-enduring and rock solid for all citizens. SSRTOs for the United States have led to calls for a cadre of specialists for these activities. While the Agency for International Development does this to an extent, the broader requirements around the world, coming up against the nation's perception of the immediacy of the problems after the Afghan government's role with *Al-Qaeda* in the 1990s and early 2000s, mean that this cadre must be nurtured and developed before it can be useful in the field.

Transformational Developmental States. The former states of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, along with many states in the former "Third World" have not all completely assumed democratic governments but continue working toward those goals at various paces. U.S. assistance, occasionally in the form of military troops but often civilian advisors, will continue to address this priority as set forth by the president of the United States in his 2005 inauguration address. The likelihood of continued involvement in these operations in locations around the world is high.

Strategic States. The United States, as far back as the Bill Clinton administration, has used the concept of "big emerging" or crucial states to identify those areas where the promotion of democracy and special attention to the states' conditions has been important. Brazil, India, and China have been cited repeatedly in this category.

Today, however, states such as Indonesia with its vast Islamic population and history of terrorism also reaches into this category. The population of more than two hundred million, most of whom are Muslims, has seen violence, deprivation, physical danger from the *tsunami*, and malgovernance over the past sixty years of independence. Trying to support the needs of the Jakarta government will remain a responsibility of various SSRTO communities in the United States to prevent a repeat of the October 2003 Bali bombings or similar ones ten months later at Western hotels in the capital.

Similarly, Colombia, with its strategic location in northwestern Latin America, has been the target of much U.S. transformational assistance over the past decade. Plagued repeatedly over its history with civil wars, Colombia became a major site, then a source, for drug trafficking into the United States over the final three decades of the twentieth century. Under "Plan Colombia" of the Andrés Bistrana Arango administration (1998–2002), President Clinton, and later President George W. Bush, agreed to provide the government in Bogotá with millions of dollars in assistance to reinforce democracy. Long a government of elected presidents rather than dictators, Colombia's problems in rural areas were violence and lack of government presence. Plan Colombia provided military assistance, for the most part, along with some aid in civil-society-building to reinforce the judiciary, police, legislature, and other nonmilitary aspects of the society. The Plan had

a seven-year duration but the government of Pastrana's successor, Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002–2010), is President George W. Bush's closest ally in Latin America. The latter has already made known his intent on providing enduring help to the Bogotá government as it seeks to make enduring changes to the country, rather than temporary victories over well-armed and financed *guerrilla* groups such as the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas* (FARC) and *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN).

Humanitarian Response. By its nature, humanitarian response is a rapid response to an unanticipated problem resulting from a natural disaster, either man-made or otherwise. The United States, with its long history of heartfelt public reactions to those affected by need around the world, will continue viewing these requirements as crucial to the U.S. role in the international community. The reactions may be responses to earthquakes, typhoons, famine, medical needs, and other unanticipated crises. The almost unique U.S. ability to provide airlift and similar transportation makes this likelihood exceptionally high as a major responsibility for the future.

Ships like the USNS *Comfort*, a mercy ship that the United States deploys on goodwill missions around the globe, are a vehicle not only to show the flag and raise U.S. visibility in foreign lands but also as a manner of helping those in need, a traditional and enduring U.S. commitment to those who are not as well-off as others.

Global Issues. As environmental concerns continue growing in international prominence, the probability of U.S. military and civilian government sector roles in responding to the problems is high. While the U.S. government has not uniformly accepted some of the responsibilities that others around the world have tried to ascribe to the United States, the military is likely to remain a crucial player in any U.S. response because of its capacity to respond. The creativity and ingenuity of U.S. military forces when confronted with a challenge makes likely their role in addressing whatever national responses the president and Congress seek to use.

The 2005 Department of Defense Statement on the Concepts. As noted, the Department of Defense issued a policy statement in late 2005 which formally elevated stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations to an equal level with traditional conflict activities around the world. This is a fundamental shift in formal responsibility of actions within the military services, raising the desirability of committing to these nonkinetic roles as professional fields within the military career path.

While no U.S. armed forces leaders or rank-and-file personnel would ever diminish any military task, "warfighting" had always been the most important and valued activities for those in uniform. The move toward raising these activities

in reconstruction, transition, or any other SSRTTO category to an equal responsibility within the Department of Defense will make this a more desirable field for concentration, thus increasing the quality and regularity of work in the area.

The Future for Stability Operations and Nation-Building? The Iraq and Afghan experiences are proving as seminal for the current generation of political and military leadership as Southeast Asia was for their parents. President Bush's early expression of hope, encapsulated by the visit to the USS *Abraham Lincoln* in early May 2003, has turned to a considerably greater expression of anxiety across the board. Stability operations and associated tasks illustrate a number of aspects that many would, in retrospect, see as enduring phenomena.

- Technology does not, in the end, appear to end conflict as neatly as thought. Without any doubt whatsoever, the United States has had utter and complete technological superiority over the Iraqi or Afghan or Liberian forces seeking to prevent the development of a nation-state along modern lines.
- What is originally accomplished relatively easily will require constant reappraisal, if not redoing. The Iraqi and Afghan experiences clearly illustrate this problem. The April 9, 2003, overturning of a Saddam Hussein statue in Baghdad was an example of how difficult long-term change is even with the superficial indications of the old regime destroyed.
- Cultures different from our own do not necessarily desire to share in U.S.-formed democracy, free markets, and individual rights-based politics.

The Afghan and Iraq experiences illustrate the need for understanding the cultural bases to other societies.

The needs of other societies require more than military power to bring about change. Instead, the instruments of statecraft offered by the civilian wings of society may be equally effective, even if they are more decentralized and apparently less "efficient" than the uniformed military. The George W. Bush administration's desire to keep nation-building, reconstruction, and stability activities under control of the Pentagon proved a singularly unsuccessful effort because much of this effort requires a patience and reinforcement that does not work as well in the military element of statecraft where progress is so crucial to the sense of mission.

More important, however, is the difficulty confronting policymakers as they ponder the role of terrorism around the world as engaging in nation-building and stability operations. The line between political disagreement manifested.

Other questions arising on the new form of nation-building in the face of terrorism include the following ones¹⁸:

- What is the role of private contractors in these operations?
- How important are these contractors to efforts in the states that often engage in nation-building, such as the United States or the United Kingdom?
- What are the reasons that these states use private groups for this aspect of nation-building?

- What other aspects need be considered before pursuing this route?
- How do the private contractors affect interagency issues in each state?
- What is the role of research in tracking these activities?

Notes

1. Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 79(1) (January/February 2000): 45–62.
2. Final, December 2006 draft of *Counterinsurgency Manual*, accessed on 18 February 2007, available at www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24fd.pdf.
3. International Crisis Group, "Pakistan: Madrassas, Extremism, and the Military," *Asia Report No. 36*, July 29, 2002.
4. President George W. Bush, "Presidential Address to the Nation," October 7, 2001, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html>.
5. The State of the Union speech, on January 29, 2002, contained the memorable term "axis of evil" to describe states that were undemocratic and presented significant problems for the United States; it can be found at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>, while the speech at West Point was delivered on June 1, 2002, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>.
6. Two of the most cited anecdotes include Paul O'Neill's portrayal of the administration in Ron Suskind, *The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O'Neill* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004) and Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terrorism* (New York: Free Press, 2004). Both describe the concerns about Iraq outweighing any other possible sources for terrorists or assumed links between Iraq and terror problems affecting the nation.
7. *Washington Post*, Outlook Section, February 25, 2007, p. 4.
8. George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address, January 20, 2005, available at <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=446072>.
9. CNN, April 12, 2003, accessed on January 20, 2007, available at <http://www.cnn.com/US/04/11/sprj.irq.pentagon/>.
10. The number of books on Iraq has proliferated in 2006 and 2007. These include the U.S. Administrator for Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope* (NY: Threshold Books, 2006); George Packer, *The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq* (New York: Strauss, Farrar Giroux, 2006); Larry Diamond, *Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq* (NY: Owl Books, 2006); and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone* (New York: Knopf, 2006), and are only a selection.
11. The author was at a single planning meeting at the Pentagon for inserting a group of academics to reconstruct the Iraqi education infrastructure in early August 2003. When she asked why the Pentagon was leading these efforts instead of the Agency for International Development, of which she was aware of long-standing efforts around the world, an uncomfortable silence followed her question.
12. Senate testimony by General George Casey, Jr., U.S.A., in nomination for Army Chief of Staff, February 2007.
13. <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-07-22.pdf>.
14. <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24fd.pdf>.

15. Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, U.S.A., Testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee on Afghanistan stability, February 13, 2007.
16. Pew Center polling results, January 2007.
17. CNN International, February 5, 2007.
18. These questions come from an online publication, Matthew Uttley, "Private Contractors on Deployed Military Operations: Opportunities and Challenges," *Heritage Lecture* 972, lecture delivered June 2006; online version published October 31, 2006.

Personalities

Abizaid, John. A Lebanese-American born in California, John Abizaid is the retired four-star officer who was responsible for U.S. forces in the Central Command with its headquarters in Tampa, Florida. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Abizaid frequently received the designation of “an Army intellectual” because of his thoughtfulness and Princeton University degrees. Abizaid represented the generation of Army leadership seeking to avoid repeating the Vietnam experience where uniformed personnel received contemptuous welcomes upon returning home. Abizaid took command of U.S. forces operating largely in the Middle East in the summer of 2004, confronting an insurgency that has only developed further in Iraq. In mid-2006, Abizaid, along with other senior military leaders, acknowledged that conditions in Iraq were highly problematic. After the 2006 mid-term elections where the Republicans lost control of the Congress, President George Bush decided to change commanders and tactics in Iraq. General Abizaid chose this opportunity to retire early from his Central Command position, leaving office in early 2007. Admiral William Fallon of the Pacific Command replaced General Abizaid at Centcom in a shift away from a land service dominance over this command.

Albright, Madeleine Korbelt. Czech-born, Madeleine Albright is the daughter of Jewish parents who raised her as a Catholic to preclude the discrimination that they had faced. Albright’s father was an international relations professor who ultimately landed at the University of Denver where he later taught another Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice. Madeleine Albright studied at Wellesley before marrying into a newspaper family. She returned to graduate school later in life, earning a doctorate at Columbia University, then earning a position at Georgetown University. Albright served in consultative positions for democratic candidates at many levels of government in the 1970s and 1980s. Upon Bill Clinton’s election in 1992, Albright went from advising to serving as ambassador to the United

Nations where she repeatedly advocated using military force to provide humanitarian assistance and to engage in peacekeeping. Albright supposedly asked then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell why the United States had such a superb military if it was not to be used. She certainly supported using the military to prevent the “appeasement” of dictators that her parents’ generation had seen in Germany in the late 1930s.

Annan, Kofi. Born to a prominent royal family in preindependence Ghana, Kofi Annan held career positions in the United Nations bureaucracy before assuming the position as Secretary General of the United Nations in 1997, making him the first person to rise from the ranks of the organization to head it. Annan studied in Minnesota where he earned an economics degree in 1961 after his initial studies in his home nation. Subsequently, he went to do graduate work at both the Institut universitaire des hautes études internationales in Geneva and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Annan began his professional work in the World Health Organization, followed by the Economic Commission for Africa, the United Nations Emergency Force, and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. After rising to the position of Controller, Annan became involved in the United Nations roles in peacekeeping and repatriation of individuals after the Iraq War of 1991. He was Under Secretary General in the 1990s as the body became much more heavily involved in peacekeeping operations and other stabilization activities. Annan’s assumption of the secretary general position coincided with the expansion of U.S. concerns about ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Additionally, political forces within the United States believed the international organization had been deficient in its management requirements, meshing with the publication of his reform agenda “Renewing the United Nations.” Annan’s role as Secretary General was most important during the lead up to the invasion of Iraq because he made clear his concerns that the weapons of mass destruction charges made by the United States were overstated. Annan supported the U.N. role in post-Saddam Iraq for the first few months until the August 2003 bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad. The attack resulted in the assassination of Annan’s personal envoy, Brazilian diplomat Sérgio Vieira de Mello, and the serious mutilation of other United Nations employees. Annan withdrew the U.N. unit after the bombing. He continued to clash with U.S. government officials who saw a different role for U.N. peacekeeping forces than the United States envisioned and supported. Annan preferred using international organizations to address issues for which the United States found military solutions more immediate. Annan’s reputation underwent attack when his son Kojo’s involvement in the Iraq oil-for-food program became the source of international scrutiny. Annan ended his term as Secretary General of the United Nations when Ban Ki-moon from South Korea replaced him in January 2007.

Baker, James A., III. A Houston lawyer who had been Secretary of State under President George H.W. Bush, James Baker returned to government service by

cochairing the Congressionally mandated Iraq Study Group. Originally a Democrat who became George Bush the Elder's campaign manager in his unsuccessful quest for Senatorship from Texas in 1970, Baker became a fixture with the Bush family. After that period he also served in the Ronald Reagan administration in the 1980s when he served as Chief of Staff and Treasury Secretary. Baker served in President Bush's government between 1989 and 1992 but did not successfully get the President reelected in 1992. Baker considered a presidential run himself in the 1990s but returned to the private sector instead. He orchestrated the successful actions by Texas Governor and presidential candidate George W. Bush to defend his election victory in Florida in the face of legal challenges to the vote. In the aftermath of deteriorating conditions in the U.S. occupation of Iraq after 2003, President Bush the Younger turned to Baker as an "elder statesman" of the party to get help with foreign affairs. Not only did Baker take on the role of cochairing the Iraq Study Group but he also acted as an important intermediary with regard to other Middle Eastern states. President George W. Bush resoundingly rejected the advice of the Iraq Study Group when he announced on January 10, 2007, his intention to send twenty-one thousand more U.S. troops to Iraq in an effort to work toward a victory in the conflict.

Blair, Anthony "Tony." The longest serving Prime Minister of Great Britain, Tony Blair resurrected the Labour Party's fortunes after two generations of a deteriorating position in British politics. Known as heading "New Labour," Blair was an Oxford-educated barrister who entered the House of Parliament at the lowest point for the Labour party in the 1980s. He assumed the position of the Head of the Party in 1994 upon the death of the Scottish politician John Smith. Blair was exceptionally media-savvy, often compared with U.S. President Bill Clinton as members of a younger generation in their respective countries. While Clinton and Blair were close ideologically, Blair's relationship with President George W. Bush was much more significant. Although political opposites, Blair and Bush shared a profound belief in the role of faith in their lives. Blair, moved by the plight of the United States after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, supported Bush's decision to send forces into Afghanistan in pursuit of Usama Bin Laden as the mastermind of the attacks. In the months after the Afghan campaign began in October 2001, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair began to coordinate their positions on the need to oust Saddam Hussein from Iraq because of the dangers he posed to the Middle East. While Blair did not have the personal tie that Bush had to the issue because of the latter's father's position as President in the 1991 war over Kuwait, he agreed with the U.S. public concerns about the potential for Hussein to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The British public turned overwhelmingly against British involvement in the coalition seeking to overthrow Saddam before the invasion in March 2003, but Blair persisted in his support for the policy. In the 2005 by-elections, Blair's historic majority within the House of Commons diminished significantly although Labour retained a majority and Blair acknowledged that he would not stand for reelection as prime minister in the

next general election. Questions were common about whether the British Prime Minister had been led astray by the U.S. President, accelerated by the suicide of a prominent British public official who had been involved in the intelligence reporting on Saddam Hussein's capabilities prior to the war and a public inquiry as to whether the Prime Minister had misused intelligence, a charge against which he was exonerated. Blair was under significant pressure since the 2005 Labour victory to end his tenure as Prime Minister but acknowledged his intention to retire from his post by the autumn of 2007. Blair left the position of prime minister in late June 2007 before taking on a position as an international envoy to the Middle East.

Bremer, L. Paul "Jerry," III. A retired diplomat who returned to government service to run the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in post-Saddam Iraq, L. Paul "Jerry" Bremer has been the target of much debate with regard to his approach to nation-building and stability operations in theater. Bremer served in the Foreign Service for three decades, including a stint with former National Security Advisor and Secretary of States Henry Kissinger. Before concluding his service under George H.W. Bush's government in the late 1980s as a counterterrorism specialist, Bremer served as U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands. Bremer was serving in the private sector when President George W. Bush chose the former ambassador to replace retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner in heading the reconstruction efforts for Iraq. Garner had only been in country for a month when Bush decided that the efforts to end the anticipated rapid reconstruction efforts were not going well. Bremer immediately took a "hands-on" approach to make the decisions that would best allow Iraq to get past its Ba'athist past. Some analyses of Bremer's performance accuse him of micromanaging events, which led to frustration on the part of Iraqis. Most controversial of Bremer's activities were his decisions to "de-Ba'athify" the Iraqi military. Critics believe this single decision, intended to take the most fearful element of Iraqi society out of a position of control in the future, left too many unemployed former military men who turned to local militia and associated violence because they had no method of earning a living but had plenty of free time on their hands. During Bremer's thirteen months running the CPA, he suffered significant frustration at how slowly the physical reconstruction efforts proceeded. Analyses of Bremer's tenure in Baghdad frequently comment on the high concentration of young political supporters of President Bush who worked with the CPA, possibly to the exclusion of some of the best, most practical thinkers on the reconstruction side of things. Bremer's own memoir acknowledges the desirability of a higher number of U.S. troops in the country during this period but Bremer operated as a team player who did not question what he received.

Bush, George Herbert Walker. Born into a prominent political dynasty, George H.W. Bush is only the second man in the nation to see his fellow citizens elect both him and his son Presidents of the United States. George H.W. Bush grew

up with his father, who was a Republican Senator from Connecticut, and married Barbara Pierce, whose ancestor Franklin Pierce was the president of the United States in the nineteenth century. Bush served in the Naval Aviation Corps during World War II where he became one of the youngest heroes in the conflict. He returned to finish his education at Yale before moving to West Texas where he engaged in petroleum exploration at a time when this part of the country was still open to energy expansion. In the mid-1960s, Bush ran for the House of Representatives from a district in Houston. He served two terms before running unsuccessfully for Senate from Texas. Bush lost the election but moved into a series of highly prominent Republican political appointments (Republican Party Chairman, Central Intelligence Agency Director, U.S. envoy to the People's Republic of China) which ultimately put him in the position to run for Presidency in 1980. Bush lost that struggle with the ultimate victor, Ronald Reagan, but won Reagan's trust as his vice-presidential nominee. The two won back-to-back national elections in the 1980s. With his multiple positions in foreign affairs, Bush had a role as Reagan's foreign policy Vice President. In 1988, Bush ran on his own as President, winning handily over Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis. Bush governed during the period of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the first Gulf War to oust Saddam Hussein from occupied Kuwait, and as the international community in a non-Cold War environment increasingly turned to peacekeeping and stability operations to bring about peace. While wildly popular immediately after forcing Saddam out of Kuwait in late February 1991, he lost reelection campaign the following year in a struggle with Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton. Within a month of losing the vote, Bush chose to introduce U.S. humanitarian assistance to Somalia, an east African state in collapse during a drought. Since the mission went against the approach preferred by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Colin L. Powell, Bush's decision was not without controversy but it was consistent with a traditional U.S. sense of the obligation to provide humanitarian aid to those in need around the world. Upon leaving office in January 1993, Bush kept relatively to the sidelines until his eldest son assumed the presidency in January eight years later. In the lead up to the younger Bush's inauguration, the elder Bush worked mightily for his son's election. During the second George W. Bush term, the president called upon his father and former President Bill Clinton to work in a bipartisan manner for humanitarian options around the world, ranging from raising money for *tsunami* relief in the Indian Ocean after the devastating natural disaster of December 26, 2004, to the relief operations in Louisiana after the devastating hurricane of 2005.

Bush, George Walker. The eldest son of former President George H.W. Bush, George Walker Bush is only the second man to share the distinction with his father of being elected President of the United States. Born in Connecticut but tied to the culture and people of Texas where he grew up, the younger Bush attended Yale like his father but did not serve in the Vietnam War, instead serving a controversial enlistment in the Texas Air National Guard. Walker Bush returned to

pursue a Master's in Business Administration at Harvard before returning to Texas where he married Laura and engaged in petroleum companies as his father did. In the 1980s, prior to his father's inauguration, Walker Bush succeeded in pursuing one of his greatest passions, being a partner in the Texas Rangers baseball team. After his father's defeat for reelection in 1992, Walker Bush defeated incumbent Ann Richards for Governor of Texas in 1993. The Texas Governor then chose to run in a large field as he sought the presidency in 2000. The academic who became his initial National Security Advisor, Stanford University Provost, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, heralded the Texan's strong opposition to U.S. military forces being deployed in "peacekeeping," "stability operations," or broadly speaking "nation-building" environments on the grounds that these deployments depleted U.S. forces of their overwhelming skills as warfighters. During subsequent months as he ran for office, the Texas Governor repeated his concerns that the activities where the Clinton administration committed U.S. forces in the 1990s were hurting national prestige, readiness of forces, and other conditions which he intended to reverse upon taking office. In what was the closest popular vote percentage in U.S. history, the George W. Bush–Richard Cheney ticket defeated Vice President Al Gore and Senator Joseph Lieberman after six weeks of dispute. Upon taking the oath of office, President George W. Bush adhered to his honed position that nation-building was not a desirable action for U.S. forces until the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. At that juncture, the president reversed his views to support the nation-building that had long been missing from the U.S. approach to Afghanistan. Less than a month after the attacks, the president ordered U.S. forces to put "boots on the ground in Afghanistan" in hopes of finding Usama Bin Laden, held the instigator of the attacks. Soon the mission evolved into one of ousting the Taliban, the Islamist government in Kabul, which was assumed to have given safe haven to Bin Laden and others seeking to punish the United States. Bin Laden, six years later, remains at large but President Bush's opposition to nation-building crumbled further when he decided to oust Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, then embraced the goal of rebuilding Iraq in the image of a western democratic, pluralist society. The administration's main justification for sending in U.S. troops was that the Iraqi probably had a weapons of mass destruction capability (in process or developed) that would threaten the neighborhood and U.S. citizens. The reasoning also evolved into concerns about the conditions under which Iraqi citizens lived by the time the troops actually entered Iraq in mid-March 2003. In the months since that fateful invasion, President Bush's decision making on the nation-building aspects in Iraq has been almost constantly under siege by his supporters and critics alike who believe the administration took too light a view of the postinvasion contingencies. The conditions on the ground in Iraq have proven far different from the assumptions upon which the planning for what would occur were based. The troop strength has been constantly challenged as too low to address the requirements for an occupation force needed to conduct the reconstruction efforts vital to a post-Saddam Iraq which could sustain a democratic condition. President Bush has argued, at

times, that nation-building efforts were as much Iraqi responsibility as that of the United States while at other times he has embraced a view which seems to mirror the phrase then Secretary of State Colin L. Powell supposedly used with the commander-in-chief prior to the operation: "If you break it, you keep it." As his administration looks at its final months in office, the number of instances where U.S. forces—uniform and civilian—are operating in reconstruction, stability, peacekeeping, and nation-building operations are as high as during the Clinton administration but the expenditures into the foreseeable future are much higher than they were in the past. In the aftermath of the Republican majority losing its edge in the 2006 midterm Congressional elections, President Bush announced his intention of revisiting his policy in Iraq. He began a two-month reappraisal of the policy and the decision makers in an effort to prove to the citizenry that he heard their disquiet with the war's path to that point. By January 2007, however, the President's determination to keep a similar path of achieving an overwhelming victory was clear. He replaced Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld with former Central Intelligence Director Robert Gates, a loyalist of his father's circle of advisors, but rejected the advice of the Iraq Study Group. On January 10, 2007, he announced that he would send an additional twenty-one thousand troops (five brigades' worth troops) into Baghdad in an effort to stabilize the sectarian violence. President Bush also noted he would replace the Army commander, George Casey, with Lieutenant General David Petraeus, a known counterinsurgency advocate and supporter of the troop increase. Casey would move to the Chief of the Staff of the Army. A Naval aviator and Pacific Command head Admiral William "Fox" Fallon became Bush's replacement for General John Abizaid who had voiced concern about the continued approach. Over the summer of 2007, President Bush increasingly argued that the "surge" was improving the situation on the ground in Iraq as he anticipated General Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker's reports in September would indicate.

Casey, George, Jr. The on-the-ground Commander of Combined Forces in Baghdad in the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, George Casey is a General in the Army. Casey's father, also an Army General officer, died in Vietnam when young Casey was an undergraduate student at Georgetown University. The younger Casey had a distinguished career in the Army, including major stints on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, before assuming the position of Major Officer in theater during the Iraq conflict. Casey took on the position as the Abu Ghraib scandal persisted in raising doubts about U.S. commitments to democratic principles. During Casey's tenure in Baghdad, the sectarian violence of Iraq escalated regardless of U.S. beliefs that its troops were bringing better conditions to Iraq, which were bound to bring democracy to the nation. Instead, the persistent concerns about reconstruction efforts, coupled with doubts about impartiality in which Islamic sect's leaders would rule the post-Saddam Iraq, made Casey's tenure as commander a most trying one. In January 2007, the Commander-in-Chief named Casey the Chief of Staff of the Army.

Chayes, Sarah. The daughter of a pair of prominent Cambridge, Massachusetts, scholars and activists, Sarah Chayes was a National Public Radio correspondent who became an activist in nation-building efforts in Afghanistan. A graduate of Harvard and a Peace Corps volunteer in Morocco, Chayes earned a master's degree in Middle East Studies at Harvard. She worked for National Public Radio through much of the late 1990s, covering Bosnia war crimes, international tribunal developments, and other predominantly European issues. In the early part of the following decade, Chayes followed the war to Kabul and other far-flung regions of Afghanistan. She soon left radio reporting to participate in an Afghan organization, Afghans for a Civil Society, and several other hands-on programs to help the reconstruction and nation-building efforts crucial to this isolated society. Chayes offered analyses to the questions that too few could address on Afghanistan because she took the unusual step of living in the society among those she sought to help, wearing traditional garb and living off the local economy as a member, not a visitor. Chayes wrote a volume in 2006, *The Pursuit of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan after the Taliban*, outlining why the transition steps in this country have left little impact on traditional Afghan society.

Cheney, Richard B. One of the most enduring figures in the United States over the past thirty-five years, Richard Cheney has been crucial to the role of nation-building, stability operations, and reconstruction efforts in the United States as Vice President during both terms of George W. Bush's presidency. Born in Nebraska but raised in the openness of Wyoming, Dick Cheney studied at Yale but left due to poor grades. He restarted his academic work at the University of Wyoming, where he married his high school sweetheart, Lynne, before he moved on to graduate work at the University of Wisconsin in political science. Cheney received draft deferments because he had two daughters but was still interested in participating in the political process of 1960s Washington. Cheney arrived in the capital under an American Political Science Association fellowship program, which ultimately led him to serving as an intern to former Illinois Republican Congressman Donald Rumsfeld. The latter had left Congress to run the Equal Opportunity Commission in the new administration of Richard Nixon. Cheney and Rumsfeld worked well together so the former never completed his graduate studies but became a capital fixture over the next four decades. In the 1970s, Cheney served in the White House, as Rumsfeld was President Gerald R. Ford's Chief of Staff. When Rumsfeld moved to become the youngest Secretary of Defense in history, Cheney replaced him as Chief of Staff. When Ford lost his reelection bid to former Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter in 1976, Cheney returned to Wyoming where he ran for the state's single seat in the House of Representatives as a Republican. Cheney held that seat, rising through the minority ranks to become one of the most respected Republicans in the House, sitting on the bipartisan Iran-Contra review committee to determine how the Reagan government got involved in that scandal. After George H.W. Bush's assumption of the presidency in 1989, his first nominee for Secretary of Defense, former Texas Senator John Tower,

failed to gain confirmation. Bush nominated Cheney for the position where he easily earned confirmation. Cheney was Secretary of Defense during the fall of 1989, as the Soviet Empire collapsed, and then in August 2000 when Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator who the United States had tacitly supported during the Iran–Iraq War between 1980 and 1988, occupied Kuwait. Cheney immediately went into action, convincing the Saudis of President Bush’s determination to defend the status quo ante in the Middle East through ousting Saddam from Kuwait. Cheney worked with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Colin Powell, Central Command head Army General Norman Schwarzkopf, Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, and National Security Advisor retired Air Force Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft in carrying out Bush’s coalition approach to addressing this crisis in the Middle East. After Bush’s unsuccessful attempt to retain his seat in 1992, Cheney left government to run the Halliburton Corporation, a Dallas-based group. Cheney considered a run for the presidency himself but, having suffered four heart attacks, decided not to pursue the nomination. In 2000, candidate George W. Bush asked Cheney to chair a committee to help the Texas Governor find the best person to run as his vice presidential partner; Cheney became that individual. Upon their election finally becoming settled in December, Cheney’s possible role in the new administration became more apparent as his former boss Donald Rumsfeld became the Secretary of Defense appointee. Cheney, a much more experienced Washington hand than the new president, assumed a serious role in the new administration instead of the token job that most of his predecessors had. His position, as a constitutionally mandated individual in the chain of succession, became even more important on September 11, 2001, when the President was on a trip to Florida. Cheney, among others, urged the president to remain outside of the capital until the situation clarified itself, adding to the reasons for the roundabout path the president took in returning home. Cheney supported a strong response to the attacks, and immediately questioned whether the *Al-Qaeda* attacks were also tied to long-term U.S. nemesis Saddam Hussein in Iraq. While no evidence for such links have ever appeared, many analysts argued that Cheney continued this assertion long after the 9/11 Commission and others disputed the fact. Cheney became a public voice for the administration’s urgent need to oust Saddam, providing a range of reasons for this required action. Cheney gave some of the most passionate public remarks as to why the invasion of Iraq and ouster of Saddam would make the United States a safer place in the face of the global war on terrorism. The week before the invasion began, Cheney opined that the invasion would engender great appreciation on the part of Iraqis, even though some specialists on the region doubted this assertion. Cheney has remained a trusted advisor to the president and has rarely voiced any doubts whatsoever about the strategy chosen on Iraq and Afghanistan, even though public confidence in the strategy has dropped precipitously. Cheney remains confident of the need of strong action, even if it would have had to be unilateral, arguing that the nation faced a dire threat in the form of Saddam Hussein and his probable nuclear weapons program.

Chiarelli, Peter. As Multinational Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli has had the job of trying to bring reconstruction to reality in Iraq, returning for his second tour in the theater in early 2006. Chiarelli grew up in the Seattle area before taking on an Army career. Known as an intellectual within Army circles, Chiarelli is a serious individual who prefers operating in a hands-on manner rather than exclusively through his subordinate commanders. A 1993 graduate of the National War College, Chiarelli was a chief aide to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Commander, Army General Wesley K. Clark, during the latter's tenure there. Chiarelli first served in Operation *Iraqi Freedom* as the Army's First Division commander, leading them to the Middle East from Fort Hood, Texas. He returned, as head of the Multinational Force in Baghdad, arguing strongly that the key to Iraq was to improve the standard of living and overall conditions on the ground in Iraq.

Clark, Wesley Kanne. Former Army four-star general Wesley Clark had to engage in nation-building as Supreme Allied Commander of the NATO forces in Kosovo in the late 1990s. Clark was born to a Chicago couple but his father died young so his mother returned to her native Arkansas where he grew up. Like another Arkansas child, Bill Clinton, Wesley Clark excelled academically before moving east to attend a high-prestige university—the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York—before winning a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford University in Britain. Clark entered the Army at the end of the exquisitely painful Vietnam era from which his generation of officers vowed to refuse to make similar mistakes in the future. Clark served on the Joint Staff, a frequent path to four-star rank, before becoming Combatant Commander at Southern Command, then moving to Brussels to serve as Supreme Allied Commander Europe as he ran NATO. Heavily involved in the direct planning for airstrikes and other activities under his charge, Clark headed NATO when that body chose to try deterring Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic from ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in the late 1990s. Clark's role as trying to bring peace to a warring region of the deteriorating former Yugoslavia may have been classic to the type of interventions into which U.S. forces are inserted in the foreseeable future. Clark's personal involvement became controversial as civilian leaders in member countries chose to take military actions with which Clark disagreed. President Clinton removed him, *de facto*, from his position by not renominating him for a second term. Clark returned home with much personal prestige but as a symbol of the ever-tense civil–military relationship in the Clinton government. In the lead up to the 2004 presidential election, Clark made a run on the democratic side of the aisle. Never having run for elective office, Clark represented a fresh face, one that had clearly run something as opposed to being only a member of the political class in the nation. Clark also was a novelty as a genuine warfighter in the Democratic Party. John Kerry of Massachusetts ultimately won the nomination but Clark has made known his potential interest in subsequent campaign opportunities.

Clinton, William “Bill” Jefferson. Elected in 1992 as the first post–World War II-born president, Bill Clinton served two controversial terms at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Born to a widowed nurse in a poor section of Arkansas, Clinton rose to study at Georgetown University and Yale Law School, also winning the Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford University. Returning to Arkansas, Clinton first taught law, then ran successfully for Attorney General of his home state. In 1978, he won election as the nation’s youngest governor but lost after one term. Re-elected in 1982, Clinton served five more terms before unseating President George H.W. Bush a decade later. Roughly simultaneously with Clinton’s election, the United Nations unveiled the “Agenda for Peace,” under Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a program highlighting considerably greater attention to nation building and peace operations on the part of the international community. Upon assuming office, Clinton confronted a situation of U.S. forces providing humanitarian assistance in war-torn Somalia and a deteriorating situation in the former Yugoslavia. Because of his personal experience that did not include national service and included trying to avoid such a requirement during the controversial war in Southeast Asia, Clinton had exceptionally strained relations with the U.S. military. Clinton’s activist, United Nations Ambassador-turned-Secretary of State, Dr. Madeleine K. Albright, pushed repeatedly for the use of military force to end ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia and to stop fleeing refugees and generalized chaos in Haiti. In Somalia, Clinton’s decision to try using U.S. forces to capture a warlord in Mogadishu cost the lives of several Army officers when their helicopter went down at the hands of mobs on the street. In the second administration, he sent U.S. forces into the Kosovo area to stop further ethnic cleansing. Many in the services seriously objected to this use of force, arguing that it contributed to the deterioration in capabilities. Clinton did not use U.S. forces to protect the Rwandans subjected to genocide in April 1994 when internal violence resulted in the death of more than a million citizens. After leaving office, Clinton, largely through his Clinton Foundation, engaged in many charitable actions such as anti-AIDS work, *tsunami* relief in 2004, and simply raising attention to global poverty.

Crocker, Ryan. A career Foreign Service officer who served as the Ambassador to Pakistan after November 2004, Crocker was instrumental in crafting the CPA support within the Iraqi elite after the 2003 invasion. A native of Washington State, Crocker joined the Foreign Service after showing much linguistic aptitude in Arabic and Farsi, putting him in line to serve multiple tours in the region. He was serving in Lebanon during the 1983 attacks on the U.S. Embassy, and Marine Corps Barracks at Beirut International Airport. Crocker served as Ambassador to Kuwait, Syria, and Lebanon prior to his involvement in helping Iraqis create a better governance system in the aftermath of the Saddam Hussein regime. Crocker was also part of the State Department study groups, which created an alternate assessment from that of the Defense Department regarding the likely conditions confronting Iraq after Saddam fell from power. Crocker served on the faculty

of the National War College in 2003/4, where he was named International Affairs Advisor to the Commandant of the College. In 2004, President Bush named Crocker a Career Ambassador, the highest rank for anyone in the Foreign Service. Crocker left the War College to assume the ambassadorship to Pakistan as the United States had increasing frustration with President Pervaz Musharraf. In 2007, Crocker replaced Zalmay Khalilzad as envoy to Baghdad where he is one of the most seasoned U.S. government officials in the country.

Dobbins, James. A former Foreign Service officer who excelled at nation-building efforts around the world as he carried out national security interests, Ambassador James Dobbins is one of the more frequently cited analysts on nation-building efforts by the United States over the past sixty years, back to World War II. Dobbins served in various posts around the world as a Foreign Service Officer. He was also the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs in the last years of the Clinton administration. President George W. Bush sent Dobbins to be special envoy to Kabul, Afghanistan, as the United States transitioned its efforts from warfighting to a much greater nation-building consideration in late 2001. Dobbins' experience in this effort was one of some frustration as the nation-building efforts went slowly. Upon concluding that effort, Dobbins returned to the civilian sector as an analyst at the RAND Corporation. He was the primary author of an important RAND study on nation-building in 2003. Dobbins' conclusions were that nation-building challenges are enduring, substantial, and expensive.

Eikenberry, Karl. An Army Foreign Area Officer who speaks Mandarin, Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry has the challenge of trying to bring nation-building success to the highly complex situation in Afghanistan as the Commander of Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan. Eikenberry graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at the end of the conflict in Vietnam. Eikenberry studied at Harvard in Asian Studies, Stanford in Political Science, and the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard as a National Security Fellow. Additionally, he earned a translator's certificate in Mandarin from the British Ministry of Defense Mandarin School and from Nanjing University in language. Serving in a number of traditional Army jobs, Eikenberry became a Foreign Area Officer in China studies. He served in the Embassy in Beijing as Defense Attaché in the late 1990s as well as on the China desk of the Office of Secretary of Defense, an important policymaking position. As happens infrequently to Foreign Area Officers in the Army, Eikenberry earned three star rank after serving with the Pacific Command Director of Strategic Planning after he was on the ground in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2003 as Head of the office charged with building the Afghan military through U.S. assistance. Eikenberry's return to the Central Asian state as the Head of U.S. forces there coincided with the undesired return of the Taliban forces to challenge U.S. and NATO forces in charge of reconstructing and defending Afghanistan. In early 2007, Eikenberry acknowledged that Taliban activities had accelerated again. He moved from Afghanistan to a position in the NATO hierarchy in that year.

England, Lynndie. An enlisted Army soldier who became the U.S. face of the prisoner abuse scandal at the Abu Ghraib prison of Baghdad, Lynndie England went to jail for her court martial as an Army soldier. Raised in West Virginia, England joined the Army Reserve in 2000 as a Private. She went to Iraq after the March 2003 invasion to overthrow Saddam Hussein in her Reservist capacity attached to the Military Police. As the control over growing numbers of prisoners expanded, England and others took steps to humiliate Iraqi men. England and other enlisted personnel charged with the crimes of violating orders on their behavior at Abu Ghraib, even though the enlisted personnel claimed that they were following orders from superiors interested in humiliating the Iraqis with the intention of making the prisoners more malleable to interrogation. England violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice by engaging in consensual sex with her superior, Specialist Charles Graner, by whom England became pregnant. England received a court marshal conviction for her behavior, clearly shown by photographs on the world wide web that portrayed her as gleefully engaging in the humiliation activities, which created severe doubts around the world about the intent of U.S. forces engaging in reconstruction and nation-building in Iraq.

Feith, Douglas. A principle architect of the U.S. involvement in Iraq, Douglas Feith was the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy between 2001 and his resignation in 2005. Feith had served in the Republican administrations of the 1980s but became much more prominent during the George W. Bush government. Feith's father had survived the Holocaust, giving his son a firm understanding of the need to battle injustice and evil around the world as well as the need to protect Israel in the dangerous neighborhood where it exists. Feith was instrumental in crafting the policy that led to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in March 2003 and the subsequent policies that left the United States significantly understaffed in its military deployment in Iraq. Feith's rosy view of the likely reception U.S. forces would receive in post-Saddam Iraq proved flawed within weeks of their arrival, at least partially because U.S. forces proved to be unprepared and unable to deal with the seriously deteriorated living conditions facing Iraqis. The impression that freedom would outweigh the need for electricity, jobs, and a rising standard of living was wrong in the eyes of growing numbers of Iraqis. Feith became a lightning rod as conditions worsened in 2004/5. Feith left office several months after President Bush's reelection in 2004, returning to the civil sector where he had been an attorney prior to his government service under President Bush.

Galbraith, Peter. A former Senate staffer who holds a major passion for international law, Peter Galbraith has become a major advocate for the Kurds and for the creation of a new state along Kurdish lines in the former collective state of Iraq. A son of the famed Harvard economist, John Kenneth Galbraith, Peter Galbraith grew up in the salon environment with global political and social figures as his

personal friends, such as former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Galbraith earned his undergraduate degree at Harvard before the graduate study in Britain and completing a law degree at Georgetown University. Galbraith taught briefly before becoming a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffer who pursued questions about U.S. policy options in places across the globe. In the late 1980s, when Saddam Hussein gassed thousands of his own Kurdish citizens toward the end of the Iran–Iraq War, Galbraith took fact-finding trips into northern Iraq to determine the breadth of the horror. In the mid-1990s, when the Congress reverted to Republican control, President Clinton appointed Galbraith as his ambassador to the newly independent state of Croatia, a region with which the United States often had discomfort regarding ethnic cleansing and the fracturing of the former Yugoslavia under Serbian domination. Galbraith joined the National War College faculty for several years at the turn of the century after he stepped down from the ambassador position. He engaged in literal nation-building when the United Nations called upon Galbraith to function as *de facto* Foreign Minister in the newly independent East Timor. Upon returning to Washington during the Bush administration, Galbraith supported the President's goal of ousting Saddam Hussein but for reasons different from many in the administration: Galbraith believed a post–Saddam Iraq represented a more realistic opportunity to constitute reasonable, realistic ethnic states in the territory of Iraq. In particular, Galbraith supported the creation of a Kurdish entity in northern Iraq, *de facto* independent for the first time. Galbraith served as a special correspondent, with superb contacts, in Iraq in the weeks immediately following the March 2003 invasion, challenging the administration to administer its occupation more effectively to protect Iraqi citizens. Since the invasion, Galbraith has been a strong critic of Bush administration's assumptions and attempts to reconstruct the Iraq of Saddam Hussein in some form that did not allow for a partition into ethnicity- and religion-based entities. Some of Galbraith's critics accuse him of being too closely tied to Kurdish interests.

Garner, Jay. A retired Lieutenant General in the U.S. Army, Jay Garner was President Bush's first choice to lead reconstruction efforts in post–Saddam Hussein Iraq. Garner gained the administration's attention by his efforts under President George H.W. Bush to provide humanitarian assistance to Iraqi Kurds in the aftermath of the 1991 war to oust Saddam from Kuwait. When Saddam Hussein had to withdraw his forces from Kuwait, many people in the United States and abroad anticipated that U.S. forces would proceed to Baghdad to capture the Iraqi dictator. In late February 1991, President George H.W. Bush and his advisors determined that the United Nations' Resolution, which authorized ousting Iraq from Kuwait, did not empower the United States to go into Baghdad after Saddam nor did U.S. leaders believe this feasible at the time. Saddam, upon realizing this, attacked Shi'ite "Marsh Arabs" in the southern portion of the country as they rose against Sunni Ba'athist rule on the assumption that they would receive U.S. assistance in their revolt. When U.S. forces did not oust Saddam, he launched attacks

on the Shi'ites and drove the Kurds in the north, already the subject of his 1988 gas attacks, to flee for fear that he would attack them as well. The Turkish government, fearing a massive influx of Kurds to add to the volatile minority already in Turkey, sealed the border. In mid-March and April of 1991, Kurds were left exposed in the mountainous northern portion of Iraq with no means of physical protection, food, water, or any other amenities. At that point, U.S. officials launched Operation *Provide Comfort* to provide massive assistance to Kurds, with Lieutenant General Jay Garner in charge of the operation. Garner's successful response to this humanitarian crisis, coming at a time of other global requirements on U.S. forces, made him an obvious choice to Bush administration officials as they pondered upon a civilian leader for reconstruction efforts in 2003 Iraq. By this point, Garner had taken off his uniform and so he was hired on to operate as a civilian for the U.S. government. In retrospect, efforts to contemplate the reconstruction requirements of Iraq began only a limited period prior to the invasion itself. While the planning for the military operations transpired over more than twelve months, Garner had fewer than three to gather his team, grasp the nature of the damage he would confront, and begin forming a priority list of projects. Books on the reconstruction period indicate that Garner faced resistance from some regarding the individuals who Garner chose for his team although he has said little over the years. Garner had fewer than thirty days on the ground before President Bush chose to replace him with former Ambassador L. Paul "Jerry" Bremer who served as head of the CPA from May 2003 through turning over the government of Iraq to its citizens in late June 2004.

Ghali, Boutros Boutros. A former Egyptian diplomat, Boutros Boutros-Ghali was the sixth Secretary General of the United Nations, serving in the first part of the final decade of the twentieth century who introduced the global role of nation-building to public attention. Born in a Coptic Christian family, Boutros-Ghali married a Jewish woman, proving his cosmopolitan nature, and studied at the University of Paris where he earned a doctorate in International Law. Boutros-Ghali taught his subject at Cairo University for decades, specializing in regional organizations in international law. His work in law had long involved human rights and other topics related to humanitarian assistance, nation-building, stability operations, and other relevant issues. Boutros-Ghali had been an Egyptian Parliamentarian and was a member of the 1978 Egyptian delegation at the Camp David negotiations. Boutros-Ghali was highly critical of the global powers, especially the Clinton administration in Washington, for the callous manner by which the world looked aside during the 1994 Rwandan genocide (where almost a million died in a six-week period) and the disintegration of the Republic of Yugoslavia into ethnic entities where Serbs felt challenged. Boutros-Ghali also criticized wealthy states for ignoring the plight of states increasingly consumed by the AIDS/HIV virus as it ravaged their populations. Boutros-Ghali's criticisms cost him a second term as Secretary General as the

Security Council Permanent Five sought to replace him with Ghanaian Kofi Annan.

Hamilton, Lee. One of the most respected analysts of U.S. national security involvement in nation-building and other national security fields, long-serving former Congressman Lee Hamilton of southern Indiana has been a voice of caution and reason on nation-building efforts. Hamilton served the district surrounding the college town of Bloomington for several decades. He was always a solid, hard-working analyst who took nothing for granted but tested all of his assumptions carefully. Hamilton served through the late 1990s when he left the House of Representatives to head the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars. After the 9/11 attacks, the Congress created a bipartisan commission to determine what policy options could have been pursued differently. Hamilton, along with retired New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean, Sr., cochaired the commission through its ups and downs, including allegations by many that it was whitewashing the findings to protect various officials. Hamilton has argued that nation-building had to be pursued carefully to prevent subsequent attacks. Hamilton and former Secretary of State James Baker headed the Congressionally mandated Iraq Study Group with a dozen other prominent citizens. While the Study Group's December 2006 findings strongly urged the administration to change its course, the President made clear the following month his desire to take steps that would deepen, not lessen, U.S. involvement.

Khalilzad, Zalmay. An Afghan-born political scientist, Zalmay Khalilzad has been at the heart of Bush administration efforts to reconstruct and recreate the Middle East and Central Asia over the past two decades. Khalilzad came to the United States during his high school days. He did well academically at the American University in Beirut, before ultimately pursuing a doctorate in political science at the University of Chicago. Khalilzad taught at Columbia University in New York City in the late 1970s and 1980s before entering the Reagan administration State Department as a Special Advisor as the Soviets still occupied his native Afghanistan. Khalilzad worked with many of the nation-building specialists who became the decision makers of the George W. Bush government, such as Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Khalilzad spent time at the Defense Department in the early 1990s before the change of government led him to work for the research center, RAND, producing many analyses on national security topics, especially at the showcase Project Air Force. In the 1990s, Khalilzad supported the idea that Saddam Hussein was a threat to peace in the Middle East. After the 9/11 attacks, Khalilzad became a crucial figure in the Bush administration because of his understanding of Afghanistan and later Iraq. He served as a primary advisor on Afghan issues during the period of 2001–2005, serving as the Ambassador to Kabul between 2003 and his appointment to a similar position in Baghdad two years later. His nomination as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations was

part of the January 2007 changes the President announced to shake up his Iraq team.

Marshall, George Catlett. Perhaps the most famous nation-builder in modern U.S. history, former Army Chief of Staff and Secretary of State General George C. Marshall was a towering figure in the middle decades of the twentieth century. Born in Pennsylvania, Marshall studied military affairs at the Virginia Military Institute. Marshall excelled in the Corps of Cadets so he entered the Army in the first decade of the twentieth century. Marshall deployed with Army forces to late Imperial China where the deterioration of the Qing dynasty led to threats against U.S. citizens in the country. Marshall remained in the Service through World War I and into the dark days of the interwar period as it appeared a dead end position. As the United States began confronting a changing world scene in the 1930s, Marshall rose through the ranks as an exceptionally competent officer who President Franklin Delano Roosevelt trusted to create a modern force. Marshall had the foresight to pluck Dwight David Eisenhower out of the relative backwater of Manila to come to Washington in the late 1930s, ultimately sending him to Europe where the latter instrumentally orchestrated the Normandy invasion of June 6, 1944, and the ultimate campaign to oust Hitler in 1945. General Marshall served as Army Chief of Staff through the World War II period. Marshall's ability to judge men matched his strategic vision. President Harry S Truman sent him to China on a special mission in 1945/46 to deal with the Chinese Civil War. Uncharacteristically and unrealistically, Marshall could not solve the problem any better than anyone else and U.S. relations with the Chinese leadership deteriorated through the late 1940s until Mao Zedong and the Communists drove Chiang Kai-shek to the nearby island of Taiwan in 1949. Upon returning home, Marshall accepted President Truman's challenge to serve as Secretary of State, mating the soldier with the diplomat in a virtually unique condition. During his tenure at the Department, General Marshall announced a nation-building assistance package, which has been known for sixty years by his name: the Marshall Plan. The effort provided capital to rebuild the war-torn Europe for its own sake and as a measure of thwarting possible Soviet expansion in the early years of the Cold War (1947–1989). Marshall's assistance plan was massive in scale and unthinkable in today's environment but his personal prestige proved instrumental in its passage and acceptance as a policy choice. Marshall won the Nobel Peace Prize in the 1950s, a fitting cap to his career in the final years before he died in 1959.

McCain, John. The son and grandson of Navy admirals, John McCain has been a Naval aviator, prisoner of war, and Senator over his career. He attended the U.S. Naval Academy where he was a less-than-interested student. He served as an aviator in the Vietnam War where North Vietnamese forces shot him down and held him prisoner at the Hanoi Hilton for seven years, a remarkable state of events when his father was the Commander-in-Chief for Pacific Command in

Honolulu. McCain won release at the end of the conflict, returned home to attend the National War College, retired from the Service, then ran for the House of Representatives from an Arizona constituency. After a couple of terms in the House, McCain ran as a Republican Senate candidate from Arizona, one of the most respected faces on national security, nation-building, and stability operations in the legislature. He was a fierce critic of foreign policy decisions, which he believed undercut U.S. positions around the world, especially the Abu Ghraib scandal and prisoner interrogation techniques during the global war on terrorism. McCain argued forcefully that these actions did nothing to enhance U.S. interests around the world but seriously undermined the position of U.S. forces put into enemy hands. McCain has been running for the presidency in 2008.

Murtha, John. A former Marine with Vietnam experience, Democratic Representative John Murtha raised political heat in the United States when he called the U.S. policy in Iraq a failure in the autumn of 2005. Congressman Murtha served in the Marine Corps, active duty and reserves, for thirty-seven years before retiring as a Colonel in 1990. He earned the Purple Heart twice in 1967, meaning he was wounded in combat, and the Bronze Star for combat valor in 1968. Murtha won election from the Twelfth District, surrounding Johnstown in south central Pennsylvania, in the "Watergate" tidal wave of 1974. Murtha, as a result of his personal knowledge and the declining number of members who had military service, has long been a highly respected defense specialist within the Congress, often supporting higher levels of support for the Armed Forces. Murtha visited U.S. forces in Iraq in mid-2005, as questions about the future of U.S. nation-building and overall strategy in that area were rising. Murtha's decision to criticize the Bush administration's policy, arguing the need for an overall withdrawal of U.S. forces to prevent them from losing an unwinnable security context, stunned many and inflamed passions. Murtha's motives and patriotism became the subject of attacks by those who opposed him. Murtha did not rescind his criticism of existing policy but reiterated his concerns that the military forces were being asked to accomplish a nation-building and stability operations task that was impossible.

Musharraf, Pervez. The President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf is a controversial partner in both nation-building efforts in Central Asia, because of his nation's geographic position and antiterrorism, due to the role of Islamists in his country. Musharraf was born in Delhi during the final decade of British-controlled India. Because his family was Muslim, they moved to the Islamic portion of the former Raj as the partition of the subcontinent occurred with independence in 1947. Musharraf represented a rarity in the newly emerging Pakistani military when he entered in 1964: an Urdu-speaking background instead of the traditional Punjabi. He attended British educational stints during his career, rising to the rank of Army chief in 1998 in the aftermath of the Pakistani and Indian nuclear tests of May 1997. Three years later, Musharraf removed the Prime Minister, declaring himself Head of State. He automatically became a crucial partner for the United

States in the war on terrorism because analysts knew that the Taliban and Usama Bin Laden, chief culprit for the 9/11 attacks later in 2001, were probably operating in and out of northwest Pakistan because of the nature of the rough terrain in Waziristan province. This frontier area, along the Afghan border, has been described as virtually a state unto itself since the Pakistani state and armed forces have historically had little sway there. Musharraf, immediately after the decision that the 9/11 terrorists had to suffer for their efforts, became central to the U.S. and its allies' moves into Afghanistan because of his military's knowledge of Afghanistan but also to prevent support by some of his citizens who were supporting these terrorist efforts. U.S. antiterrorism officials had long known of Islamists' ties to various *madrassas*, Islamic educational institutions, and groups in Pakistan. The 9/11 attacks made clear the need to address these concerns and the health of Pakistan itself. Musharraf has resisted attempts to remove him from office, be they constitutional or terrorist, including surviving two assassination attempts in December 2003 alone. Musharraf also answered pressure from the Bush administration about his status as a military officer governing Pakistan by resigning from the Army instead of stepping down. Musharraf offers a challenge to nation-builders in the West for several reasons. His ties to China, controversial because of their covert nature, have raised concerns about the East Asian state's goals in the eastern expanse of the Islamic world as well as in light of Pakistan's possible proliferation of nuclear weapons. Similarly, questions about much control or efforts Musharraf is exercising over the intelligence service or Islamists within Pakistan, as a trade for staying in power, raise concerns about the stability of the state itself. Musharraf's own nation-building efforts have been problematic for sustaining a democratic system in Pakistan.

Negroponte, John. A long-serving Foreign Service officer who has been U.S. Ambassador to a number of nations, John Negroponte served as the first Ambassador to post-Saddam Iraq for which he is best known but has been one of the most important nation-builders in the country for the past forty years. Negroponte graduated from Yale before joining the diplomatic corps in the 1960s. He served as Ambassador to Honduras during the major insurgencies in the region in the 1980s, the Philippines, and Mexico, interspersed with time in the State Department hierarchy as well as at the White House. His Honduras period raised questions among human rights groups regarding the ambassador's commitment to democracy and genuine nation-building versus defending entrenched U.S. interests, regardless of the behavior in Honduras. Negroponte retired from the Foreign Service in 1997 but returned to representing his country at President George W. Bush's request that he represent the nation at the United Nations seven days after the September 11 attacks. Negroponte's extensive experience was crucial to working with the international community as it worked to respond to the 9/11 attacks. Negroponte was the Representative in New York when Secretary of State Colin L. Powell made his February 5, 2003, case for intervention in Iraq to oust the dictator. He agreed to President Bush's request to become the first Ambassador to the post-CPA Iraq

in July 2004. Negroponte took over a diplomatic representation in a time of turmoil and in the aftermath of tremendous tension within the U.S. efforts—military and civilian—in that country after L. Paul Bremer's tour there. Negroponte's mission coincided with deepening of the insurgency against U.S. military occupation in Iraq. He left as envoy in 2005, assuming the position as the first Director of National Intelligence. In that position, Negroponte, never an intelligence operative himself, has the title as overseeing all intelligence in the United States although the effect of the position, less than two years later, is not entirely obvious. In early 2007 in the midst of changes in his national security team, Negroponte shifted from Director of National Intelligence to Deputy Secretary of State.

Petraeus, David H. Early in January 2007, President George W. Bush nominated Lieutenant General David Petraeus as the ground commander for U.S. military commander in Iraq. Petraeus, a 1974 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, is an iconoclastic member of the Army who received much attention as the trainer of Iraqi military in support of the U.S. effort in reconstructing Iraq. One of the more energetic members of the Army, Petraeus took his commission in the Infantry before embarking on a career that gave him responsibility in the Infantry, Airborne, Mechanized, and Air Assault Infantry units of the Service. He also served with U.S. forces in Haiti and Bosnia and was Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Petraeus did advanced education at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, where he was deemed the top student when he earned the General George C. Marshall Award. Petraeus also earned master's and doctoral degrees at Princeton. General Petraeus taught at West Point. General Petraeus attracted much attention for his creative thinking about how to address Iraqi insurgents, leading to his subsequent assignment as Commanding General at the Combined Arms School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Petraeus also was responsible for the redrafting of the Army's Counterinsurgency manual in 2006. In mid-2007, Petraeus believed the "surge" was working in sections of Iraq although the political equation in the country was not improving.

Powell, Colin Luther. The son of Jamaican immigrants, Colin Powell rose through the U.S. society to become the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the Secretary of State under George W. Bush. Born in New York City during the years of segregation and limited opportunity for minorities, Powell's parents guaranteed him a decent education by forcing him into a solid schooling. Powell enrolled in the City College of New York where he also began the Army Reserve Officer Training Program, which enchanted him as he pursued a geology degree at the undergraduate level. Powell earned an Army commission in the late 1950s as opportunity began opening gradually through the desegregation of the Services. Powell set off down the common path of a tour of service in West Germany, the focus of the Cold War, as well as multiple tours in Vietnam where he distinguished himself. Powell also attracted respect in stateside assignments where his superiors noted his enthusiasm, skill, analysis, and leadership. In the 1970s,

Powell attended the George Washington University for a master's degree in Business Administration. He also became a White House Fellow in 1972/73 where he worked for Frank Carlucci in the Office of Management and Budget, an exceptionally prestigious position that marked the future leaders of the policymaking community. Powell studied national security strategy at the National War College, graduating in 1976 with an acknowledged better understanding of how rigorous thinking could affect his chosen field. From this education, his Army assignments, such as with the Forces Command or at Fort Leavenworth, interspersed with policymaking jobs, Powell became involved in the Reagan White House first as the Military Advisor to the Secretary of Defense, then on the National Security Council staff as it began anew after the Iran–Contra problems. Powell, working again for Frank Carlucci, moved to the National Security Council staff in the last years of the second Reagan administration. Ultimately, Powell rose to become the National Security Advisor to the President in his own right under President Reagan in 1987. He retained that job for some months before President George H.W. Bush selected the youngest man and first African American to ever hold the position. Powell was in this position when the Berlin Wall signaled the end of the Cold War in late 1989 and Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in mid-1990. After successfully encouraging the Bush administration to pursue a war against Saddam with a sufficient troop presence to make the job work, Powell turned his attention to armed forces, which were shrinking with the end of the Cold War. He also fought increasing pressures to use U.S. military prowess to address nation-building issues instead of warfighting. Powell argued that U.S. troops could not be put in a dangerous position of not having adequate support for their efforts, seeming to rebut attempts by President George H.W. Bush to send troops to Somalia in late 1992 to alleviate conditions of famine. Powell also opposed sending troops to the former Yugoslavia where many wanted the United States to end genocide. Powell objected to many desires on the part of the Clinton administration for U.S. forces for altering their composition (through the admission of lesbian women and homosexual men to the Services) on the grounds that they would adversely affect readiness. Powell retired from the position as Chairman in September 1993 with thirty-five years' service in uniform. He thought seriously about a run for the presidency because Powell was one of the most popular men in the United States and certainly its most famous retired officer. He chose not to run but threw himself into ongoing efforts at creating opportunity for inner city and disadvantaged youth through his organization called America's Promise. In 2000, General Powell became President-elect George W. Bush's designated Secretary of State. Bush recognized that Powell had considerably greater foreign policy knowledge than did the newly elected president and was a wildly popular figure while the president himself was a polarizing figure, especially after the controversial election. Powell was in Lima, Peru, on the September 11 attacks. He argued firmly for the administration's retaliatory positions against Afghanistan but recognized the nation-building, which would result from these actions, regardless of the President's claims in the 2000 election campaign that he would not engage in

nation-building. Powell became instrumental in the administration's arguments for the invasion of Iraq, although the Secretary made known his cautions to the President. Powell, who apparently preferred greater time for diplomatic actions, is thought to have told President George W. Bush something to the effect of "you break [Iraq], it's yours," rather than a place which could be handed back to someone else with whom the United States may or not have agreed. Powell developed a strong antagonism to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld both because of their fiefdoms coming into conflict and because of his concerns that Rumsfeld did not understand the use of force in this case. Powell's most famous moment was a February 5, 2003 speech when he went forth with information about weapons of mass destruction in an argument to the United Nations that had managed to make it out of the White House, despite attempt to prevent such actions. Powell stayed through the second presidential election but tendered his resignation in late 2004. Powell has remained relatively silent since his retirement about the administration's decision making on nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Rice, Condoleezza. An African American Republican from Birmingham via Denver, South Bend, and Palo Alto, Dr. Condoleezza Rice has served as President Bush's National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. Born into a prominent African American family in Alabama, Rice was an only child who excelled as a pianist and an ice skater. She attended the University of Denver for her undergraduate education where she studied with Dr. Josef Korbel, a Czech foreign affairs professor who had served his nation in the 1940s in Foreign Service prior to fleeing the Communists in the 1950s. Dr. Korbel was the father of President Bill Clinton's second Secretary of State, Dr. Madeleine Korbel Albright. Korbel drew Rice to the field of international relations where she excelled at studying the Soviet Union. Rice graduated from the University of Denver before pursuing a master's degree in Government and International Studies at the University of Notre Dame, ultimately earning a doctoral degree in political science as a Sovietologist from Stanford University. Dr. Rice joined the Stanford political science department where she attracted attention from the Washington Republican establishment in the 1980s. In the administration of George H.W. Bush, Rice joined the National Security Council staff as a Russian specialist. She was at the heart of the U.S. policymaking community at the time the Bush administration confronted a changing global context as the Berlin Wall collapsed. With President Clinton's defeat of George H.W. Bush in 1992, Rice returned to Stanford, where she served as University Provost. In 2000, she returned to the center of the U.S. decision-making community when she authored an article in *Foreign Affairs*, which many saw as a manifesto for presidential candidate, Texas Governor George W. Bush. In that article, Rice argued against the Clinton propensity to send U.S. military forces into nation-building scenarios from southeast Europe to Africa to Haiti. Upon Bush's election, Dr. Rice assumed the position as National Security Advisor, the position she held during the 9/11 attacks, the overthrow of the Taliban

in Afghanistan, and the invasion of Iraq. Her role in the intelligence accuracy of weapons of mass destruction assumptions about Iraq came into question after the invasion as some challenged Rice's accuracy in providing material to the President, a charge she adamantly denied. Upon President Bush's second inaugural, Dr. Rice traded the National Security Advisor title for that of Secretary of State. From that position, she was powerful in helping decide the administration's position on nation-building efforts.

Rumsfeld, Donald. The only man to hold the position of Secretary of Defense twice, Donald Rumsfeld has been the key figure in the administration's nation-building efforts. Secretary Rumsfeld, a native of Chicago, attended Princeton before serving as a Naval aviator in the 1950s. In the early 1960s, Rumsfeld won election at a young age to the House of Representatives as a Republican. In the last years of the decade, he left his House seat for a series of appointed positions in the Nixon administration, such as the Equal Opportunity Commission and the U.S. Ambassador to the NATO. When President Gerald Ford succeeded Nixon in the White House, Rumsfeld took the job as Chief of Staff. After holding that job, Rumsfeld became Secretary of Defense during some of the lowest points in the twentieth century as the U.S. military tried to come to grips with the pain of the Vietnam experience. This experience affected the secretary's fears of military leadership's inability to move forward to meet the world it confronted. With Jimmy Carter's accession to the White House, Rumsfeld returned to Chicago where he ran the mega-pharmaceutical company, Searle, and was influential in Republican national politics, entertaining a presidential run himself. He also chaired a Blue Ribbon Commission recommending the development of a ballistic missile defense. When Vice President-elect Dick Cheney was recommending candidates for various cabinet offices, he turned to his former mentor Donald Rumsfeld to fill the sensitive Defense job. Many analysts thought of Rumsfeld as being too old and too out-of-touch for the Department of Defense position until he became a pivotal decision maker after the September 11 attacks. According to many books that have come out after the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, Rumsfeld's positions were hard on subordinates and challenging to equals. He retained the President's trust even as the nation is coping with rising doubts about the efficacy of nation-building in places around the world where the United States is engaged. At the beginning of November 2006, however, President Bush replaced Rumsfeld with Bush family confidant Robert Gates of Texas A&M University and former Central Intelligence Director.

Sánchez, Ricardo. An Army Lieutenant General who was a Ground Force Commander in Iraq during the Abu Ghraib scandal's development, Rick Sanchez was a rise from poverty to success. Born to Mexican immigrants along the Texas–Mexico border, Sanchez was from an exceptionally poor family that had no options for his education other than taking a Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) scholarship. He earned a commission and rose through the ranks to become the

Operational Commander in Iraq months into the invasion and occupation. Sanchez confronted a growing insurgency in Iraq and demands from home to gather as much intelligence as possible to counter possible attacks on U.S. nation-building efforts. During his tenure, Army troops charged with interrogating Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib in Baghdad engaged in humiliating interrogation techniques and dubious behavior. Much of this activity appeared on the Internet as photographs, which ignited international condemnations and protests by Arab and Islamic groups. Eventually, several enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers received military disciplinary trials and a reserve Brigadier General received the bulk of the formal response. Critics challenged Sánchez's position as Ground Commander without the blame for these actions by troops under his ultimate charge, raising the question of whether a "command environment" of tolerating this misbehavior was his responsibility. Additionally, Sánchez, by all accounts, had rocky relations with his civilian counterpart, Ambassador L. Paul "Jerry" Bremer, the other key figure in reconstruction efforts in Iraq. When the Bush administration decided to elevate Sanchez's position to a four-star command, he rotated out of Iraq in favor of Lieutenant General George Casey, Junior.

Truman, Harry S. The President of the United States both at the end of World War II and the rebuilding of Europe after conflict, Harry S Truman engaged in perhaps the greatest nation-building endeavor the world has ever seen. Born in southwest Missouri at Lamar, Truman was from a farming family where he succeeded for more than a decade but wanted to serve in the armed forces when war broke out in Europe. Truman earned a commission in the Field Artillery, deployed to France as a Captain. He returned to northwestern Missouri where he married, then left farming for commercial pursuits as a haberdasher in Kansas City. Truman worked with a Jewish businessman in this enterprise, raising the future President's sensitivity to issues relating to discrimination against Jews around the world. Truman became heavily involved in Missouri Democratic politics, eventually seeking elective office as an administrative judge in Jackson County. In 1934, Truman won a senate seat where he served for a decade before President Franklin Delano Roosevelt selected him as a running mate for the latter's fourth and final election run in 1944. Truman had little foreign policy experience and no knowledge of the "Manhattan Project" to develop an atomic weapon when Roosevelt died suddenly in April 1945, months into their term. In his government, between 1945 and early 1953, Harry Truman was arguably the most vigorous nation-builder in U.S. history. During his presidency, Truman supported the Marshall Plan, a vast financing program to rebuild war-ravaged Western Europe in the late 1940s and 1950s. Additionally, he worked to end the civil war in China, failing in the end but supporting the Taiwan development as the Republic of China in place of recognizing Communist Party control in Beijing. Truman also oversaw U.S. relations with newly independent swaths of the world in South and Southeast Asia (India, Indonesia, and Pakistan), the struggle for the future of the Korean peninsula, and the maturing of independence movements in the

Middle East. Truman also desegregated the U.S. armed forces in a massive change. He was far from successful in many of his efforts, barely winning reelection on his own in 1948, but Truman's role as instigating a modern U.S. nation-building commitment is crucial.

Weinberger, Caspar. A long-time California Republican power broker, Caspar Weinberger served as Director of Management and Budget in the 1970s when he was known as "Cap the Knife" for his budget-cutting propensities. More importantly, President Ronald Reagan chose Weinberger to serve as his Secretary of Defense during the period of the massive Reagan military buildup. Weinberger was a passionate bureaucratic infighter, often coming into conflict with Reagan's second Secretary of State, economist George Shultz. Shultz frequently advocated use of U.S. armed forces in peacekeeping or peace stabilization efforts, such as in Lebanon in 1982, which Weinberger opposed. Weinberger argued strongly that the United States should not call upon military solutions unless the troops strength and commitment was massive and overwhelming. While Weinberger and Shultz served the same president, they frequently differed as significantly as Reagan administration officials did with their political opponents. Weinberger mentored Colin L. Powell, his military assistant in the 1980s, who went on to become both the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an Army four-star as well as the Secretary of State. The 'Weinberger Doctrine' was rules for peace keeping involvement.

Wolfowitz, Paul Dundes. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. Paul Wolfowitz remains known largely as the "architect of the Iraq war." The son of a Cornell University mathematician, Wolfowitz shifted from mathematics into political science before entering a doctoral program at the University of Chicago under the legendary Dr. Albert Wohlstetter. Wolfowitz operated with many future "neo-conservative" thinkers, such as Zalmay Khalilzad, Richard Perle, and others during his graduate school days. He taught briefly at Yale, where I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby who became close to Vice President Richard B. Cheney was his student, before entering the Washington political sphere in the 1970s. Wolfowitz held many political positions between his work in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under Presidents Nixon and Ford, a Defense Department official under President Carter, Policy Planning at the State Department and Ambassador to Indonesia under President Reagan, and a senior Defense official in George H.W. Bush administration. Wolfowitz, by the early 1990s, became heavily associated with Republican administrations so he accepted the position as Dean of the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University during the Clinton governments. President George W. Bush chose Wolfowitz as the second highest Defense official in 2001. He orchestrated efforts to oust the Taliban in Afghanistan after the September 2001 attacks but then immediately tried to raise awareness in the administration about Saddam Hussein's assumed links to the attacks. A strong proponent of overthrowing Saddam Hussein in ending military

threats that he was believed to pose with possible weapons of mass destruction, Wolfowitz pushed for the invasion, at least partially because he argued that this would be likely one of Iraqis welcoming U.S. forces. As the conflict devolved into a grinding insurgency, Wolfowitz became the target of critics, particularly focusing on his remarks undercutting the Army Chief of Staff weeks before the invasion as the latter predicted hundreds of thousands of troops would be necessary to stabilize the theater. President Bush named Wolfowitz as the President of the World Bank in 2005, a position where he controlled much of the international capital available to developing states for their nation-building activities before he was ousted in 2007.

Zinni, Anthony. A Marine Corps four-star who served as Combatant Commander at Central Command, General Tony Zinni has been one of the fiercest critics of the current strategy for nation-building in Iraq. A 1965 graduate of Villanova University, Tony Zinni earned a commission as a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps during the Vietnam War. Zinni served as a Marine officer in assignments across the world before he gained much attention heading up U.S. humanitarian relief operations in Somalia in the mid-1990s. As the nation reevaluated the nation-building mission in light of the attack on U.S. troops offering assistance in Mogadishu in October 1993, Zinni was learning important lessons about the premises, assumptions, and operations that went into these missions. In the Clinton administration, Zinni replaced Army General Binford Peay as the head of the Central Command, encompassing U.S. efforts in the region from the Mediterranean Sea to as far east as Pakistan, a highly volatile and crucial area for U.S. interests. Zinni ran the command during the period when the United States was enforcing a “no-fly zone” over Iraq to keep Saddam Hussein in line with the 1991 cease-fire agreement he signed with the international community. Zinni finished his normal rotation at the Command in 2000 and retired from military service after thirty-five years. He returned to serving his nation when President George W. Bush asked him to serve as a special envoy to the Arab-Israeli dispute. In 2005/6, Zinni attracted considerable attention by heavily criticizing President Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld for the strategy to overthrow Saddam Hussein and the subsequent moves to create a new Iraq. Zinni argued that the plans had failed because they did not take into consideration the lessons learned over the prior years. Additionally, he charged that too few troops were in theater to accomplish the mission, directly undercutting the plans he had developed while in command to deal with this particular challenge. Zinni has remained vocal in concerns that the nation-building operations are not going to address the mission as described to the nation.

Documents

The documents selected here are only a small number of the large number of documents that the U.S. government has produced on SSRTOs. The selected documents are each prefaced for their particular interest. They are almost all excerpted because of their length.

The Second Inaugural Speech by George W. Bush on January 20, 2005 indicated the strong commitment to pursuing democratic forms of government through engaging in nation-building, stability operations, reconstruction, and the variety of methods discussed in this volume. The Second Inaugural Speech is available in its entire text at <http://www.whitehouse.gov>

Vice President Cheney, Mr. Chief Justice, President Carter, President Bush, President Clinton, reverend clergy, distinguished guests, fellow citizens: . . .

We have seen our vulnerability—and we have seen its deepest source. For as long as whole regions of the world simmer in resentment and tyranny—prone to ideologies that feed hatred and excuse murder—violence will gather, and multiply in destructive power, and cross the most defended borders, and raise a mortal threat. There is only one force of history that can break the reign of hatred and resentment, and expose the pretensions of tyrants, and reward the hopes of the decent and tolerant, and that is the force of human freedom.

We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.

America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one. From the day of our Founding, we have proclaimed that every man and woman on this earth has rights, and dignity, and matchless value, because they bear the image of the Maker of Heaven and earth. Across the generations we have proclaimed the imperative

of self-government, because no one is fit to be a master, and no one deserves to be a slave. Advancing these ideals is the mission that created our Nation. It is the honorable achievement of our fathers. Now it is the urgent requirement of our nation's security, and the calling of our time.

So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.

This is not primarily the task of arms, though we will defend ourselves and our friends by force of arms when necessary. Freedom, by its nature, must be chosen, and defended by citizens, and sustained by the rule of law and the protection of minorities. And when the soul of a nation finally speaks, the institutions that arise may reflect customs and traditions very different from our own. America will not impose our own style of government on the unwilling. Our goal instead is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way.

The great objective of ending tyranny is the concentrated work of generations. The difficulty of the task is no excuse for avoiding it. America's influence is not unlimited, but fortunately for the oppressed, America's influence is considerable, and we will use it confidently in freedom's cause.

My most solemn duty is to protect this nation and its people against further attacks and emerging threats. Some have unwisely chosen to test America's resolve, and have found it firm.

We will persistently clarify the choice before every ruler and every nation: The moral choice between oppression, which is always wrong, and freedom, which is eternally right. America will not pretend that jailed dissidents prefer their chains, or that women welcome humiliation and servitude, or that any human being aspires to live at the mercy of bullies.

We will encourage reform in other governments by making clear that success in our relations will require the decent treatment of their own people. America's belief in human dignity will guide our policies, yet rights must be more than the grudging concessions of dictators; they are secured by free dissent and the participation of the governed. In the long run, there is no justice without freedom, and there can be no human rights without human liberty.

Some, I know, have questioned the global appeal of liberty—though this time in history, four decades defined by the swiftest advance of freedom ever seen, is an odd time for doubt. Americans, of all people, should never be surprised by the power of our ideals. Eventually, the call of freedom comes to every mind and every soul. We do not accept the existence of permanent tyranny because we do not accept the possibility of permanent slavery. Liberty will come to those who love it.

Today, America speaks anew to the peoples of the world:

All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know: the United States will not ignore your oppression, or excuse your oppressors. When you stand for your liberty, we will stand with you.

Democratic reformers facing repression, prison, or exile can know: America sees you for who you are: the future leaders of your free country.

The rulers of outlaw regimes can know that we still believe as Abraham Lincoln did: "Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves; and, under the rule of a just God, cannot long retain it."

The leaders of governments with long habits of control need to know: To serve your people you must learn to trust them. Start on this journey of progress and justice, and America will walk at your side.

And all the allies of the United States can know: We honor your friendship, we rely on your counsel, and we depend on your help. Division among free nations is a primary goal of freedom's enemies. The concerted effort of free nations to promote democracy is a prelude to our enemies' defeat. . . .

A few Americans have accepted the hardest duties in this cause—in the quiet work of intelligence and diplomacy . . . the idealistic work of helping raise up free governments . . . the dangerous and necessary work of fighting our enemies. Some have shown their devotion to our country in deaths that honored their whole lives—and we will always honor their names and their sacrifice.

All Americans have witnessed this idealism, and some for the first time. I ask our youngest citizens to believe the evidence of your eyes. You have seen duty and allegiance in the determined faces of our soldiers. You have seen that life is fragile, and evil is real, and courage triumphs. Make the choice to serve in a cause larger than your wants, larger than yourself—and in your days you will add not just to the wealth of our country, but to its character. . . .

The decision to issue Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 is a major shift in traditional views of using the military in the United States. The shift is not entirely a welcome one to those wearing uniforms who believe their role is to be "warfighters" rather than "nation builders" but U.S. fidelity to command decisions is renowned. While the armed forces have been involved in these activities throughout the nation's history, never have the SSRTTO activities been placed at par with traditional warfighting before this Directive. As noted below, this Directive is detailed on the worldwide web in its full form.

Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, signed November 28, 2005

Military Support for Stability, Security, Reconstruction, and Transition Operations (SSRTO)

SUBJECT: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. . . .

1. PURPOSE

This Directive:

1.1. Provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop. Future DoD policy will address these areas and provide guidance on the security, transition, and reconstruction operations components of SSTR operations and DoD's role in each.

1.2. Establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the Department of Defense for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense under reference (a) and the guidance and responsibilities assigned in reference (b).

1.3. Supersedes any conflicting portions of existing DoD issuances. Such instances shall be identified to the office of primary responsibility for this Directive as listed at Web site <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>.

2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components").

3. DEFINITIONS

3.1. *Stability Operations*. Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.

3.2. *Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR)*. Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.

4. POLICY

It is DoD policy that:

4.1. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

4.2. Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs.

The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

4.3. Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces. Stability operations tasks include helping:

4.3.1. rebuild indigenous institutions including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment;

4.3.2. revive or build the private sector, including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure; and

4.3.3. develop representative governmental institutions.

4.4. Integrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful stability operations. Whether conducting or supporting stability operations, the Department of Defense shall be prepared to work closely with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, global and regional international organizations (hereafter referred to as “International Organizations”), U.S. and foreign nongovernmental organizations (hereafter referred to as “NGOs”), and private sector individuals and for-profit companies (hereafter referred to as “Private Sector”).

4.5. Military–civilian teams are a critical U.S. Government stability operations tool. The Department of Defense shall continue to lead and support the development of military–civilian teams.

4.5.1. Their functions shall include ensuring security, developing local governance structures, promoting bottom-up economic activity, rebuilding infrastructure, and building indigenous capacity for such tasks.

4.5.2. Participation in such teams shall be open to representatives from other U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector with relevant skills and expertise.

4.6. Assistance and advice shall be provided to and sought from the Department of State and other U.S. Departments and Agencies, as appropriate, for developing stability operations capabilities.

4.7. The Department of Defense shall develop greater means to help build other countries’ security capacity quickly to ensure security in their own lands or to contribute forces to stability operations elsewhere.

4.8. Military plans shall address stability operations requirements throughout all phases of an operation or plan as appropriate. Stability operations dimensions of military plans shall be:

4.8.1. Exercised, gamed, and, when appropriate, red-teamed (i.e., tested by use of exercise opposition role playing) with other U.S. Departments and Agencies.

4.8.2. Integrated with U.S. Government plans for stabilization and reconstruction and developed when lawful and consistent with security requirements and the Secretary of Defense's guidance, in coordination with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector.

4.9. The Department of Defense shall support indigenous persons or groups—political, religious, educational, and media—promoting freedom, the rule of law, and an entrepreneurial economy, who oppose extremism and the murder of civilians.

4.10. DoD intelligence efforts shall be designed to provide the optimal mix of capabilities to meet stability operations requirements, taking into account other priorities.

4.11. Stability operations skills, such as foreign language capabilities, regional area expertise, and experience with foreign governments and International Organizations, shall be developed and incorporated into Professional Military Education at all levels.

4.12. Information shall be shared with U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and the members of the Private Sector supporting stability operations, consistent with legal requirements.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES

5.1. The *Under Secretary of Defense for Policy*, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall:

5.1.1. Develop stability operations policy options for the Secretary of Defense.

5.1.2. Coordinate DoD relations with the Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (hereafter referred to as "S/CRS") or any successor organization.

5.1.3. Represent the Secretary of Defense in discussions on stability operations policy and strategy with other U.S. Departments and Agencies, including S/CRS, foreign governments, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector.

5.1.4. Identify DoD-wide stability operations capabilities and recommend priorities to the Secretary of Defense.

5.1.5. Submit a semiannual stability operations report to the Secretary of Defense, developed in coordination with responsible DoD Components. This report shall:

5.1.5.1. identify tasks necessary to ensure the Department of Defense implements the responsibilities prescribed in this Directive; and

- 5.1.5.2. evaluate the Department of Defense's progress in implementing this Directive using the measures of effectiveness directed herein.
- 5.1.6. Develop a list of countries and areas with the potential for U.S. military engagement in stability operations in consultation with relevant DoD Components and U.S. Departments and Agencies. This list shall be submitted semiannually to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- 5.1.7. Ensure stability operations are incorporated into the strategic policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans the Secretary of Defense provides to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pursuant to Section 153 of reference (a).
- 5.1.8. Create a stability operations center to coordinate stability operations research, education and training, and lessons-learned.
- 5.1.9. Develop a process to facilitate information sharing for stability operations among the DoD Components, and relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector while adequately protecting classified information and intelligence sources and methods, in coordination with relevant DoD and non-DoD entities (such as the Director of National Intelligence) . . .
- 5.2. The *Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence* (USD(I)) shall:
 - 5.2.1. Ensure DoD intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities are developed to support stability operations, in coordination with relevant U.S. Government intelligence entities and DoD Components.
 - 5.2.2. Ensure the availability of suitable intelligence and counterintelligence resources for stability operations, including the ability to rapidly stimulate intelligence gathering and assign appropriately skilled intelligence and counterintelligence personnel to such missions.
 - 5.2.3. Support the Combatant Commanders' development of intelligence support plans and intelligence campaign plans, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
 - 5.2.4. Ensure intelligence career paths attract and retain the quantity and quality of skilled intelligence personnel required for stability operations, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)).
 - 5.2.5. Coordinate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the relevant Combatant Commanders, and members of the U.S. intelligence community to ensure the effective use and employment of intelligence activities and resources in stability operations . . .
- 5.3.2. Develop a joint and combined stability operation training policy that promotes interoperability with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- 5.3.3. Develop methods to recruit, select, and assign current and former DoD personnel with relevant skills for service in stability operations assignments, and recommend necessary changes to laws, authorities, and regulations related thereto.
- 5.3.4. Develop opportunities for DoD personnel to contribute or develop stability operations skills by:
 - 5.3.4.1. undertaking tours of duty in other U.S. Departments and Agencies, International Organizations, and NGOs;
 - 5.3.4.2. participating in non-DoD education and training programs relevant to stability operations; and
 - 5.3.4.3. learning languages and studying foreign cultures, including long-term immersion in foreign societies.
- 5.3.5. Develop opportunities for personnel from other U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments, International Organizations, and NGOs to participate, as appropriate, in DoD training related to stability operations . . .
- 5.3.7. Ensure DoD medical personnel and capabilities are prepared to meet military and civilian health requirements in stability operations . . .
- 5.8. The *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* shall:
 - 5.8.1. Identify stability operations capabilities and assess their development.
 - 5.8.2. Develop stability operations joint doctrine in consultation with relevant DoD Components, U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector.
 - 5.8.3. Support the USD(P) and appropriate U.S. Departments and Agencies through participation in U.S. Government and multinational stability operations planning processes.
 - 5.8.4. Provide annual training guidance that addresses stability operations capabilities and analyze training results.
 - 5.8.5. Develop curricula at joint military education and individual training venues for the conduct and support of stability operations, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.
 - 5.8.6. Ensure instructors and students from other U.S. Departments and Agencies are able to attend DoD schools to receive or provide instruction on stability operations, in coordination with the USD(P&R).
 - 5.8.7. Ensure that U.S. Armed Forces have the training, structure, processes, and doctrine necessary to train, equip, and advise large numbers of foreign forces in a range of security sectors, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments . . .
- 5.9. The *Commanders of the Geographic Combatant Commands*, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall:
 - 5.9.1. Designate an appropriate military officer as the Joint Force Coordinating Authority for Stability Operations to ensure proper emphasis is given

to preparing for stability operations. The Joint Force Coordinating Authority for Stability Operations shall:

5.9.1.1. Identify stability operations requirements.

5.9.1.2. Incorporate stability operations into military training, exercises, and planning, including intelligence campaign plans and intelligence support plans.

5.9.1.3. Engage relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector in stability operations planning, training, and exercising, as appropriate, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the USD(P).

5.9.2. Conduct intelligence campaign planning for stability operations, in coordination with the USD(I). These intelligence campaign plans shall be tested and shall include, at a minimum:

5.9.2.1. Information on key ethnic, cultural, religious, tribal, economic and political relationships, non-military security forces, infrastructure, sanitation and health structure, munitions facilities, border controls, and customs processes.

5.9.2.2. Requirements for the order of battle, open source data, and numbers of personnel with appropriate language and cultural skills and proficiency levels.

5.9.2.3. Means to meet these requirements by specifying particular national and DoD intelligence capabilities . . .

President Bush supported a significant enhancement in formal coordination for humanitarian and stability operations, a subset of SSRTOs, soon after the Pentagon issued its Directive.

Presidential Decision on Humanitarian and Stability Operations December 14, 2005

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

On December 7, President Bush issued a new Presidential directive to empower the Secretary of State to improve coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. These improved capabilities should enable the U.S. to help governments abroad exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.

The directive establishes that the Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. Depending on the situation, these operations can be

conducted with or without U.S. military engagement. When the U.S. military is involved, the Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict. The United States shall work with other countries and organizations, to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law.

The following is a suggestion for interagency coordination for SSRTOs, crafted by the Congressional Research Service.

PLANNING FOR STABILIZATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

S/CRS

SECTION I: PURPOSE, BACKGROUND, AND DEFINITIONS

PURPOSE

The purpose of this pamphlet is to present and refine an interagency planning process for reconstruction, stabilization, and conflict transformation operations that will serve as the future framework for integrated civilian and military planning. This planning framework, developed by the S/CRS, enables USG civilian agency planners to identify and gain policy-level approval for overarching policy goals, corresponding major mission elements, and the essential tasks of an operation. The process develops a resource strategy to achieve policy goals, identifies lead agencies responsible for essential tasks, and incorporates a structure for metrics and evaluation.

This pamphlet is not intended to discuss specific policy or country plans, and any country-specific information contained herein is only illustrative to explain planning processes.

The pamphlet is organized into five sections:

Section 1: Purpose, Background, and Definitions. Provides a discussion of the reasons for an interagency planning process for these operations, objectives of the process, and lessons on which the process is based.

Section 2: The Planning Process. Provides an overview of the three-part planning process: policy formulation, strategy development, and implementation. This section discusses the agents and stakeholders in that process, and the audiences for the planning framework and corresponding planning products.

Section 3: The Toolbox. Provides an overview of the tools that the USG has at its disposal in conflict transformation operations.

In late 2005, the U.S. government, in reaction to the reality that nation-building efforts require much greater coordination across the government in all sorts of areas, released this Department of State message on better coordination.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE AND POSTING

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of the Spokesman

For Immediate Release

December 14, 2005

2005/1166

Fact Sheet

President Issues Directive to Improve the United States' Capacity to Manage Reconstruction and Stabilization Efforts

On December 7, President Bush issued a new Directive to empower the Secretary of State to improve coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.

These improved capabilities should enable the U.S. to help governments abroad exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.

The Presidential Directive establishes that the Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.

Depending on the situation, these operations can be conducted with or without U.S. military engagement. When the U.S. military is involved, the Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict. The United States shall work with other countries and organizations, to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law.

State Department's Role—Supporting Transformational Diplomacy

The Presidential Directive establishes that the Secretary of State will be supported by a Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to:

* Develop strategies for reconstruction and stabilization activities; provide U.S. decision makers with detailed options for R&S operations; ensure program and policy coordination among U.S. Departments and Agencies; lead coordination of

reconstruction and stabilization activities and preventative strategies with bilateral partners, international and regional organizations, and nongovernmental and private sector entities.

- * Coordinate interagency processes to identify states at risk of instability, lead interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, develop detailed contingency plans for integrated U.S. reconstruction and stabilization, and provide U.S. decision makers with detailed options for an integrated U.S. response.

- * Lead U.S. development of a strong civilian response capability; analyze, formulate and recommend authorities, mechanisms and resources for civilian responses in coordination with key interagency implementers such as AID; coordinate R&S budgets among Departments and Agencies; identify lessons learned and integrate them into operational planning by responsible agencies.

Civilian–Military Coordination: The Secretaries of State and Defense will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans, when relevant and appropriate. The Presidential Directive creates the framework to integrate these planning responsibilities. DOD Directive 3000.05 establishes how Defense will address and develop its functions for stability, security, transition and reconstruction and commits the Defense Department to supporting U.S. reconstruction and stabilization efforts.

Harnessing the Skills and Expertise Throughout the U.S. Government:

Conflict transformation requires a broad range of expertise from multiple agencies, particularly those with operational experience in post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. The Presidential Directive calls on each agency to strengthen its capacity to respond to crises; mobilize expert staff; participate in deployed teams; and assist with planning, policy exercises, and training.

Building Global Capacity: There is unprecedented collaboration among international and non-governmental partners to build global capacity for conflict management. The Presidential Directive instructs U.S. agencies, with the State Department in the coordination lead, to work with these key partners on early warning, prevention, and conflict response.

Making Progress Towards the President's Goals

- * **Building on Current Efforts:** The State Department, USAID, and other U.S. agencies, have a base of experience assisting countries to move from conflict toward sustainable peace. The U.S. is actively engaged in defense cooperation, regional security, humanitarian assistance, job creation, economic cooperation, rule of law, democratic governance, human rights, and other important initiatives. This Presidential Directive strengthens U.S. capacity to develop and implement integrated U.S. responses, coordinated with international and non-governmental partners.

* **Planning Process:** S/CRS is developing a common planning framework, to provide the blueprints for a U.S. response to conflict. The framework has been used for civilian planning in a variety of countries. With further development and experimentation, it can also form the basis for integrated civilian–military planning. The planning process allows for a unified national strategy for conflict transformation, rather than a collection of agency responses.

* **Country Engagement:** S/CRS has coordinated strategic planning for U.S. efforts in Sudan and Haiti in concert with Regional Bureaus in the State Department, the NSC and interagency partners. Using tools such as the planning framework, the coordinated process has brought together strategic guidance and resources to address conflict transformation goals.

* **Civilian Response Capabilities:** Over a decade of operational experience has underscored the need for a civilian field presence in the very first stages of a stabilization and reconstruction mission. S/CRS has been working with civilian agencies and the military to develop concepts for providing the U.S. with deployable civilian teams for reconstruction and stabilization that can embed with the military or operate independently. The State Department has begun a Response Corps of diplomatic first responders and standby personnel, who can augment or provide the U.S. diplomatic platform on the ground. S/CRS is developing models for teams of civilian technical experts who can be deployed immediately with or without the military to jumpstart activities critical to a transition. To facilitate long-term implementation of assistance programs, S/CRS is developing a comprehensive network of skills available through contracts and rosters.

Early Warning and Prevention: Closing the gap between early warning and early response is a key challenge. S/CRS is working to inject conflict prevention and mitigation into mainstream foreign policy processes. The National Intelligence Council now bi-annually prepares a list of countries at risk of instability. It is reviewed within the policy community to identify countries where early policy attention could help prevent or mitigate a crisis. S/CRS is also using policy exercises, roundtables, and simulations to bring together U.S., international and non-governmental experts to consult and foster consensus on policy approaches for prevention.

Secretary of State Rice has been involved in attempting to broaden the SSRTTO, with greater coordination and interagency responsibility. Her remarks at Georgetown University in early 2006 illustrate the trend of her thinking in the area.

REMARKS

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
Georgetown School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University
January 18, 2006
Washington, D.C.

SECRETARY RICE: Thank you very much. Thank you—President DeGioia for that wonderful introduction. Thank you. Happy for that great start to this session. I'd like to thank the Board of Trustees and say how pleased I am to be here at Georgetown University's distinguished School of Foreign Service. I just have to recognize my friend, Andrew Natsios, who's sitting in the front row, even if he did leave us to come to Georgetown. He said he was doing it because this is an institution that he loves dearly. You've got a fine man and you're going to have a fine professor in Andrew Natsios. Thank you for your service to the country. . .

Almost a year ago today in his second Inaugural Address, President Bush laid out a vision that now leads America into the world. "It is the policy of the United States," the President said, "to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world." To achieve this bold mission, America needs equally bold diplomacy, a diplomacy that not only reports about the world as it is, but seeks to change the world itself. I and others have called this mission "transformational diplomacy." And today I want to explain what it is in principle and how we are advancing it in practice.

We are living in an extraordinary time, one in which centuries of international precedent are being overturned. The prospect of violent conflict among great powers is more remote than ever. States are increasingly competing and cooperating in peace, not preparing for war. Peoples in China and India, in South Africa and Indonesia and Brazil are lifting their countries into new prominence. Reform—democratic reform—has begun and is spreading in the Middle East. And the United States is working with our many partners, particularly our partners who share our values in Europe and in Asia and in other parts of the world to build a true form of global stability, a balance of power that favors freedom.

At the same time, other challenges have assumed a new urgency. Since its creation more than 350 years ago, the modern state system has rested on the concept of sovereignty. It was always assumed that every state could control and direct the threats emerging from its territory. It was also assumed that weak and poorly governed states were merely a burden to their people, or at most, an international humanitarian concern but never a true security threat.

Today, however, these old assumptions no longer hold. Technology is collapsing the distance that once clearly separated right here from over there. And the greatest threats now emerge more within states than between them. The fundamental character of regimes now matters more than the international distribution of power. In this world it is impossible to draw neat, clear lines between our security interests, our development efforts and our democratic ideals. American diplomacy must integrate and advance all of these goals together.

So, I would define the objective of transformational diplomacy this way: To work with our many partners around the world, to build and sustain democratic,

well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. Let me be clear, transformational diplomacy is rooted in partnership; not in paternalism. In doing things with people, not for them; we seek to use America's diplomatic power to help foreign citizens better their own lives and to build their own nations and to transform their own futures.

In extraordinary times like those of today, when the very terrain of history is shifting beneath our feet, we must transform old diplomatic institutions to serve new diplomatic purposes. This kind of challenge is sweeping and difficult but it is not unprecedented; America has done this kind of work before. In the aftermath of World War II, as the Cold War hardened into place, we turned our diplomatic focus to Europe and parts of Asia. We hired new people. We taught them new languages, we gave them new training. We partnered with old adversaries in Germany and Japan and helped them to rebuild their countries. Our diplomacy was instrumental in transforming devastated countries into thriving democratic allies, allies who joined with us for decades in the struggle to defend freedom from communism.

With the end of the Cold War, America again rose to new challenges. We opened 14 new embassies in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and we repositioned over 100 of our diplomats to staff them. Our efforts helped newly liberated peoples to transform the character of their countries and now many of them, too, have become partners in liberty and freedom, members of NATO, members of the European Union, something unthought of just a few years ago. And during the last decade, we finally realized a historic dream of the 20th century therefore, a vision of a Europe whole and free and at peace.

In the past five years, it was my friend and predecessor Colin Powell who led the men and women of American diplomacy into the 21st century. He modernized the State Department's technology and transformed dozens of our facilities abroad. Most importantly, Secretary Powell invested in our people. He created over 2,000 new positions and hired thousands of new employees and trained them all to be diplomatic leaders of tomorrow.

Now, today, to advance transformational diplomacy all around the world, we in the State Department must again answer a new calling of our time. We must begin to lay the diplomatic foundations to secure a future of freedom for all people. Like the great changes of the past, the new efforts we undertake today will not be completed quickly. Transforming our diplomacy and transforming the State Department is the work of a generation, but it is urgent work that must begin.

To advance transformational diplomacy, we are and we must change our diplomatic posture. In the 21st century, emerging nations like India and China and Brazil and Egypt and Indonesia and South Africa are increasingly shaping the course of history. At the same time, the new front lines of our diplomacy are

appearing more clearly, in transitional countries of Africa and of Latin America and of the Middle East. Our current global posture does not really reflect that fact. For instance, we have nearly the same number of State Department personnel in Germany, a country of 82 million people that we have in India, a country of one billion people. It is clear today that America must begin to reposition our diplomatic forces around the world, so over the next few years the United States will begin to shift several hundred of our diplomatic positions to new critical posts for the 21st century. We will begin this year with a down payment of moving 100 positions from Europe and, yes, from here in Washington, D.C., to countries like China and India and Nigeria and Lebanon, where additional staffing will make an essential difference . . .

We will also put new emphasis on our regional and transnational strategies. In the 21st century, geographic regions are growing ever more integrated economically, politically and culturally. This creates new opportunities but it also presents new challenges, especially from transnational threats like terrorism and weapons proliferation and drug smuggling and trafficking in persons and disease.

Building regional partnerships is one foundation today of our counterterrorism strategy. We are empowering countries that have the will to fight terror but need help with the means. And we are joining with key regional countries like Indonesia and Nigeria and Morocco and Pakistan, working together not only to take the fight to the enemy but also to combat the ideology of hatred that uses terror as a weapon.

We will use a regional approach to tackle disease as well. Rather than station many experts in every embassy, we will now deploy small, agile transnational networks of our diplomats. These rapid response teams will monitor and combat the spread of pandemics across entire continents. We are adopting a more regional strategy in our public diplomacy as well.

In the Middle East, for example, as you well know, a vast majority of people get their news from a regional media network like Al Jazeera, not from a local newspaper. So our diplomats must tell America's story not just in translated op-eds, but live on TV in Arabic for a regional audience. To make this happen, we are creating a regional public diplomacy center. We are forward deploying our best Arabic-speaking diplomats and we are broadly coordinating our public diplomacy strategy both for the region and from the region.

Our third goal is to localize our diplomatic posture. Transformational diplomacy requires us to move our diplomatic presence out of foreign capitals and to spread it more widely across countries. We must work on the front lines of domestic reform as well as in the back rooms of foreign ministries. There are nearly 200 cities worldwide with over one million people in which the United States has no formal diplomatic presence. This is where the action is today and this is where we

must be. To reach citizens in bustling new population centers, we cannot always build new consulates beyond a nation's capital.

A newer, more economical idea is what we call an American Presence Post. This idea is simple. One of our best diplomats moves outside the embassy to live and work and represent America in an emerging community of change. We currently operate American Presence Posts in places like Egypt and Indonesia and we are eager to expand both the size and the scope of this new approach.

Perhaps the newest and most cost effective way to adopt a more local posture is through a Virtual Presence Post. Here one or more of our young officers creates and manages an internet site that is focused on key population centers. This digital meeting room enables foreign citizens, young people most of all, to engage online with American diplomats who could be hundreds of miles away. This is a great way to connect with millions of new people across Europe and Asia and Latin America.

In today's world, our diplomats will not only work in different places, they will work in different communities and they will serve in different kinds of conditions, like reconstruction and stabilization missions, where they must partner more directly with the military.

So to advance transformational diplomacy we are empowering our diplomats to work more jointly with our men and women in uniform.

Over the past 15 years, as violent state failure has become a greater global threat, our military has borne a disproportionate share of post-conflict responsibilities because we have not had the standing civilian capability to play our part fully. This was true in Somalia and Haiti, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, and it is still partially true in Iraq and Afghanistan.

These experiences have shown us the need to enhance our ability to work more effectively at the critical intersections of diplomacy, democracy promotion, economic reconstruction and military security. That is why President Bush created within the State Department the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization. Recently, President Bush broadened the authority and mandate for this office and Congress authorized the Pentagon to transfer up to \$100 million to State in the event of a post-conflict operation, funds that would empower our reconstruction and stabilization efforts. We have an expansive vision for this new office, and let there be no doubt, we are committed to realizing it. Should a state fail in the future, we want the men and the women of this office to be able to spring into action quickly. We will look to them to partner immediately with our military, with other federal agencies and with our international allies, and eventually we envision this office assembling and deploying the kinds of civilians who are essential in post-conflict operations: Police officers and judges and electricians and engineers, bankers and economists and legal experts and election monitors.

Our Reconstruction and Stabilization Office must be able to help a failed state to exercise responsible sovereignty and to prevent its territory from becoming a source of global instability, as Afghanistan was in 2001.

The diplomacy of the 21st century requires better “jointness” too between our soldiers and our civilians, and we are taking additional steps to achieve it. We for decades have positions in our Foreign Service called Political Advisors to Military Forces, affectionately called POLADS, in our business. We station these diplomats where the world of diplomacy intersects the world of military force, but increasingly this intersection is seen in the dusty streets of Fallujah or the tsunami-wrecked coasts of Indonesia. I want American diplomats to eagerly seek our assignments working side-by-side with our men and women in uniform, whether it is in disaster relief in Pakistan or in stabilization missions in Liberia or fighting the illegal drug trade in Latin America.

Finally, to advance transformational diplomacy, we are preparing our people with new expertise and challenging them with new expectations. I’ve been Secretary of State for almost exactly one year now, and in that time I have become more convinced than ever that we have the finest diplomatic service in the world. I’ve seen the noble spirit of that service, a service that defines the men and women of our Foreign Service and Civil Service and our Foreign Service Nationals, many of whom are serving in dangerous places far away from their families.

I see in them the desire and the ability to adapt to a changing world and to our changing diplomatic mission. More and more often, over the course of this new century, we will ask the men and women of the State Department to be active in the field. We will need them to engage with private citizens in emerging regional centers, not just with government officials in their nations’ capitals. We must train record numbers of people to master difficult languages like Arabic and Chinese and Farsi and Urdu.

In addition, to advance in their careers, our Foreign Service Officers must now serve in what we call hardship posts. These are challenging jobs in critical countries like Iraq and Afghanistan and Sudan and Angola, countries where we are working with foreign citizens in difficult conditions to maintain security and fight poverty and make democratic reforms. To succeed in these kinds of posts, we will train our diplomats not only as expert analysts of policy but as first-rate administrators of programs, capable of helping foreign citizens to strengthen the rule of law, to start businesses, to improve health and to reform education.

Ladies and gentlemen, President Bush has outlined the historic calling of our time. We on the right side of freedom’s divide have a responsibility to help all people who find themselves on the wrong side of that divide. The men and women of American diplomacy are being summoned to advance an exciting new mission. But there is one other great asset that America will bring to this challenge. No, in a day and a time when difference is still a license to kill, America stands as

a tremendous example of what can happen with people of diverse backgrounds, ethnic groups, religions all call themselves American. Because it does not matter whether you are Italian American or African American or Korean American. It does not matter whether you are Muslim or Presbyterian or Jewish or Catholic. What matters is that you are American and you are devoted to an ideal and to a set of beliefs that unites us.

Ladies and gentlemen, in order for America to fully play its role in the world, it must send out into the world a diplomatic force, a diplomatic corps that reflects that great diversity. It cannot be that the last three Secretaries of State—the daughter of European immigrants, the son of Jamaican immigrants and a daughter of the American segregated South—would be more diverse than the Foreign Service with which they work. And so I want to make a special appeal to each and every one of you. It's exciting to be a diplomat these days because it is not just about reporting on countries. It's not just influencing governments. It's being a part of changing people's lives, whether in our AIDS programs abroad or in our efforts to educate girls in Afghanistan or to help with extremism in the Middle East with good partners like Pakistan and Jordan. Imagine the excitement of the people who are going to work in Liberia now with the first woman President on the African continent to try and build a Liberia where people can reach their dreams and their future.

But we cannot do it without America's best and brightest, and America's best and brightest come in all colors, they come in all religions, they come in all heritages. Our Foreign Service has got to be that way, too . . .

And there's a portrait of Thomas Jefferson that looks direct at me when I am speaking to those foreign ministers, and I wonder sometimes, "What would Mr. Jefferson have thought?" What would he have thought about America's reach and influence in the world? What would he have thought about America's pursuit of the democratic enterprise on behalf of the peoples of the world? What would he have thought that an ancestor—that my ancestors, who were three-fifths of a man in his constitution, would produce a Secretary of State who would carry out that mission?

Ladies and gentlemen, America has come a long way and America stands as a symbol but also a reality for all of those who have a long way to go, that democracy is hard and democracy takes time, but democracy is always worth it . . .

President George W. Bush announced after the November 8, 2006 midterm elections that he was going to reevaluate all aspects of his Iraq policy, implying all aspects of SSRTOs. He did not offer his analysis until January 2007.

President's Speech to the Nation on Iraq Troop Increase, January 10, 2007

THE PRESIDENT: Good evening. Tonight in Iraq, the Armed Forces of the United States are engaged in a struggle that will determine the direction of the global war

on terror—and our safety here at home. The new strategy I outline tonight will change America's course in Iraq, and help us succeed in the fight against terror.

When I addressed you just over a year ago, nearly 12 million Iraqis had cast their ballots for a unified and democratic nation. The elections of 2005 were a stunning achievement. We thought that these elections would bring the Iraqis together, and that as we trained Iraqi security forces we could accomplish our mission with fewer American troops.

But in 2006, the opposite happened. The violence in Iraq—particularly in Baghdad—overwhelmed the political gains the Iraqis had made. Al Qaeda terrorists and Sunni insurgents recognized the mortal danger that Iraq's elections posed for their cause, and they responded with outrageous acts of murder aimed at innocent Iraqis. They blew up one of the holiest shrines in Shia Islam—the Golden Mosque of Samarra—in a calculated effort to provoke Iraq's Shia population to retaliate. Their strategy worked. Radical Shia elements, some supported by Iran, formed death squads. And the result was a vicious cycle of sectarian violence that continues today.

The situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American people—and it is unacceptable to me. Our troops in Iraq have fought bravely. They have done everything we have asked them to do. Where mistakes have been made, the responsibility rests with me.

It is clear that we need to change our strategy in Iraq. So my national security team, military commanders, and diplomats conducted a comprehensive review. We consulted members of Congress from both parties, our allies abroad, and distinguished outside experts. We benefitted from the thoughtful recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan panel led by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton. In our discussions, we all agreed that there is no magic formula for success in Iraq. And one message came through loud and clear: Failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the United States.

The consequences of failure are clear: Radical Islamic extremists would grow in strength and gain new recruits. They would be in a better position to topple moderate governments, create chaos in the region, and use oil revenues to fund their ambitions. Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Our enemies would have a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks on the American people. On September the 11th, 2001, we saw what a refuge for extremists on the other side of the world could bring to the streets of our own cities. For the safety of our people, America must succeed in Iraq.

The most urgent priority for success in Iraq is security, especially in Baghdad. Eighty percent of Iraq's sectarian violence occurs within 30 miles of the capital. This violence is splitting Baghdad into sectarian enclaves, and shaking the confidence of all Iraqis. Only Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and secure their people. And their government has put forward an aggressive plan to do it.

Our past efforts to secure Baghdad failed for two principal reasons: There were not enough Iraqi and American troops to secure neighborhoods that had been cleared of terrorists and insurgents. And there were too many restrictions on the troops we did have. Our military commanders reviewed the new Iraqi plan to ensure that it addressed these mistakes. They report that it does. They also report that this plan can work.

Now let me explain the main elements of this effort: The Iraqi government will appoint a military commander and two deputy commanders for their capital. The Iraqi government will deploy Iraqi Army and National Police brigades across Baghdad's nine districts. When these forces are fully deployed, there will be 18 Iraqi Army and National Police brigades committed to this effort, along with local police. These Iraqi forces will operate from local police stations—conducting patrols and setting up checkpoints, and going door-to-door to gain the trust of Baghdad residents.

This is a strong commitment. But for it to succeed, our commanders say the Iraqis will need our help. So America will change our strategy to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to put down sectarian violence and bring security to the people of Baghdad. This will require increasing American force levels. So I've committed more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq. The vast majority of them—five brigades—will be deployed to Baghdad. These troops will work alongside Iraqi units and be embedded in their formations. Our troops will have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs.

Many listening tonight will ask why this effort will succeed when previous operations to secure Baghdad did not. Well, here are the differences: In earlier operations, Iraqi and American forces cleared many neighborhoods of terrorists and insurgents, but when our forces moved on to other targets, the killers returned. This time, we'll have the force levels we need to hold the areas that have been cleared. In earlier operations, political and sectarian interference prevented Iraqi and American forces from going into neighborhoods that are home to those fueling the sectarian violence. This time, Iraqi and American forces will have a green light to enter those neighborhoods—and Prime Minister Maliki has pledged that political or sectarian interference will not be tolerated.

I've made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American people—and it will lose the support of the Iraqi people. Now is the time to act. The Prime Minister understands this. Here is what he told his people just last week: "The Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation."

This new strategy will not yield an immediate end to suicide bombings, assassinations, or IED attacks. Our enemies in Iraq will make every effort to ensure that our television screens are filled with images of death and suffering. Yet over time, we can expect to see Iraqi troops chasing down murderers, fewer brazen acts of terror, and growing trust and cooperation from Baghdad's residents. When this happens, daily life will improve, Iraqis will gain confidence in their leaders, and the government will have the breathing space it needs to make progress in other critical areas. Most of Iraq's Sunni and Shia want to live together in peace—and reducing the violence in Baghdad will help make reconciliation possible.

A successful strategy for Iraq goes beyond military operations. Ordinary Iraqi citizens must see that military operations are accompanied by visible improvements in their neighborhoods and communities. So America will hold the Iraqi government to the benchmarks it has announced.

To establish its authority, the Iraqi government plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's provinces by November. To give every Iraqi citizen a stake in the country's economy, Iraq will pass legislation to share oil revenues among all Iraqis. To show that it is committed to delivering a better life, the Iraqi government will spend \$10 billion of its own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will create new jobs. To empower local leaders, Iraqis plan to hold provincial elections later this year. And to allow more Iraqis to re-enter their nation's political life, the government will reform de-Baathification laws, and establish a fair process for considering amendments to Iraq's constitution.

America will change our approach to help the Iraqi government as it works to meet these benchmarks. In keeping with the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, we will increase the embedding of American advisers in Iraqi Army units, and partner a coalition brigade with every Iraqi Army division. We will help the Iraqis build a larger and better-equipped army, and we will accelerate the training of Iraqi forces, which remains the essential U.S. security mission in Iraq. We will give our commanders and civilians greater flexibility to spend funds for economic assistance. We will double the number of provincial reconstruction teams. These teams bring together military and civilian experts to help local Iraqi communities pursue reconciliation, strengthen the moderates, and speed the transition to Iraqi self-reliance. And Secretary Rice will soon appoint a Reconstruction Coordinator in Baghdad to ensure better results for economic assistance being spent in Iraq.

As we make these changes, we will continue to pursue Al Qaeda and foreign fighters. Al Qaeda is still active in Iraq. Its home base is Anbar Province. Al Qaeda has helped make Anbar the most violent area of Iraq outside the capital. A captured Al Qaeda document describes the terrorists' plan to infiltrate and seize control of the province. This would bring Al Qaeda closer to its goals of taking down Iraq's democracy, building a radical Islamic empire, and launching new attacks on the United States at home and abroad.

Our military forces in Anbar are killing and capturing al Qaeda leaders, and they are protecting the local population. Recently, local tribal leaders have begun to show their willingness to take on Al Qaeda. And as a result, our commanders believe we have an opportunity to deal a serious blow to the terrorists. So I have given orders to increase American forces in Anbar Province by 4,000 troops. These troops will work with Iraqi and tribal forces to keep up the pressure on the terrorists. America's men and women in uniform took away Al Qaeda's safe haven in Afghanistan—and we will not allow them to re-establish it in Iraq.

Succeeding in Iraq also requires defending its territorial integrity and stabilizing the region in the face of extremist challenges. This begins with addressing Iran and Syria. These two regimes are allowing terrorists and insurgents to use their territory to move in and out of Iraq. Iran is providing material support for attacks on American troops. We will disrupt the attacks on our forces. We'll interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria. And we will seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq.

We're also taking other steps to bolster the security of Iraq and protect American interests in the Middle East. I recently ordered the deployment of an additional carrier strike group to the region. We will expand intelligence-sharing and deploy Patriot air defense systems to reassure our friends and allies. We will work with the governments of Turkey and Iraq to help them resolve problems along their border. And we will work with others to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons and dominating the region.

We will use America's full diplomatic resources to rally support for Iraq from nations throughout the Middle East. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf States need to understand that an American defeat in Iraq would create a new sanctuary for extremists and a strategic threat to their survival. These nations have a stake in a successful Iraq that is at peace with its neighbors, and they must step up their support for Iraq's unity government. We endorse the Iraqi government's call to finalize an International Compact that will bring new economic assistance in exchange for greater economic reform. And on Friday, Secretary Rice will leave for the region, to build support for Iraq and continue the urgent diplomacy required to help bring peace to the Middle East.

The challenge playing out across the broader Middle East is more than a military conflict. It is the decisive ideological struggle of our time. On one side are those who believe in freedom and moderation. On the other side are extremists who kill the innocent, and have declared their intention to destroy our way of life. In the long run, the most realistic way to protect the American people is to provide a hopeful alternative to the hateful ideology of the enemy, by advancing liberty across a troubled region. It is in the interests of the United States to stand with the brave men and women who are risking their lives to claim their freedom, and to help them as they work to raise up just and hopeful societies across the Middle East.

From Afghanistan to Lebanon to the Palestinian Territories, millions of ordinary people are sick of the violence, and want a future of peace and opportunity for their children. And they are looking at Iraq. They want to know: Will America withdraw and yield the future of that country to the extremists, or will we stand with the Iraqis who have made the choice for freedom?

The changes I have outlined tonight are aimed at ensuring the survival of a young democracy that is fighting for its life in a part of the world of enormous importance to American security. Let me be clear: The terrorists and insurgents in Iraq are without conscience, and they will make the year ahead bloody and violent. Even if our new strategy works exactly as planned, deadly acts of violence will continue—and we must expect more Iraqi and American casualties. The question is whether our new strategy will bring us closer to success. I believe that it will.

Victory will not look like the ones our fathers and grandfathers achieved. There will be no surrender ceremony on the deck of a battleship. But victory in Iraq will bring something new in the Arab world—a functioning democracy that polices its territory, upholds the rule of law, respects fundamental human liberties, and answers to its people. A democratic Iraq will not be perfect. But it will be a country that fights terrorists instead of harboring them—and it will help bring a future of peace and security for our children and our grandchildren.

This new approach comes after consultations with Congress about the different courses we could take in Iraq. Many are concerned that the Iraqis are becoming too dependent on the United States, and therefore, our policy should focus on protecting Iraq's borders and hunting down Al Qaeda. Their solution is to scale back America's efforts in Baghdad—or announce the phased withdrawal of our combat forces. We carefully considered these proposals. And we concluded that to step back now would force a collapse of the Iraqi government, tear the country apart, and result in mass killings on an unimaginable scale. Such a scenario would result in our troops being forced to stay in Iraq even longer, and confront an enemy that is even more lethal. If we increase our support at this crucial moment, and help the Iraqis break the current cycle of violence, we can hasten the day our troops begin coming home.

In the days ahead, my national security team will fully brief Congress on our new strategy. If members have improvements that can be made, we will make them. If circumstances change, we will adjust. Honorable people have different views, and they will voice their criticisms. It is fair to hold our views up to scrutiny. And all involved have a responsibility to explain how the path they propose would be more likely to succeed.

Acting on the good advice of Senator Joe Lieberman and other key members of Congress, we will form a new, bipartisan working group that will help us come together across party lines to win the war on terror. This group will meet regularly with me and my administration; it will help strengthen our relationship with

Congress. We can begin by working together to increase the size of the active Army and Marine Corps, so that America has the Armed Forces we need for the 21st century. We also need to examine ways to mobilize talented American civilians to deploy overseas, where they can help build democratic institutions in communities and nations recovering from war and tyranny.

In these dangerous times, the United States is blessed to have extraordinary and selfless men and women willing to step forward and defend us. These young Americans understand that our cause in Iraq is noble and necessary—and that the advance of freedom is the calling of our time. They serve far from their families, who make the quiet sacrifices of lonely holidays and empty chairs at the dinner table. They have watched their comrades give their lives to ensure our liberty. We mourn the loss of every fallen American—and we owe it to them to build a future worthy of their sacrifice.

Fellow citizens: The year ahead will demand more patience, sacrifice, and resolve. It can be tempting to think that America can put aside the burdens of freedom. Yet times of testing reveal the character of a nation. And throughout our history, Americans have always defied the pessimists and seen our faith in freedom redeemed. Now America is engaged in a new struggle that will set the course for a new century. We can, and we will, prevail.

We go forward with trust that the Author of Liberty will guide us through these trying hours. Thank you and good night.

One of the issues that many find most perplexing about these operations is any sense of success versus obvious signs of possible failure. The attached report is one of the Defense Department's 2006 appraisals of its work: methods of measurement, indicators of future trends, and issues of most danger ahead. Reports appear roughly quarterly.

November 30, 2006

Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq

November 2006 accessed at www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/9010Quarterly-Report-20061216.pdf

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 - 2.2 Ministry of Interior

2.3 Ministry of Defense

This report to Congress, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, is submitted pursuant to Section 9010 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, Public Law 109-289.¹ The report includes specific performance indicators and measures of progress toward political, economic, and security stability in Iraq, as directed in that legislation. This is the sixth in a series of reports on this subject. The most recent report was submitted in August 2006. The report complements other reports and information about Iraq provided to Congress, and is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition partners, or Iraq.

The goal of U.S. engagement in Iraq is a united, stable, democratic, and secure nation, where Iraqis have the institutions and resources they need to govern themselves and to provide security for their country. The metrics discussed in this report measure progress toward—and setbacks from—this goal and help illuminate the challenges. Although the U.S. goal remains constant, the ways and means used to achieve the goal have changed and will continue to change to adapt to a shifting situation. The United States and its Coalition partners remain committed to assist the Iraqi people to take over full responsibility for their country. Ultimately, success in these efforts lies with the Iraqi people. The period covered in this report (August 12, 2006 to November 10, 2006) saw incremental progress in the Government of Iraq's willingness and ability to take over responsibility, to build institutions, and to deliver essential services. This progress is notable given the escalating violence in some of Iraq's more populous regions and the tragic loss of civilian life at the hands of terrorists and other extremists. To counter this violence, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have assumed more leadership in counter-insurgency and law enforcement operations as they approach completion of the programmed goals for training and equipping. The Government of Iraq has identified future security requirements and is working, both independently and with the United States, to program additional security resources. The international community is also responding to its role in Iraq's peaceful development, as evidenced by recent United Nations Security Council resolutions and regional engagement initiatives.

Political Stability

Iraq's Council of Representatives has passed key legislation to initiate the constitutional review process, to facilitate foreign investment, and to outline a process for region formation. Most important for long-term political stability is the success of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project. This project initiated a series of meetings among political, religious, tribal, and sectarian leaders, and could, under the right circumstances, over the long run, serve as a basis for effective legislation for civil society and a national compact resolving the divisive issues in Iraq.

However, so far, this project has shown little progress. Sectarian violence has steadily increased despite meetings among religious and tribal leaders. The proposed meeting between political leaders has been repeatedly delayed. Concrete actions by the Government of Iraq to implement national reconciliation have not been successful.

Some Iraqis now express a lack of confidence in the government's ability to equitably solve fundamental issues. The U.S. government should continue to press the Iraqi government to act on the Presidency Council's October 2006 legislative and political agenda. This document included a timeline for key issues that directly impact Iraqi reconciliation efforts. The international community continued to show support for long-term peace and stability in Iraq and the region. In August 2006, the United Nations extended the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission to Iraq and, in November 2006, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to extend the mandate of the multi-national force in Iraq. Within the region, the Organization of the Islamic Conference held a meeting in Mecca during which Iraqi religious leaders of both Sunni and Shi'a communities publicly declared suicide bombings and other attacks on Iraqi Muslims a sin. Critical domestic issues, including hydrocarbon legislation, de-Ba'athification reform, provincial elections, and demobilization of militias, must still be addressed. The failure of the government to implement concrete actions in these areas has contributed to a situation in which, as of October 2006, there were more Iraqis who expressed a lack of confidence in their government's ability to improve the situation than there were in July 2006. It remains an urgent responsibility of the Government of Iraq to resolve the outstanding issues that inhibit political progress and to demonstrate a resolve to contain and terminate sectarian violence.

Economic Activity

The Iraqi economy continued to show progress, but still faces serious challenges. High unemployment continued to feed sectarian, insurgent, and criminal violence. Although definitive data are not available on the actual unemployment rate, it has been an issue that has had a significant effect on the security environment. The Iraqi government, along with Coalition and international help, must create an effective strategy to provide jobs. This program must be seen as fair and non-sectarian by common Iraqis. It must produce tangible results for a plurality of Iraqis or it may decrease the legitimacy of the Government of Iraq and have little effect on the level of violence. Oil production and electricity generation have improved since August 2006, but the security situation, maintenance deficiencies, and management issues have adversely affected distribution and delivery of these essential services. As of the data cut-off date for this report, crude oil production was 2.3 million barrels per day (mbpd). This is 7.5% higher than the production reported in August 2006, but still short of the Government of Iraq's goal of 2.5 mbpd per day. Oil exports remained at 1.6 mbpd, short of the government's revised goal of 1.7 mbpd, but the financial impact of the shortfall was completely

offset by higher-than-projected oil prices, resulting in higher-than-projected oil revenues. The average peak generating output for electricity for the reporting period was 4,650 megawatts, 2% more than the previous quarter, and Iraq averaged 11 hours of power per day nationwide. In October 2006, the last month for which data were available, the national average increased to 12.2 hours, slightly exceeding program goals. Electrical distribution was affected by the same problems as the oil sector, leaving some areas, including Baghdad, with far fewer hours of government-supplied electricity. New water projects have increased the supply of potable water by 35% since May 2006, but availability of fresh water remained far short of the need.

The Security Environment

In the past three months, the total number of attacks² increased 22%. Some of this increase is attributable to a seasonal spike in violence during Ramadan. Coalition forces remained the target of the majority of attacks (68%), but the overwhelming majority of casualties were suffered by Iraqis. Total civilian casualties increased by 2% over the previous reporting period. Fifty-four percent of all attacks occurred in only 2 of Iraq's 18 provinces (Baghdad and Anbar). Violence in Iraq was divided along ethnic, religious, and tribal lines, and political factions within these groups, and was often localized to specific communities. Outside of the Sunni Triangle, more than 90% of Iraqis reported feeling very safe in their neighborhoods. Still, concern regarding civil war ran high among the Iraqi populace. The number of infrastructure attacks continued to decrease, but the lack of recovery from the cumulative effects of these attacks, combined with ineffective infrastructure repair and maintenance, impeded the delivery of essential services to Iraqis and undermined the legitimacy of the government among the Iraqi people. The U.S. Congress provided supplemental funds that the Departments of State and Defense plan to use to improve infrastructure security.

Iraqi Security Forces

More than 45,000 additional Iraqi soldiers and police have completed initial training and equipping since August 2006, bringing the total number of ISF that have been trained and equipped to 322,600. By the end of December 2006, the United States and its Coalition partners will have met the force generation targets while continuing the efforts to improve the ISF's capability to meet emergent requirements. However, the trained-and-equipped number should not be confused with present-for-duty strength. The number of present-for-duty soldiers and police is much lower, due to scheduled leave, absence without leave, and attrition. The ISF increasingly took operational lead, assuming primary area security responsibility and demonstrating an increased capability to plan and execute counter-insurgency operations. As of November 13, 2006, there were 6 Division Headquarters, 30 Brigade Headquarters, and 91 Iraqi Army battalions that have been assigned their own areas for leading counter-insurgency operations. In

September 2006, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) transferred command and control of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) to the Ministry of Defense Joint Headquarters. Joint Headquarters also assumed command and control of the Iraqi Air Force and Navy, and IGFC assumed command and control of two Iraqi Army divisions (4th and 8th). In total, 104 Iraqi Army combat battalions, 2 Special Operations Battalions, and 6 Strategic Infrastructure Battalions are now conducting operations at varying levels of assessed capability. The most significant remaining challenges are the reformation of the Ministry of Interior police force and the development of ISF logistics and sustainment capabilities. The Government of Iraq, with U.S. assistance, is working to eliminate militia infiltration of the Ministry of Interior and the extensive reliance of Iraqi forces on U.S. support and sustainment.

Transferring Security Responsibility

On September 21, 2006, responsibility for the security of Dhi Qar Province was transferred from MNF-I to the Iraqi Provincial Governor and the civilian-controlled Iraqi police. Dhi Qar became the second of Iraq's 18 provinces to make the transition to Provincial Iraqi Control. Pending successful negotiations between the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government, MNF-I and the Government of Iraq intend to transfer security responsibility of Dahuk, Irbil, and Sulamanyiah Provinces to the Kurdistan Regional Government by the end of December 2006. The remaining provinces are expected to achieve Provincial Iraqi Control in 2007. In consultation with the military commanders in Iraq, the Government of Iraq, and Coalition partners, the Department of Defense continued to advise the President on the appropriate level of U.S. forces in Iraq. As security conditions improve and the ISF become more capable of securing their own country, Coalition forces will move out of the cities, reduce the number of bases from which they operate, and conduct fewer visible missions.

1.1 Political Stability

1.1.1 Steps to a Free and Self-Governing Iraq

As detailed in the August 2006 *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq* report, the political milestones for democracy in Iraq have been completed. Accomplishment of these milestones could enable the Government of Iraq to advance three parallel actions: a national reconciliation program; regional engagement; and a negotiated, realistic timetable for transition to security self-reliance. These actions could enable Iraqis to resolve their political differences and grievances and to assume a unifying responsibility for Iraq's future. These actions must effectively deal with militias, including disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating them into Iraqi society. However, a range of criminal, political, ethnic, and religious factions that pursue their own interests through the use of terror, murder, sabotage, extortion, bribery, and corruption is threatening accomplishment

of these actions. In October 2006, there were more Iraqis who expressed lack of confidence in their government's ability to improve the situation than there were in July 2006.³

National Reconciliation Program

A successful national reconciliation program is important to Iraqi political development. On June 25, 2006, Prime Minister Maliki presented his National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project to the Council of Representatives (CoR). This plan aims at reconciling past inequalities, working to move beyond sectarian divisions, and establishing democratic unity through participation in the political process. . . .

On August 26, 2006, the first of four planned reconciliation conferences was held. The participants, roughly 500 tribal sheiks, endorsed the Prime Minister's National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project and called for an end to sectarian violence, the disbanding of militias, a delay in federalism, and a review of de-Ba'athification reform. On September 16–18, 2006, the Government of Iraq held the second conference, for approximately 800 civil society leaders. This meeting produced recommendations for civil society and nongovernmental organizations that were intended to be used as guidance during the national reconciliation process. There are two other conferences to be held: a political parties conference and a religious scholars conference. The political parties conference (which has been postponed several times) may provide participants with an opportunity to make concessions and reach agreements that could lead to constitutional amendments in the hopes of solidifying Iraqi unity and security. At a minimum, the conference could improve the atmosphere for crafting amendments in the CoR. Such amendments might provide political and legal structures that would allow other initiatives—such as the Maliki Peace Initiative, de-Ba'athification reform, and the demilitarization of Iraq—to proceed. The religious scholars conference has not been scheduled. The National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project was complemented by a religious leaders' conference, sponsored by the Organization of the Islamic Conference, aimed at reducing sectarian violence among Muslims in Iraq. At this meeting, held in Mecca, October 19–20, 2006, Iraqi religious leaders of both Sunni and Shi'a communities issued a document of honor declaring suicide bombings and other attacks on Iraqi Muslims a sin.

Regional Engagement

Stability and security in Iraq is a regional issue. Each of Iraq's neighbors—Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey—is a stakeholder in regional stability, and engaging Arab states in the region to work for a united and independent Iraq and to end active and passive support for violent groups operating from within their territories is critical to the success of national reconciliation efforts. Although each neighbor has different concerns and policies regarding Iraq, they all share a common interest in promoting political, economic, and security

stability. The United States is facilitating regional negotiations on mutual interests and can help find common ground on contentious transnational issues.

Timetable for Transition to Security Self-Reliance

Coalition forces remain in Iraq at the request of the Government of Iraq while Iraqis develop the capability to assume responsibility for their own security. A negotiated, realistic timetable for transition to security self-reliance could allow the Government of Iraq to take responsibility for its political development, economy, and security, without threatening or unnecessarily risking the gains made so far. Such a timetable could lead to changes in the political dynamic in Iraq, providing support for the government's own long-term vision: a united, federal, and democratic country, at peace with its neighbors and itself.

1.1.2 Progress in Legislative Action

The CoR has made progress in several areas, including approving the Executive Procedures to Form Regions Law, passing the Investment Law, and forming a Constitutional Review Committee. There is a notable tendency for the government of Iraq to delay making difficult decisions. Political parties boycott CoR sessions where agendas include

1.2 Economic Activity

1.2.1 Building the Iraqi Economy

The Government of Iraq is committed to economic reform, including expanding private sector activity, and has taken some positive, concrete steps forward, such as raising gas prices and passing important legislation, including the Fuel Import Liberalization Law and the Investment Law. Notable progress has been made in the energy, electricity, and water sectors over the last quarter; the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that non-oil GDP growth in 2006 will be 10%. Nevertheless, the Government of Iraq faces serious challenges in the economic sector and has made only incremental progress in economic reform and execution of its own budget and programs. On October 31, 2006, the members of the International Compact group met to finalize the compact, anticipating approval by the end of 2006. Over the next five years, the International Compact has the potential to bring together the international community and multilateral organizations to help Iraq in attainment of sustainable economic growth and integration of its economy into the region and the world. The UN Compensation Commission approved awards of US\$52.5 billion for the compensation fund established to pay victims of Iraq's 1991 invasion of Kuwait. As of September 2006, Iraq had paid more than US\$20 billion. Every year, 5% of Iraq's oil revenue goes to the compensation fund. This payment is placing a significant strain on Iraq's resources and Prime Minister Maliki has proposed that this obligation be ended.

1.2.2 Indicators of Economic Activity

Economic indicators are collected and published regularly, largely through the Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation and international organizations, such as the World Bank, the UN, and the IMF. As depicted in the figure below, projections from the IMF assume that economic growth over the medium term will remain dependent on the performance of the oil sector, which currently accounts for more than two-thirds of Iraq's GDP. The outlook also assumes that the Government of Iraq's investment in the oil sector will generate increased oil production and strong GDP growth over the medium term. The fact that government ministries are having difficulty executing their budgets is undercutting the capital expenditure needed for medium-term growth. Part of the Ministerial Capacity Development program is targeted toward helping Government of Iraq ministries improve the development and execution of their budgets.

Inflation

Iraq's high rate of inflation is a serious obstacle to progress under the IMF's Stand-By Arrangement (SBA). Sustained progress under the SBA is necessary to secure donor support for the International Compact, and failure to meet the terms of the SBA would complicate negotiations for a new IMF program in 2007. Satisfactory progress under an IMF program for three years is required for the final 20% of Paris Club debt relief. High inflation—a result of disruptions in the supply of food and fuel, price deregulation, spending by the Government of Iraq and donors, and growth of the money supply—is threatening progress toward economic stability in Iraq. Unlike in previous years, when inflation was confined mainly to rents, fuel, and transport, prices are now increasing rapidly in all sectors. According to Iraq's Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology, the annual inflation rate from October 2005 to October 2006 was 53%. It is widely believed that the official inflation rate underestimates the actual inflation rate. Runaway inflation exacerbates the government's decline in purchasing power and increases wage and pension demands, placing added pressure on the budget. Over the past three months, the Central Bank of Iraq has taken steps to try to stem inflation.

- The bank raised interest rates from 7% to 12%, but the weak banking sector and the significant influence of the dollar rendered this move largely symbolic.

- The bank also slowly appreciated the dinar. The exchange rate is now approximately 1,455 Iraqi dinar to US\$1. However, a much faster rate of appreciation will be necessary to fight inflation. By increasing the dinar's value, the Central Bank of Iraq could encourage more Iraqis to hold onto dinars as opposed to converting them to dollars... the dinar would also reduce the dinar value of the Government of Iraq's dollar denominated revenue (more than 90% of revenues is from oil), but, as appreciation succeeds in controlling inflation, the government would require fewer dinars to pay for its expenditures. Appreciation of the

dinar would not harm the competitiveness of Iraqi exports—non-oil exports are negligible—but it could impair the ability of domestic industries like agriculture to compete with foreign imports. However, the bank has been reluctant to take the necessary stronger measures.

Unemployment

There have been no new unemployment data since the August 2006 report. At that point, official unemployment estimates ranged from 13.4% to 18%.⁴ Other reporting indicates unemployment is significantly higher. Private sector-led economic growth and investment are essential for any long-term, sustained reduction in unemployment. Unemployment and underemployment may make financial incentives for participating in insurgent or sectarian violence more appealing to military age males. There is a correlation between dissatisfaction over jobs and levels of violence. A decrease in unemployment may well have a significant impact on the level of sectarian violence and insurgent attacks based on analysis by the Joint Warfare Analysis Center. The Department of Defense is engaged in early efforts to increase employment opportunities in Iraq. The Business Transformation Agency is engaged in an effort to streamline contracting mechanisms and put more US contracts directly in the hands of capable Iraqi contractors. They are undertaking a review of State Owned Enterprises to identify factories that could quickly reopen and potentially employ thousands of Iraqis. Additionally, senior Defense officials have engaged in an outreach program to executives at major U.S. corporations to encourage them to do businesses with Iraqi companies. Engagement with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has been well received and several top U.S. companies have come forward offering to assist. Additional interagency and international efforts to create jobs are in development. Programs such as US-AID's Community Stabilization Program, Community Action Program, Izdahar Micro-Credit Programs, and Agribusiness programs need to be expanded and accelerated to further increase employment. Efforts to address unemployment and underemployment must be viewed as a top United States and Iraqi priority and be appropriately funded.

Oil Production, Distribution, and Export

Over the course of Saddam Hussein's reign, Iraq's oil infrastructure deteriorated badly due to lack of replacement of critical parts and equipment from the original suppliers. The Coalition has worked to help the Government of Iraq restore oil facilities, increase production, improve refining, boost natural gas production, and maintain pipeline facilities. However, poor operational and maintenance practices, insurgent attacks, slow repair, and flawed procurement and contracting procedures have hampered progress and have precluded the Ministry of Oil from providing sufficient funds for operations and maintenance, needed rehabilitation projects, and new field development. The flow of crude oil has been periodically halted by corrosion, fires, maintenance, and attacks, all of

which hamper production of refined products and crude oil for export. Despite these problems, crude oil production for the August–October 2006 quarter rose to 2.3 million barrels per day (mbpd); exports remained at 1.6 mbpd. Oil exports fell short of the Government of Iraq's revised goal (1.7 mbpd). However, due to higher market prices for crude oil, revenues improved and exceeded annual targets by US\$1.7 billion through the end of October. During the last reporting period, Iraq briefly resumed exports from northern oilfields for the first time since the autumn of 2005, though on a very small scale. Sabotage and equipment failures continued to prevent significant northern exports. The regulated price of regular gasoline (87 octane) in Iraq is currently about 170 dinars (~US\$0.45) per gallon, while premium gasoline (92 octane) is about 350 dinars (~US\$0.90) per gallon. Fuel subsidies and a limited supply lead to gray market⁵ activities and corruption. Gray market prices for refined products in Iraq are considerably higher than the regulated prices and are comparable to those of its neighbors, with the exception of Turkey, which heavily taxes refined oil products. On September 6, 2006, the CoR passed the Fuel Import Liberalization Law, which, if properly implemented, would break the government's monopoly on fuel importation.

This legislation should allow the refined fuel market to grow, relieve the cost of the subsidy on the Government of Iraq, and ease the frequent shortages of refined fuels. The U.S. Embassy is working on recommendations to improve the implementing regulations, which do not yet meet standards that would encourage private sector importers to invest. These recommendations will be presented to the Ministry of Oil, to obtain the maximum benefit of the Import Liberalization Law...

Electricity Production and Distribution

Estimated peak demand for electricity over the reporting period was 9,896 megawatts (MW), an increase of 12% over the same period in 2005. The Government of Iraq's goal for daily average peak generating output by the end of December 2006 is 6,000 MW, but it is unlikely that this goal will be met.

During the current reporting period, the actual average daily peak generating output was 4,650 MW, an increase of 2% over the period covered in the previous quarterly report and 78% of the goal. Almost half of Iraqis report supplementing government-supplied electricity with private generators to fill the supply gap. The shortfall between government-supplied electricity and demand is aggravated by the absence of a rational fee-for-service tariff system that would encourage conservation and reduce the effects of corruption. Many experts agree that such a system is a crucial step toward solving the supply gap problem. Government-produced electricity averaged 11 hours per day over the previous quarter and 12.2 hours per day for the month of October, the last full month for which data are available. The October data are slightly higher than the programmed end state of 12 hours per day nationwide. Baghdad, however, averaged only 6 hours of power per day in the previous quarter, rising to 6.7 hours in October, 5.3 hours short

of the programmed end state. Iraqis in some neighborhoods in other regions of the country also did not receive the national average hours of power due largely to interdiction of high-voltage transmission lines, lack of a rapid repair capability in the Ministry of Electricity, and limited local electrical generation capacity. Residents of other neighborhoods received continuous power . . .

Water and Sanitation

New projects have added capacity to provide access to potable water to approximately 5.2 million Iraqis—an increase of 1 million people since the August 2006 report. Direct measurement of water actually delivered to Iraqis is not available.⁶ Iraq must closely examine and improve its domestic water usage within the different sectors. The agricultural sector uses approximately 90% of the water consumed, but there is tremendous potential to improve the efficiency of water use in this sector. Toward this end, in 2005 and 2006, the U.S. Government funded Phase I of a new national water master plan for Iraq, which, once completed, will guide water resource development in Iraq for the next three decades.

Nutrition and Social Safety Net

The most recent estimates of hunger and nutrition were reported in the August 2006 report. Malnutrition was reported as varying between 14.2% and 26.5%, depending on the province.⁷ A social safety net program, being developed by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, was described in the last report. The social safety net program is an essential step in reforming national subsidies, as required by the IMF SBA . . .

1.3 The Security Environment

1.3.1 Overall Assessment of the Security Environment

During the most recent reporting period, the conflict in Iraq has been characterized by a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a armed groups fighting for religious, political, and economic influence, set against a backdrop of a Sunni insurgency and terrorist campaigns directed against the majority-Shi'a Government of Iraq and the Coalition forces that are supporting it. The competition among factions has manifested itself in ethno-sectarian violence, conflicting national and provincial politics, suspicion about the work of government ministries, pressures in ISF operations, and criminal activities. In contested areas, such as Baghdad, Diyala, and Kirkuk, extremists on all sides have sought to undermine the religious and ethnic tolerance of the Iraqi people in order to gain control of territory and resources. Attack levels—both overall and in all specific measurable categories—were the highest on record during this reporting period, due in part to what has become an annual cycle of increased violence during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. The most significant development in the Iraqi security environment

was the growing role of Shi'a militants. It is likely that Shi'a militants were responsible for more civilian casualties than those associated with terrorist organizations. Shi'a militants were the most significant threat to the Coalition presence in Baghdad and southern Iraq. Baghdad remained the focus of much of Iraq's violence, but it was also significant in Diyala and Anbar Provinces and in the cities of Kirkuk, Mosul, Basrah, Al Amarah, and Balad. In Baghdad, the number of attacks trended downward during August as a result of the start of Operation Together Forward Phase II (OTF II), but rebounded quickly. The nature of violence in Iraq varied from area to area.

- The violence in Anbar was almost completely initiated by Sunni extremists and directed at Coalition forces. However, there were attempts by al-Qaeda in Iraq and affiliated Sunni extremists to intimidate the local population. These efforts provoked a backlash. Some tribal chiefs and Sunni Rejectionist leaders began localized efforts to retake control of their areas.

- In Diyala, and recently in Balad, the conflict between al-Qaeda in Iraq and Jaysh al-Mahdi was a sectarian fight for power and influence. In Diyala, sectarian violence decreased in September, largely due to a successful series of Iraqi Army/Coalition forces operations, which significantly degraded al-Qaeda in Iraq activity. However, in October, the number of casualties rose, as al-Qaeda in Iraq resumed sectarian attacks.

- The conflict in Basrah, Amarah, and the south was characterized by tribal rivalry, increasing intra-Shi'a competition, and attacks on Coalition forces operating in the region.

1.3.2 Recent Developments in the Security Environment

The level of sectarian violence in Baghdad has risen, with much of it directed against civilians. Neighborhoods have responded by forming their own militias for self-defense. The Sunni Arab insurgency also remains a potent threat to Coalition forces and the ISF, but it generally conducts smaller-scale attacks on military targets. As a result, the insurgents have had a lower profile than the sectarian elements executing civilians or al-Qaeda in Iraq elements conducting mass-casualty bombings and suicide attacks. OTF II was launched as a means of reducing violence in Baghdad. OTF II began on August 7, 2006, and quickly led to a significant reduction in death squad activity, as extremists concentrated on hiding weapons and evading capture during intensive search operations. However, as the operation progressed, death squads adapted to the new security environment and resumed their activities in areas not initially targeted by OTF II. During September, the levels of sectarian violence and civilian casualties increased and in some cases almost returned to the levels seen in July. Shi'a death squads leveraged support from some elements of the Iraq Police Service and the National Police who facilitated freedom of movement and provided advance warning of upcoming operations. This is a major reason for the increased levels of murders and executions. The violence and intimidation have led to an increase in the number of internally

displaced persons in Iraq. According to the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration, about 460,000 people have been displaced since February 2006.

1.3.3 The Nature of the Conflict Terrorists and Foreign Fighters

Although a combination of Iraqi Sunni and Shi'a groups are responsible for the majority of violence against the Iraqi people and Coalition forces, a few foreign operatives are responsible for the majority of high-profile attacks. Sunni terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda in Iraq and Ansar al-Sunnah, are engaged in a religiously motivated conflict to end "foreign occupation" and to marginalize the Shi'a.

- High-profile terrorist attacks are most often attributed to al-Qaeda in Iraq, whose goals include instigating sectarian violence. Al-Qaeda in Iraq and the affiliated Mujahadeen Shura Council consist of both foreigners and Iraqis motivated by an extremist Sunni Islamist ideology and seek to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Iraq. The emergence of Abu Ayub al-Masri as leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq demonstrated its flexibility and depth, as well as its reliance on non-Iraqis (al-Masri literally means "the Egyptian"). Al-Masri benefited from detailed knowledge of former al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's planning as well as his own extensive operational experience, allowing him to carry forward many of his predecessor's existing strategies. Al-Masri has attempted to set the tone for the Iraqi jihad and to solidify the perception of continued strong leadership within al-Qaeda in Iraq. Since al-Masri assumed leadership, al-Qaeda in Iraq has continued its main strategy of instigating sectarian violence using high profile attacks against Shi'a civilians.

- Ansar al-Sunnah is a mostly indigenous terrorist group with similar goals. However, Ansar al-Sunnah objects to al-Qaeda in Iraq's indiscriminate targeting of Iraqis.

Sunni Rejectionists

The New Ba'ath Party, the 1920 Revolutionary Brigade, and Jaysh Muhammad are the most prominent Sunni Rejectionist groups. To date, Sunni rejectionists—also known as the Sunni Resistance—have exhibited limited interest in Prime Minister Maliki's National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project. These groups attack Coalition and Iraqi forces to try to get Coalition forces to withdraw and to regain a privileged status in a Sunni-dominated Iraq. Sunni Rejectionists target Coalition forces at higher rates than Shi'a militia groups do. Most of the Rejectionist insurgents will probably continue attacking Coalition forces as long as the Coalition remains in Iraq, and the Rejectionists are likely to increase attacks against Shi'a-dominated ISF as they assume greater responsibility. The decentralized nature of the Rejectionist groups means local insurgent motivations vary. Nevertheless, Sunni Rejectionists are seeking security improvements in Sunni and mixed areas, disarmament and demobilization of Shi'a militia groups, a timetable

for Coalition withdrawal, an end to de-Ba'athification, and amnesty for Rejectionist fighters. The Government of Iraq must address the majority of these diverse motivations before most of the Rejectionist fighters will lay down arms, but the Government of Iraq is unlikely to satisfy the Rejectionists completely.

Death Squads

Death squads are armed groups that conduct extra-judicial killings; they are formed from terrorists, militias, illegal armed groups, and—in some cases—elements of the ISF. Both Shi'a and Sunni death squads are active in Iraq and are responsible for the significant increase in sectarian violence. Death squads predominantly target civilians, and the increase in civilian casualties is directly correlated to an increase in death squad activities.

Militias and Other Armed Groups

A number of militias and illegal armed groups operated in Iraq before 2003. However, the Iraqi Constitution prohibits “the formation of military militias outside the framework of the armed forces.” Similarly, the Transitional Administrative Law and Coalition Provisional Authority Order 91 specified that the only legal armed groups in Iraq were Coalition forces, the ISF, and private security companies operating in accordance with Iraqi law. Coalition provisional Authority Order 91 established a framework that recognized seven militias that had fought against the Saddam regime and provided incentives for them to disband. In early October 2006, Prime Minister Maliki stated that political parties should eliminate their militias or leave the government. However, personnel with sectarian agendas remain within key ministries, especially the Ministry of Interior. In addition, rivalries for control of key resources and the central government's limited influence outside Baghdad undermine the Government of Iraq's ability to disband the militias. Despite these legal and political prohibitions, militias and other small armed groups operate openly, often with popular support, but outside formal public security structures. These militias provide an element of protection for the populace, generally on a sectarian or political basis. This is especially true in areas where there is a perception that the Government of Iraq is unwilling or unable to provide effective security for the population. Some militias also act as the security arm of organizations devoted to social relief and welfare, lending these armed groups further legitimacy. Their continued existence challenges the legitimacy of the constitutional government and provides a conduit for foreign interference. Controlling and eventually eliminating militias is essential to meeting Iraq's near- and long-term security requirements.

The group that is currently having the greatest negative affect on the security situation in Iraq is Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), which has replaced al-Qaeda in Iraq as the most dangerous accelerant of potentially self-sustaining sectarian violence in Iraq. JAM exerts significant influence in Baghdad and the southern provinces of Iraq and on the Government of Iraq. JAM receives logistical support from abroad,

and most, but not all, elements of the organization take direction from Muqtada al-Sadr. JAM and Badr Organization members periodically attack one another and are political rivals. The Badr Organization was one of the recognized militia under the Coalition Provisional Authority Order 91. Although it participates in the Government of Iraq, Badr's members for power and influence among the Shi'a. Badr receives financial and materiel support from abroad. The Peshmerga is a security organization that operates as the regional guard force described in Article 121 of the Iraqi Constitution. It maintains security independently within and along Iraq's borders for the Kurdistan Regional Government. Private security companies have hired individual Peshmerga members for work outside the Kurdish area. Some members of the Peshmerga have been integrated into the Iraqi Army; there are allegations that these former Peshmerga members remain loyal to Kurdish authorities rather than to their proper Iraqi chain of command. Although the Peshmerga does not attack Coalition or Iraqi forces, and in some cases provides security for reconstruction efforts, the perceived dual allegiance of the Peshmerga undermines effective national security and governance. Sunni Arabs do not have a formally organized, national-level militia. Sunnis, especially in heavily mixed areas like Baghdad, rely on neighborhood watches and other local armed elements to provide security in neighborhoods and areas where they perceive Iraqi institutions and forces are unwilling or unable to meet security requirements. Attacks on the Sunni population by JAM, and the presence of Badr Organization and JAM members in the Iraqi Police Service and the National Police, contribute to Sunni concerns about persecution. High levels of sectarian violence are driving some Sunni neighborhood watch organizations in Baghdad to transform into militias with limited offensive capabilities.

Foreign Influence

Iran and Syria continue to influence security negatively in Iraq. The Iranian government sees an unprecedented opportunity to bring Iraq into its sphere of influence and to prevent it from re-emerging as a threat to Iranian interests. Tehran also views the situation in Iraq through the prism of Iran's ongoing tension with the United States and the West—especially the continued presence of U.S. forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf, which threatens to constrain Iran's regional ambitions. Iran seeks to ensure that the Coalition bears political, economic, and human casualty costs to deter future U.S. regional intervention. To achieve these objectives, Iran continues to pursue a dual-track strategy of supporting Shi'a unity and a stable government in Iraq—either a functioning, unified Shi'a-dominated central government or a federated state—on one hand, while facilitating militia activities in Iraq on the other. Iran has developed links to southern Iraq and the Kurdish region to facilitate access and perhaps to safeguard its interests in case Iraq were to split into a collection of sectarian enclaves. Despite repeated warnings by the United States, the Syrian regime continues to provide safe haven, border transit, and limited logistical support to Iraqi insurgents,

especially elements associated with the former Iraqi Ba'ath Party. The Syrians also permit former regime elements to engage in organizational activities, such that Syria has emerged as an important organizational and coordination hub for elements of the former Iraqi regime. Syria has taken a relatively pragmatic approach in dealing with Islamic extremist groups, such as al-Qaeda in Iraq and foreign fighters; although it has detained and deported many foreign fighters, Syria has allowed others to transit to Iraq.

Criminals

Common criminal elements are also capitalizing on the instability in Iraq. It is increasingly difficult to distinguish their activities from those committed by insurgent and terrorist groups who are also engaged in kidnappings, extortion, murder, and other illegal behavior. In some cases, criminal gangs work with terrorist organizations, abducting hostages and selling them to the latter, who exploit them for publicity or ransom. Criminal activity, particularly kidnapping and the sale of gray-market gasoline, drugs, and weapons, is an increasingly important source of funding for insurgent and terrorist groups.

1.3.4 Attack Trends and Violence

For this report, the term “attacks” refers to specific incidents reported in the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) Significant Activities Database. It includes known attacks on Coalition forces, the ISF, the civilian population, and infrastructure. Attacks typically consist of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), small arms fire, and indirect fire weapons. Country-wide, the average number of weekly attacks increased 22% from the previous reporting period to the current reporting period. . . . Attacks decreased slightly in August, but rebounded quickly and were the highest on record in September and October. More than three-quarters of the attacks occurred in 4 of Iraq's 18 provinces (Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, and Salah ad Din). Anbar and Baghdad were the worst affected provinces, accounting for 54% of all attacks. Coalition forces attracted the majority (68%) of attacks, and Coalition casualties increased 32% from the last reporting period. However, the ISF and Iraqi civilians suffered the majority of casualties. Overall, Iraqi civilian casualties increased by 2% compared to the previous reporting period and increased 60% compared to the “Government Transition” period earlier this year. This increase in civilian casualties was almost entirely the result of murders and executions.

1.3.5 Infrastructure Attacks

This past quarter, there was an average of one attack per week on infrastructure providing essential services, such as electrical power, water, and fuel. The attack rate is down from an average of 13 attacks per week in the presovereignty period of April to June 2004. However, the present rate of infrastructure attacks, coupled with a security environment that has hampered repairs, weak ministerial

oversight, and ineffectual rapid-repair teams, has proved a major impediment to improving the supply of essential services. Since poor delivery of essential services adversely affects the legitimacy of the government in the minds of the civilian population, Iraq's infrastructure will remain a high-value target for a ruthless enemy that wages war against the Iraqi people.

1.3.6 Concerns of Civil War

At the present time, sustained ethno-sectarian violence is the greatest threat to security and stability in Iraq. Competition between sects and ethnic political groups for economic and political power has become a dominant feature of the political landscape. Such violence is tragic and tends to undermine the rule of law and discredit the elected government. However, the situation in Iraq is far more complex than the term "civil war" implies; attempts to define the several and diverse sources of violence as civil war are not helpful to Iraqi efforts to arrive at political accommodations. However, conditions that could lead to civil war do exist, especially in and around Baghdad, and concern regarding civil war runs high among the Iraqi populace.⁸ Within the four provinces where the overwhelming majority of attacks occur (Anbar, Baghdad, Salah ad Din, and Diyala), violence remains localized to mixed neighborhoods. The Iraqi institutions of the center are holding, and members of the current government have not openly abandoned the political process.⁹ Decisive leadership by the Government of Iraq, supported by the United States and its Coalition partners, could mitigate further movement toward civil war and curb sectarian violence. Iraqi leaders must take advantage of the popular support for a unified Iraq and the opposition to violence to form institutions that take responsibility for Iraq's security.

1.3.7 Public Perceptions of Security

Security is as much a matter of perception as it is actual events. Nationwide, 60% of the Iraqi people expressed a perception of worsening conditions.¹⁰ This is consistent with polling data described in previous reports. However, at the local level, many Iraqis are much more positive. In the south, the mid-Euphrates, and Kurdish areas, more than 90% of Iraqis report feeling very safe in their neighborhoods,¹¹ a notable improvement over similar data reported a year ago.¹² In contrast, perceptions of local security in violence-prone areas, such as Tikrit and Baghdad, have worsened. The national perception of worsening conditions for peace and stability within Iraq has been accompanied by erosion of confidence in the ability of the Government of Iraq to protect its citizens.¹³ One-quarter of the population believes that the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Police are corrupt and driven by sectarian interests,^{14,15} although these views vary widely by province, as do opinions on confidence in the Iraqi Army/ Iraqi Police to improve the situation.¹⁶ Alleviation of security concerns will reduce the need for standing militias and increase public pressure for local tribes and militias to join the reconciliation process. Public communication with public safety authorities

is an indirect measure of public confidence in government and support for the rule of law. Calls to the intelligence hotline continue to show strong interest in combating terrorism and criminal activity and confidence of the population that the government will respond . . .

1.4.1 Progress in Assuming Leadership in Counter-Insurgency Operations

The ISF are increasingly taking the operational lead, assuming primary area security responsibility, and demonstrating an increased capability to plan and execute counter-insurgency operations. A unit can assume the lead once it has been thoroughly assessed and has demonstrated that it is capable of planning and executing combat operations . . .

1.4.2 Process for Implementing Provincial Iraqi Control

The transfer of security responsibility from Coalition forces to the Government of Iraq reflects the capability of the Government of Iraq to fulfill its sovereign responsibility in the most fundamental, vital interest of any state—to protect its citizens and safeguard its territory. As Iraqis take on more responsibility for security, Coalition forces are increasingly moving into supporting roles, and MNF-I will maintain sufficient forces on the ground to help Iraq consolidate and secure its gains. In September 2006, responsibility for security in Dhi Qar Province was transferred from MNF-I to the provincial government and civilian-controlled Iraqi Police. Dhi Qar is the second of Iraq's 18 provinces to be designated for transition to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC).¹⁷ The joint decision of the Government of Iraq and MNF-I to hand over security responsibility is the result of the Dhi Qar civilian authorities' demonstrated ability to manage their own security and governance duties at the provincial level. Three southern provinces—An Najaf, Wasit, and Maysan—are projected to be ready to assume security responsibility by February 2007. In the north, pending successful negotiations between the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government to recognize the Peshmerga as “guards of the region” in accordance with the Iraqi Constitution, MNF-I and the Government of Iraq intend to transfer security responsibility for the provinces of Dahuk, Irbil, and Sulamaniyyah to the Kurdistan Regional Government by the end of December 2006. The remainder provinces are expected to achieve PIC in 2007 . . .

2. Iraqi Security Forces Training and Performance

By the end of 2006, the United States and its Coalition partners will have met their force generation targets, while continuing efforts to expand the size and capability of the Iraqi Security Forces to meet emergent requirements.

Since August 2006, about 45,000 additional Iraqi soldiers and police have completed initial training and equipping, bringing the total number to 322,600. The actual number of present-for-duty soldiers is significantly lower, due to

scheduled leave, absence without leave, and attrition. The police have also suffered significant attrition of personnel who have been through Coalition training, but provincial and local governments have hired tens of thousands of additional police outside the train-and-equip program, which has more than offset this attrition . . .

Current Number of Trained* Iraqi Security Forces

Component	# Trained
<i>Ministry of Interior Forces</i>	
Police	~135,000
National Police	~24,400
Border Enforcement	~28,300
Dignitary Protection	~500
MOI Objective	188,260
MOI Subtotal	~188,200
<i>Ministry of Defense Forces</i>	
Army	~118,500
Support Forces	~12,400
Special Operations	~1,500
Air Force	~900
Navy	~1,100
MOD Objective	137,478
MOD Subtotal	~134,400
Total Trained ISF	~322,600

* These numbers are not the same as those present for duty.

2.2 Ministry of Interior

MOI forces consist of the Iraqi Police Service, the National Police, the Department of Border Enforcement, the Center for Dignitary Protection, and the MOI's portion of the Facilities Protection Service. (The MOI is planning for the eventual incorporation of an estimated 150,000 members of the Facilities Protection Service who currently reside in other ministries.) Currently, the Provinces of Muthanna and Dhi Qar exercise Provincial Iraqi Control, where the Iraqi Police Service operates independently of Coalition forces. Most provinces are projected to be able to take the lead in their own security by the summer or fall of 2007. Nevertheless, progress within Iraqi civil security forces continues to be hampered by immature logistics and maintenance support systems, sectarian and militia influence, and the complex security environment. Police Transition Teams, National Police Transition Teams, Border Transition Teams, and Customs and Border

Support Teams mentor Iraqi civil security forces. Most specialized police units, such as the Criminal Evidence Directorate, the Criminal Records Directorate, and the Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Unit, have met their respective training objectives. The Criminal Investigations Division and the National Intelligence and Investigation Agency are expected to meet their force generation objectives in 2007. It should be noted that proposals are being discussed by the MOI and MNSTC-I that would add several thousand forensic specialists to Iraq's police Force...

Iraqi Police Service Training and Personnel

The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team has trained approximately 135,000 Iraqi Police Service personnel, an increase of more than 21,200 since publication of the August 2006 report. The MOI continues to struggle with personnel management. Lack of standardized personnel strength reporting from stations up their district and provincial chains causes lack of transparency on the total number of Iraqi police officers on duty on any given day. The only numbers available are the payroll numbers submitted by the provinces, which, in many cases, are higher than the actual numbers of Iraqi police officers on hand. As a result, it is unclear how many of the forces trained by the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team are still employed by the MOI, or what percentage of the 180,000 police thought to be on the MOI payroll are Civilian Police Assistance Training Team-trained and equipped. The Coalition estimates that attrition will remain approximately 20% per year as long as fighting in Iraq persists. The MOI reports paying death benefits for more than 6,000 police officers since the fall of the Ba'athist regime in May 2003. As of mid-October 2006, approximately 88,000 police recruits had graduated from the 10-week basic training course. Police with prior experience attended a 3-week course, the Transitional Integration Program, instead of the basic course. A similar course, the Officer Transitional Integration Program, was used to train junior leaders. The Transitional Integration Program includes training on human rights, defensive tactics, democratic policing, first aid, patrol procedures, firearms (9mm and AK-47), and anti-terrorism. The Officer Transitional Integration Program course curriculum includes democratic policing, human rights, first aid, police ethics, supervision and leadership, use of force, firearms (9mm and AK-47), leadership communications, problem-solving skills, anti-terrorism, patrol procedures, critical thinking for officers, and police investigations. Approximately 49,100 police officers graduated from the Transitional Integration Program and Officer Transitional Integration Program programs. Appropriate personnel distribution is a challenge. Certain geographic areas have a shortage of trained police, while additional hiring by provincial leaders in other areas has resulted in force overages. Provincial governors are authorized to hire more Iraqi Police Service officers than MNSTC-I has agreed to train and equip, but the MOI and the governors are responsible for the extra officers' equipment and training. Police are local and generally unwilling to move away from their

communities, so these “extra” police officers cannot be cross-leveled to understaffed provinces. The Government of Iraq does not consider this a problem and, as the Coalition transfers the institutional training base to MOI control, training of these “extra” local police will continue . . .

Iraqi Police Service Leadership

The Iraqi Police Service has three 2-week leadership courses to improve the quality of its leaders. The First Line Supervisor Course is designed for company grade officers, the Intermediate-Level Course is designed for field grade officers, and the Senior-Level Course is designed for General Officers. Courses cover a wide array of topics, ranging from management to ethics to field training. To date, 691 officers have completed the First Line Supervisor Course and 662 officers have completed the Intermediate-Level Course. In addition to operational training courses, the MOI conducts a series of courses designed for staff officers. The Intermediate Staff Officers Course, started in September 2006, teaches senior lieutenants and junior captains staff operational functions. To date, 14 officers have completed this course. The Advanced Staff Officers Course, which began in November 2006, will teach senior captains and majors field-grade staff functions. The Senior Staff Officers Course and the Executive Officers Course—designed for colonels and generals—are scheduled to begin in early 2007. The Officer Education System seems to develop junior leaders loyal to the Iraqi people. However, certain senior leaders are products of the former regime and continue to view leadership as an entitlement, not a responsibility. These officers have a negative influence on junior officers and fail to reinforce the leadership lessons taught in the Officer Education System. As unprofessional, corrupt, or incompetent officers are identified, they are removed.

2.2.2 National Police

The National Police is a bridging force, allowing the Minister of Interior to project power across provinces. The National Police is also charged with maintaining law and order while an effective community police force is developed. To date, the National Police has trained and served in a primarily military role, but a plan is under way to reorient it toward police functions (see below). Weak or corrupt leadership, militia influences, and a lack of logistical and maintenance sustainment programs have affected the capability of these units. Despite the force generation effort, transition to Iraqi control will be slow, as the MOI implements effective positive changes . . .

National Police Recruiting and Vetting

The MOI is responsible for recruiting and vetting the National Police force, assisted by Coalition forces advisors. Extensive re-vetting of currently serving National Police is part of the Phase II program at Numaniyah. This incorporates ID

checks, fingerprints, biometrics, a literacy test, and criminal intelligence background checks. There is no specific screening for militia affiliation. New recruits will be vetted in the manner described above and approved prior to undergoing any training. A vetting committee, consisting of senior National Police leaders and MOI officials, has been set up at Camp Solidarity . . .

Foreign/Political/Militia Influence

Corruption, illegal activity, and sectarian influence have constrained progress in developing MOI forces. Although the primary concern of the Government of Iraq remains the Sunni insurgency, the inappropriate tolerance of and influence exerted by Shi'a militia members within the MOI is also of concern. A lack of effective leadership and policies to stem corruption has enabled criminals and militia supporters to weaken the credibility of the government. Minister of Interior Jawa al-Bolani has demonstrated the resolve to remove corrupt leaders and to institute policies to eliminate corruption.

2.3 Ministry of Defense

The Iraqi MOD forces consist of the Joint Headquarters (JHQ), the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC), the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF), the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy (including Marines). The Objective Counter-Insurgency Force has an authorized strength of approximately 137,500 personnel. This force is centered on an Army with nine infantry divisions, one mechanized infantry division, and associated Combat Support/Combat Service Support units. The Air Force consists of six squadrons; the Navy has two squadrons and a Marine battalion. The Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters reached initial operating capability in July 2006 and will command and control all Iraqi institutional training facilities. The Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command consists of the Tactical Training Command and the National Defense University. The Tactical Training Command will begin to assume control of the institutional tactical training facilities—six Regional Training Centers and three Iraqi Training Battalions—in 2007. The National Defense University has reached initial operating capability and has started to operate institutions of professional development (e.g., Iraqi Staff Colleges, the National Defense College, and the Strategic Studies Institute). The total number of trained MOD military personnel is about 134,400 (98% of authorized), of which about 132,000 are Iraqi Army.¹⁹ The number of Iraqi Army personnel who are present for duty at any time, however, may well be less than the authorized strength due to casualties, desertion, and leaves. Since the first Iraqi Army combat unit generated in the post-Saddam era entered into service in November 2003, an estimated 20,000 trained-and-equipped personnel have been killed or have otherwise left the Army.

The greatest contributor to the difference between authorized strength and present-for duty strength is a leave policy that places about one-third of all

soldiers on leave at any time so that they can take their pay home to their families. This is driven by the lack of a nationwide banking system. The MOD is planning on replacing the forces that have been attrited and on expanding the overall force structure with a 30,000-person Manpower Initiative, organized and implemented by the Iraqi JHQ. This initiative will add approximately 10,000 soldiers every two months over six months; MOD has completed recruiting for this initiative, and the first training sessions began on October 1, 2006.

2.3.1 Army

The current force generation plan will train and equip a total of approximately 125,000 soldiers and officers in 36 brigades and 112 battalions. Nine Motorized Transportation Regiments, 5 logistics battalions, 2 support battalions, 5 Regional Support Units, and 80 Garrison Support Units provide logistics and support for divisions, with Taji National Depot providing depot-level maintenance and re-supply. Headquarters and Service Companies provide logistical and maintenance support for each battalion, brigade, and division.

The Army will also include 4 Strategic Infrastructure Brigades, 17 Strategic Infrastructure Battalions, and a Special Operations Forces Brigade. Efforts to improve the capability of these units are led by Military Transition Teams, with U.S. and other Coalition officers and soldiers embedded in each battalion, brigade, and division headquarters; at IGFC headquarters; and at the JHQ.

The Prime Minister has announced an Iraq-funded US\$800 million initiative to expand the Iraqi Army by 3 division headquarters, 5 brigade headquarters, 20 battalions, and 1 Special Forces Battalion. This initiative is expected to take one year to complete and demonstrates the willingness of the Government of Iraq to invest in its security forces. Since the August 2006 report, the JHQ assumed command of the IGFC, which has, in turn, assumed operational control of two divisions from MNC-I. By the end of the year, the IGFC will control 3 of the 10 Iraqi divisions, with the remaining divisions transferring to Iraqi control by June 2007. Embedded Coalition advisors continue to assist in the development of JHQ and IGFC capabilities. Force generation of Iraqi Army units is increasingly focused on combat enablers and logistics. Three Iraqi Training Battalions are formed and fully operational. These battalions allow the Iraqis to train soldiers independently in sufficient quantities for force generation and replacement needs. New recruits attend a 13-week program of basic instruction. Upon graduation, soldiers receive additional training specific to their military occupation. Depending on their military occupational skill assignment, the length of training ranges from three to seven weeks. Other training institutions, such as the Military Intelligence School, the Signal School, the Bomb Disposal School, the Combat Arms School, the Engineer School, and the Military Police School, contribute to the growing professionalism of the Iraqi Army by teaching diverse specialties necessary to execute counter-insurgency operations...

Sectarian Issues in Recruitment

The Coalition and the Government of Iraq are committed to creating an Iraqi military that reflects the ethnic and religious fabric of Iraq, with diverse units loyal to the nation, not sectarian interests. Although competence and merit are the deciding factors when selecting recruits and leaders, ISF units generally mirror the demographic make-up of Iraq. The even-numbered divisions were created from former Iraqi National Guard battalions and tend to resemble the demographics of communities from which they were recruited. The odd-numbered divisions were nationally recruited and represent the national fabric. The Minister of Defense, through an Officer Selection Committee, has used normal transitions to diversify the senior leadership in the Iraqi Army. There are, however, indications that political forces in Iraq have influenced senior military appointments on the basis of sectarian affiliation. MNF-I and our Embassy in Baghdad are working closely with the Government of Iraq to encourage balanced representation in the senior ranks of the Iraqi military to discourage sectarian influence...

Notes

1. The information in this report has been made available with the assistance of many departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, and the Government of Iraq.

2. For this report, attack numbers compare figures from August 12, 2006, through November 10, 2006, to those from May 20, 2006, through August 11, 2006.

3. U.S. Department of State, Office of Research, October and July 2006. Q: "How confident are you in the new government of Iraq to improve the situation in Iraq?" Margin of error: $\pm 4\%$ for the overall sample, but varies among regions. Sample sizes for October 2006: Baghdad 1,834[;] Kurdish Area 464[;] Mosul Area 588[;] Kirkuk Area 144[;] Tikrit/Baqubah Area 155[;] Mid-Euphrates 673[;] South 675. Sample sizes for July 2006: Baghdad 173[;] Kurdish Areas 308[;] Mosul Area 111[;] Kirkuk Area 108[;] Tikrit/Baqubah Area 210[;] Mid-Euphrates 523[;] South 437.

4. The UN World Food Program's 2005 estimate was 13.4%. As of July 2006, the Government of Iraq's Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT) estimated that unemployment was 18% and that underemployment was 34%. The COSIT estimates are consistent with a 2005 United States Agency for International Development survey.

5. "Gray market" refers to trade of legal goods in an illegal manner, as opposed to "black market," which refers to trade of illegal goods.

6. Special Inspector General Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) report, April 30, 2006, <http://www.sigir.mil>. Statement modified to reflect October 1, 2006, data provided by Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office.

7. The UN World Food Program estimated that 15.4% of the surveyed population in Iraq lacked adequate food. About 26% of Iraqi children examined were stunted, severely or moderately, in their physical growth—a symptom of chronic malnutrition. The lowest

rate observed (14.2%) was in Sulamaniyyah Province, while the highest (36.5%) was in Salah ad Din Province.

8. U.S. Department of State, Office of Research, October 2006. See Section 1.3.6. Q: "How concerned are you that civil war may break out in Iraq?" See endnote #3 for margin of error and sample size information.

9. The Sadr faction suspended its participation in the government and CoR at the end of November 2006, but, as of this writing, it is not clear if this is a lasting or temporary move.

10. MNC-I Nationwide Poll. Margin of error: $\pm 1\%$. Sample size: $\sim 8,000$. Q: "Over the past three months, would you say that conditions for creating peace and stability in Iraq have improved, worsened, or stayed the same?" 62% said "worsened," 27% said "stayed the same," and 8% said "improved."

11. U.S. Department of State, Office of Research, October 2006. Q: "How safe do you feel in your neighborhood?" Margin of error: $\pm 4\%$ for the overall sample, but varies among regions. See endnote #3 for margin of error and sample size information.

12. *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, February 2006, Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2006 (Section 9010), p. 31.

13. MNC-I Nationwide Poll, October 2006. Margin of error: $\sim \pm 1\%$. Sample size: $\sim 8,000$. Q: "In general, do you have confidence in the ability of the Iraqi government to protect you and your family from threat?"

14. MNC-I Nationwide Poll, October 2006. Margin of error: $\sim \pm 1\%$. Sample size: $\sim 8,000$. Q: "For each type of soldier, can you tell me whether you agree or disagree: Iraqi Army/Iraqi Police: Are Corrupt." 26.5%/27.3% said "agree," respectively.

15. MNC-I Nationwide Poll, October 2006. Margin of error: $\sim \pm 1\%$. Sample size: $\sim 8,000$. Q: "For each type of soldier, can you tell me whether you agree or disagree: Iraqi Army/Iraqi Police: Are influenced by sectarian interests." 24.8%/25.0% said, "agree," respectively.

16. MNC-I Nationwide Poll, October 2006. Margin of error: $\sim \pm 1\%$. Sample size: $\sim 8,000$. Q: "How much confidence do you have in the following to improve the situation? Iraqi Army/Iraqi Police." 62.5%/67.1% said, "some" or "a great deal of" confidence, respectively.

17. Muthanna Province was transferred to PIC in July 2006.

18. Some of these challenges are detailed in Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Report 06-032, "Iraq Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities," October 28, 2006.

19. This is based on a total authorization support personnel of 14,673. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction report SIGIR-06-032, Iraqi Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities notes that, "... we calculated that between 37,800 and 44,500 personnel will be required for the total number of logistics units required by the Concept to support the Iraqi Army. ... after reviewing a draft of this report, MNSTC-I officials provided information documenting that, as of September 30, 2006, a total of 42,900 'support forces' have been trained since 2004. This total includes not only logistics personnel but also military police and communications and administrative personnel."

Glossary

ADI. Andean Counterdrug Initiative

Blue helmets. The term for peacekeepers operating for the United Nations as a nonpartisan to stop violence in a conflict

COIN. Counterinsurgency operations

Counterinsurgency operations. Actions taken by a government to stop the organized actions taken by a group seeking to overthrow that regime. Actions may be psychological, political, economic, civic, military, or paramilitary.

CPA. Coalition Provisional Authority

DA. Development Assistance

DART. Disaster Assistance Response Team

FAA. Foreign Assistance Act

FSA. Freedom Support Act

FSN. Foreign Service National

FSO. Foreign Service Officers

GDA. Global Development Alliance

Humanitarian assistance. Providing basic food, shelter, medical assistance, and most basic needs to populations made vulnerable by natural or human made factors

IDFA. International Disaster and Famine Assistance

Insurgency. An organized, armed political movement which may seek to oust a government or seek to break away from that government

Iraqi Study Group. A bipartisan group, headed by retired Indiana Democratic Congressman Lee Hamilton and former Republican Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, to offer outside views on new paths towards policy in Iraq.

MCA. Millennium Challenge Account

MEPI. Middle East Partnership Initiative

Mission creep. The gradual evolution, almost invariably undefined and unstated, of a mission for U.S. forces from one limited goal into a broader activity, often unbounded in any meaningful manner.

MOOTW. Military operations other than war

Nation-building. A variety of activities conducted to assist a country in its efforts to provide an enduring, functioning government to provide a basis to ruling a society. These often engage, but do not require, military forces to achieve the desired outcome. Increasingly nation-building requires cooperation between civilians and armed forces.

NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Neo-conservatives. The like-minded believers of a dominant U.S. foreign policy role around the world along with lesser emphasis on social policy than often associated with traditional conservative values. Neo-conservatives frequently came out of the liberal Jewish and Catholic tradition but became increasingly concerned about vulnerabilities appearing to face the United States after the Vietnam War.

NGO. Nongovernmental organization

Peace operations. Actions, frequently carried on by the military, may terminate military conflict and increase the fidelity of alternate approaches to violent conflict resolutions. Often also called peacekeeping or peacemaking.

PKO. Peacekeeping operations

PIO. Public International Organization

PVO. Private Voluntary Organization

Readiness. The level of preparedness on the part of U.S. forces to be deployed for military action in pursuing national security needs.

Saso. Stability operations and support operations

Stability operations. The activities conducted primarily by militaries to assure the durability of a peaceful government intent upon creating a more coherent set of conditions in a region or nation-state.

USAID. U.S. Agency for International Development

Resources

The overwhelming majority of works presently circulating on nation-building and stability operations reflect the ongoing struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan. While trying to portray these studies adequately, this chapter also includes more cases than only the ones confronting President George W. Bush. The emphasis, as noted earlier, remains on government-based stability operations, reconstruction operations, or humanitarian operations, whether conducted by uniformed officers or their civilian counterparts. As noted earlier in this volume, nation-building and stability operations changed with the end of the Cold War in 1989–1991. Because the focus of the Praeger Security International Series is contemporary issues, the resources in this chapter mirror the emphasis on the more likely type of experiences the international community and, more particularly, the United States and its forces, will face in future.

This chapter has several subdivisions. Articles and monographs or edited volumes each have a dedicated section. Think tank resources divide into publications and events. Opinion pieces also appear separately. In today's wired environment, many events are available to people in remote locations in real time through RSS feeds or, at a minimum, through transcripts and summaries at the institution's Web site. Each URL appears for such a case. Congressional resources appear as testimony, reports, or Congressional Research Service or Government Accountability Office (the research arm and investigative arm of Congress, respectively) reports, virtually any of which appears online unless it has a security classification prohibiting its release. Media resources often commonly consider nation-building and stability operations as well. These appear by the particular medium and include as much detail on accessing the resource as possible. Speeches enunciating official policy appear in the Appendix, but any remarks offering perspectives different from official stances may appear in this chapter. Regrettably, every single item on stability operations and/or nation-building cannot appear here because of space limitations.

CONGRESSIONAL STUDIES

U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. "Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign." S. Prt. 109-52, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006.

ARTICLES

Barton, Frederick and Bathsheba Crocker. "Winning the Peace in Iraq." *The Washington Quarterly*, 26(2) (Spring 2003): 7–22. One of the earliest, most prescient alerts to the array of issues that the Iraq intervention would need address to allow the effort accomplish its goals.

Bensahel, Nora. "Mission Not Accomplished: What Went Wrong with Iraqi Reconstruction." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 29(3) (June 2006): 453–473. The nonpartisan RAND Corporation analyst argues that clear-cut mistakes occurred in Iraqi reconstruction efforts. She argues that milestones indicated these issues but passed without any changes in the policy.

Cohen, Roberta. "Afghanistan and the Challenges of Humanitarian Intervention in Time of War." No date, available online at www.reliefweb.int/library/RSC_Oxford/data/FMR/English/FMR13/fmr13.9.pdf. A telling assessment of the types of questions that would arise after the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 since the issues were broader in providing a safe haven to the anti-Western forces than merely pro-Bin Laden groups.

Fitz-Gerald, Ann. "Facing the Facts: Peacekeeping's Place Within a Broader Approach to Security." *Journal of Conflict Studies*, XXV(2) (Winter 2005): 3–22. One of the perennial issues is the linkage between the ideas of peacekeeping operations and providing better security in general. This article argues for viewing this realistically.

Freier, Nathan. "Primacy Without a Plan." *Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, XXXVI(3) (Autumn 2006): 5–21. This piece considers the limitations on nation-building and associated operations in an environment of a single, heavily tasked superpower in the global system.

"Interview with H.E. Said Tayeb Jawad on 'Rebuilding Afghanistan'." *International Affairs Review*, 15:1 (Spring/Summer 2006): 7–12. This is an interview with one of the primary Afghan architects of nation-building during the first decade of the twenty-first century.

Lobe, Jim and Michael Flynn. "The Rise and Decline of the Neoconservatives." November 17, 2006, published online at <http://www.irc-online.org>. While the title indicates a great focus on the neoconservative influences in U.S. public policy debate, this article includes a long discussion on the goals, concerns, assumptions, and problems for the nation-building in Afghanistan and Iraq and also raises questions about future nation-building efforts around the world.

Melillo, Michael R. "Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities." *Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, XXXVI(3) (Autumn 2006): 22–35. One of the major challenges of this field is the funding and equipping of the various tasks the military might face because these run over such a range from high intensity to lower level.

- O'Hanlon, Michael. "A Reality Check for the Rumsfeld Doctrine." *Financial Times*, April 29, 2003, available online at <http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/ohanlon/20030429.htm>. O'Hanlon is a prolific scholar on national security issues, including nation-building, stability operations, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations among other issues. He illustrates the reasons the secretary of defense should have had tremendous concerns about the issues confronting it in the first weeks of the Iraq operations.
- Pearson, Frederic, Marie Olson Lounsbery, and Loreta Costa. "The Search for Exit Strategies from Neo-Colonial Interventions." *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, XXV(2) (Winter 2005): 45–74. This is an academic treatment of the idea of peace operations, noting its difficulties and similarities to colonialism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
- Rice, Condoleezza. "Promoting the National Interest." *Foreign Affairs*, 79(1) (January/February 2000): 45–62. In a widely read article, less than a year prior to the Presidential election, Stanford University Provost and Bush family advisor Rice explains why the Presidential candidate opposed sending U.S. forces into situations that could broadly take the label of "stability operations" or "nation-building". It remains a haunting reminder of how the 2001 attacks affected the Bush 43 administration's view of the world.
- Rubin, Elizabeth. "In the Land of the Taliban." *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, October 22, 2006: 86–97, 172–173, 175. An exploration of why the Taliban were able to return to the reaches of Afghanistan five years after the original ouster. The role of nation-building in this society plays a significant part in this story.
- Schneider, William. "Not Exactly a Bush Flip Flop." *National Journal*, October 27, 2001: 3386, available online at http://aei.org/publications/pubID.13271,filter.all/pub_detail.asp. Candidate George W. Bush adamantly opposed nation-building as indicated in several highly visible campaign appearances. The moves and philosophy behind ousting the Taliban and then rebuilding Afghanistan turned those campaign promises on their heads in the eyes of many analysts, in the weeks after September 11 attacks.
- Stratman, Henry W. "Orchestrating instruments of power for nation building." *Joint Force Quarterly*, 41(2) (2006): 32–37. One of the key aspects of nation-building is grasping the range of instruments of national power available to accomplish this goal. This article lays out the pros and cons of these instruments at a high level.

MONOGRAPHS AND EDITED VOLUMES

- Aall, Pamela, Daniel Miltenberger, and Thomas Weiss. *Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2002. This is an important volume by three U.S. Institute of Peace specialists on the field of peace operations and the associated tasks. One practitioner called it the "Bible" of these groups and operations.
- Birdsall, Nancy, Milan Vaishnav, and Robert Ayres, editors. *Short of the Goal: U.S. Policy and Poorly Performing States*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution and the Center for Global Development, 2006. A volume that focuses on the states themselves rather than the operations, it gives a comprehensive sense of what needs to be done in places where relief and peace operations appear required.

- Bonn, Keith, and Anthony Baker. *Guide to Military Operations Other than War: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Stability and Support Operations Domestic and International*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000. A checklist on the operations themselves and what goes into them. It is oriented strongly toward the uniformed military's perspective on the field of study.
- Bowden, Mark. *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War*. New York: Atlantic Press Monthly, 1999. A title that became a highly viewed commercial movie as well, the *Atlantic Monthly* journalist covers the difficulties of the activities in Mogadishu in 1993, which led to an incident where U.S. Army Special Forces personnel lost their lives. Although they had vastly superior technology, they were harassed by the warlords in the Somali capital.
- Brainard, Lael et al. *The Other War: Global Poverty and the Millennium Challenge Account*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2005. The Bush 43 administration created the "Millennium Challenge Account" early in its tenure to provide an incentive to undergoverned and poor states, most often those requiring peace and stability operations, to improve their domestic standards in exchange for targeted U.S. foreign assistance.
- . *Security By Other Means: Foreign Assistance, Global Poverty, and American Leadership*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006. The Brookings Institution Vice President and holder of the Bernard Schwartz Chair in International Economics describes the relationship between poverty, foreign aid, and the U.S. role in addressing the problem.
- , editor. *Transforming the Development Landscape*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006. One of the most dramatic changes underway is the manner in which development problems are meeting the new security environment.
- Bremer, L. Paul, III. *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope in Iraq*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006. The former State Department senior official went to Iraq to head reconstruction efforts and left after thirteen months' experience. Bremer's memoir discusses the challenges of operating with a relatively small force in a nation where the United States has limited understanding of the factions involved.
- Carothers, Thomas, editor. *Promoting The Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006. Arguably the most prolific policy analyst on democracy and rule of law questions, Carothers takes on the role that "rule of law" plays in development, stability operations, and associated issues.
- Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. *Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone*. New York: Knopf, 2006. A detailed tale of the problems that resulted from U.S. occupation efforts in Iraq after the 2003 invasion. Anecdotal by nature, Chandrasekaran, managing editor of the *Washington Post*, paints a sad picture of the disjuncture between life inside and outside the "safe area" for U.S. efforts in Iraq.
- Chayes, Sarah. *The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban*. London: Penguin Press, HC, 2006. A former National Public Radio reporter abandons Western culture for the sparse but complicated, complex life of Afghanistan, coming to grips with the contradictions that Western nation-builders are facing.
- Chesterman, Simon, editor. *Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance*. New York: United Nations Press, 2005. Governance is a task that the Bush 43 administration seeks to address by promoting democracy around the world while others seek to address the issue in the abstract as relating to state failure as Chesterman does here.

- Cosmas, Graham A. *MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962–1967*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006. This is a history of military operations in South Vietnam in the earliest years of U.S. intervention, addressing the lower end of the violence scale, thus nontraditional conflict. Most of the U.S. involvement was of advising.
- Covey, Jock, Michael Dziedzic, and Leonard Hawley, editors. *The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2005. Specialists in military affairs address the role of intervention in trying to end conflicts around the world.
- Crocker, Chester, editor. *The Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2001. A Reagan administration Africa specialist with much experience in stability-operation questions edits this crucial volume on how the international community will have to face stability and peace operations as the twenty-first century begins.
- Danopoulos, Consantine, Dharendra Vajpeyi, and Amir Bar-or. *Civil-Military Relations, Nation-Building, and National Identities: Comparative Perspectives*. Westport, C.T.: Praeger, 2004. Several academics consider the role that civil–military relations have in nation-building activities around the world.
- DeYoung, Karen. *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*. New York: Knopf, 2006. A detailed biography, with at least tolerance on the part of the Secretary himself, of the most prominent and respected African American policy person in the nation. Powell's struggles with nation-building and stability operations, uniquely from the civilian State Department and military positions, in several problem areas of the world, such as Haiti, the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
- Diamond, Larry. *Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq*. New York: Times Books, 2005. The prominent Hoover Center scholar on democracy went to Iraq to witness and provide suggestions for the democratization process to improve conditions in the Middle Eastern state. Diamond returned to the United States discouraged and critical of the steps taken in Washington and implemented in Iraq.
- Dodge, Toby. *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and History Denied*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. Dodge, a highly respected scholar on Iraq, considers the lessons learned after two years in the Iraq nation-building efforts.
- Donini, Antonio, Karin Wermester, and Norah Niland, editors. *Nation Building Unraveled? Aid, Peace, and Justice in Afghanistan*. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian, 2004. A European view of whether efforts in Afghanistan require more attention three years after the invasion.
- Durch, William J. *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*. Washington, DC: Stimson, 1996. Lessons learned from the peacekeeping challenges of Somalia, Rwanda, and Southeast Europe, among others, appear in this analysis.
- , editor. *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2006. A prominent analyst, headquartered at the Henry L. Stimson Center, considers the likely challenges of peace operations in the decades ahead.
- Durch, William J. and Tobias C. Berkman. *Who Should Keep the Peace? Providing Security for Twenty-First Century Peace Operations*. Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, 2006. An interesting consideration of the role of various peace operations forces, governmental and nongovernmental, from around the world as this effort accelerates around the world.

- Fallows, James. *Blind Into Baghdad*. New York: Vintage, 2006. The prominent correspondent for the *Atlantic Monthly* compiles articles written in the lead up to and early months of the Iraq war to consider the issues that the administration says it did not have any way to predict. Fallows raised most of the issues in advance and cannot understand why the administration did not anticipate them.
- Feldman, Noah. *After Iraq: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2003. An advocate for the intervention, Feldman then considers the “responsibility” side of rebuilding this society, concentrating his analysis here on the question of democracy for an Islamic society.
- . *What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation-Building*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. Feldman asks questions regarding what the post-conflict involvement requires of the United States as implied in our decision to invade.
- Fukuyama, Francis. *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. Fukuyama considers not just the cultural context that goes into nation-building but the hard factors that enter into state or institutional building as the new century continues.
- . *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq* (Forum on Constructive Capitalism). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. A major thinker from the conservative side of the spectrum, Fukuyama has contributed to the debate about what nation-building should entail. Fukuyama argues that this is a phenomenon that will have long-lasting implications for U.S. national security strategy.
- Gordon, Michael and Bernard Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. New York: Pantheon, 2006. A respected *New York Times* military correspondent (Gordon) and a retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General (Trainor) reconstruct the Iraq campaign and initial stages of occupation through interviews. A troubling tale that foretold problems early after “major combat operations” ended in 2003.
- Gottesman, Evan R. *Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation-Building*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004. This is a study of the problems facing a deeply divided society after a brutal regime leaves office and the nation tries to rebuild.
- Kaplan, Robert. *Imperial Grunts*. New York: Random House, 2005. Kaplan, a senior correspondent with the *Atlantic Monthly*, studied U.S. troops deployment and operations in a number of hot spots around the world and what it entails for U.S. forces in their future stability operations and humanitarian-assistance efforts.
- Karnow, Stanley. *In Our Own Image: America's Empire in the Philippines*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1990. This is a history of the half century of U.S. colonial experience in the Philippines. Much of it relates to the challenges of nation-building.
- . *Vietnam: A History*. London: Penguin Books, 1997. Karnow describes the Vietnam experience which led to U.S. replacement of France as the dominant Western state in the country, the war leading to communist victory, and the lessons taken from the experience here. Much of it concentrates on retelling the military frustrations on the ground.
- King, R. Alan. *Twice Armed: An American Soldier's Battle for the Heart and Minds in Iraq*. Osceola, WI: Zenith Press, 2006. An Army reservist with a strong sense of cultural requirements in distant lands provides a narrative on his interactions with Iraqis through some of the early months of the postconflict occupation of Iraq.

- Kojo, Watanbe, editor. *Humanitarian Intervention: The Evolving Asian Debate*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2004. Humanitarian involvement is no longer merely a Western phenomenon but Asia's experience has long been on the receiving end, which this book seeks to challenge.
- Koonings, Kees and Dirk Kruijt, editors. *Political Armies and Nation-Building in the Age of Democracy*. London: Zed Books, 2002. Two Dutch scholars edited this book on how militaries actually function in the nation-building efforts today.
- Lancaster, Carol and Ann Van Dusen. *Organizing U.S. Foreign Aid: Confronting Challenges of the Twenty-First Century*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2005. Nation-building requires foreign assistance which Lancaster and van Dusen consider.
- Manwaring, Max and Anthony Joes. *Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Stability and Peace Operations*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000. Manwaring and Joes consider the long-term issues arising in stability and associated operations around the world.
- Marten, Kimberly Zisk. *Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. Marten describes why military leaders prefer not to be drawn into peace operations and nation-building, detailing why the additional problem of multilateralism affects the Services' ability to do this mission.
- Miller, T. Christian. *Blood Money: Wasted Billions, Lost Lives and Corporate Greed in Iraq*. Boston, MA: Little Brown, 2006. A depressing tale of the difficulties that have characterized the private contractors' involvement in Iraq between 2003 and 2006. This story covers the mismanagement in the country, the governmental fighting to preserve rights of private contractors to bid for these events, and the overseers who tried to stifle the behavior.
- O'Hanlon, Michael. *Expanding Global Military Capacity for Humanitarian Intervention*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003. O'Hanlon recognizes the importance that humanitarian involvements will pose for the United States and its armed forces in the near future.
- . *Defense Strategy for the Post-Saddam Era*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2005. One of the most prolific think tank analysts on what will happen to U.S. Defense Department planning after the Iraq war, along with a healthy dose of peace operations.
- Packer, George. *The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005. A sad treatment of the movement that got the United States involved in Iraq as well as a discussion of the reasons that Iraq will be so difficult for the United States to influence. Packer, a writer with the *New Yorker*, is sympathetic to some characters in the drama while incredulous of others.
- Paris, Roland. *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004. This study considers how the end of a conflict in a society requires it to then address many uncomfortable, divisive issues.
- Pond, Elizabeth. *Endgame in the Balkans: Regime Change, European Style*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006. The question of nation-building has also held great interest in Europe over the past fifteen years although the view that militaries do not have a role in that type of activity is less-widely held than in the United States. Southeast Europe has proven an interesting testing ground for Europe's thinking.
- Priest, Dana. *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2003. Priest, a highly visible *Washington Post* reporter on Pentagon

- issues, authored a book that gives a series of anecdotes about the roles that confront U.S. military commanders and their forces as they look at the world after the beginning of this millennium. Much of Priest's work focuses on the role that uniformed personnel play in situations traditionally calling for civilians in the past.
- Ricks, Tom. *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. New York: Penguin Press HC, 2006. Ricks, long reporting for the *Wall Street Journal* and *Washington Post*, is highly respected as a military correspondent. This volume indicates his strongly held view on the decisions that put U.S. forces into virtually unsustainable positions in the stability-operations phase of Iraq.
- Rotberg, Robert I. *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004. One of the original scholars in the field of "failed states," Rotberg discusses why these states cannot be ignored and what challenges they pose for their own citizens and the global community.
- , editor. *Building a New Afghanistan*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution and the World Peace Foundation, 2006. A long-time scholar of nation-building and failed states, Rotberg asks fundamental questions regarding the road ahead in Afghanistan.
- Rubin, Barnett R. *Afghanistan's Uncertain Transition from Turmoil to Normalcy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution and Council on Foreign Relations, 2006. A long-term student of the region lays out the array of problems that will have to be overcome in this fragile state.
- Sheehan, Neil. *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam*. New York: Vintage, 1989. A tale of formal U.S. efforts to pacify and engage in nation-building in Southeast Asia intertwines with a tale of personal failure. Many of the questions of U.S. intentions and understandings apply in other cases around the world.
- Shultz, George. *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State*. Boston, MA: Scribners, 1993. The Secretary of State's debate with the Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, about the use of force and the need to provide U.S. peacekeeping forces around the world.
- Steadman, Stephen John, editor. *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002. Addressing peace agreements, as Steadman shows, also raises peace operation issues.
- Weinberger, Caspar. *In the Arena: A Memoir of the Twentieth Century*. Washington, DC: Regnery Press, 2003. Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger strongly opposed the use of U.S. military forces as peacekeepers. This wide-ranging volume tackles this argument with the Secretary of State, George P. Shultz.
- Weiss, Thomas G. *Military-Civilian Interactions: Humanitarian Crises and the Responsibility to Respect*, 2nd ed. New Millennium Books in International Studies Series. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. Weiss has long done work on humanitarian operations and their effects on civil-military relations. A long-term civilian analyst, his work called into question the relations between policy options and the world's role in these operations as the number of instances increased since the end of the Cold War.
- Woodward, Bob. *State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006. After two prior volumes on the decision-making immediately after the 9/11 attacks and prior to the Iraq conflict, this volume portrays an isolated government leadership at the highest level while the government officials at the next level below the top of the Executive appear rife with struggle, distrust, and paralysis.

- Zartman, William, editor. *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1997. Zartman edits a volume on peace operations, questions, challenges, actors, and other concerns.
- Zinni, Anthony. *The Battle for the Peace*. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006. Former Combatant commander in Central Command heavily criticizes the current approach to staffing and prioritizing issues for Iraq. Zinni was one of the first former uniformed officers to make clear his criticisms of the Bush administration's policies on nation-building in Afghanistan and, especially, Iraq since the wars began in 2001.

DEDICATED JOURNALS

The scholarly and public policy publications appearing periodically often dedicate entire editions to a topic such as stability operations. They also regularly publish articles on the topic. The journals discussing these issues include *Parameters*, *Military Review*, *Foreign Policy*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Third World Quarterly*, and *The Washington Quarterly*.

Some dedicated issues appear on the topic, such as *Third World Quarterly* (Special Issue: From Nation Building to State Building), 27(1) (2006).

This entire volume examined the range of issues on the topic of nation-building and state construction, including articles of historical and theoretical perspectives as well as across Southeast Asia, Africa, Central and South America, and the Islamic world.

WEB SITES

The military has many Web sites including materials on stability and associated operations. Two crucial Web sites give an armed forces' view of these operations in indirect but extraordinarily useful manners. The Marine Corps' site on small wars, <http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil>, gives a different view of conflict than the large-scale wars that the public uniformly associates with military operations.

The Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama has a superb set of Web sites, one of which is Military Law and Legal Links at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-law.htm>. Because words have meanings to the Services often different from common usage, this site's links to the legal strictures on the military in security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations is invaluable.

The Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, especially the retired Army Lieutenant Colonel turned civilian historian Conrad Crane, have become the leading edge of that Service's study of lessons learned in these operations. The Army publications from the Strategic Studies Institute appear on the Web site www.ssi.awc.edu while the

Army itself maintains a Web site with notable publications at www.army.mil/professionalwriting/. An example of one such publication is Brian Watson's, *Reshaping the Expeditionary Army to Win Decisively: The Case for Greater Stabilization Capacity in the Modular Force*, from August 2005, appearing online at http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume3/december_2005/12_05_2pf.html. A study by the Web site at <http://www.sas.penn.edu/~mlipson/peacelinks.html> has extensive links to other sites with a focus on peacekeeping operations, humanitarian issues, and associated tasks. With a focus on military sites, the Web page http://www.stanford.edu/~cstlouis/lnk_mil.htm offers a series of global links to military services' ties with peacekeeping.

The fascinating Web page www2.etown.edu/vl.peace.htm offers an entrance to the international affairs via the virtual library. Similarly, the University of Michigan maintains a highly valuable Web page with organizations at <http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/intl.html>.

The Colorado Conflict Resolution Consortium also has generated two Web-based resources, www.CRInfo.org and www.Intractability.org, which offer discussion with two hundred scholars on four hundred topics in the field of international crisis.

An absolutely essential asset to the international community is <http://www.ReliefWeb.org>, which views its mission as "the critical hub for time-critical humanitarian information on complex emergencies and national disasters" (Web site accessed on December 2, 2006). Updated daily, ReliefWeb provides not only updates on crises around the world but also provides the links to the United Nations organizations and others involved in coordinating support to assist those in need. The ReliefWeb site provides a wealth of links to specific aspects of humanitarian assistance such as civil-military coordination, emergency telecommunications, and resources on avian flu as just three examples of pressing concerns.

Another site is the Peacekeeping Section of the Research Guide to Internet Law on the Internet, <http://www2.spfo.unibo.it/spolfo/PEACEKEEP.htm>.

Similarly, the Lester Bowles Pearson Canadian Centre for Training Peacekeepers has a marvelous site, specifically aiming at military peacekeeping, <http://www.CDNPeaceKeeping.ns.ca>.

One of the indicators of how dependent the analytical community is upon the Internet is the site www.globalsecurity.org. While this site broadly addresses an extraordinary range of national security concerns, it has a most useful method of introducing the material to the public, as it does with nation-building and stability operations issues. At <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/saso-support.htm>, for example, definitions appear for some of the more commonly cited terms in this area, such as nation assistance or humanitarian assistance.

To understand the intricate hub and spokes system of the United Nations, see the UN System site at <http://www.unsystem.org>. It is essential.

NationalSecurity.org is the Web site of Heritage Foundation specialists in foreign affairs. Tending toward a "conservative perspective," it generally advocates more funding, better support to enhance, and a desire to strengthen U.S. defense

and homeland security tools. This site lists activities by the organization relating to national security concerns, publications, and other related notes. The site also provides links to documents, reports, and other resources both inside and outside Heritage on crucial national security issues such as nation-building and stability operations.

THINK TANK EVENTS AND PUBLICATIONS

Events

- American Enterprise Institute. "After the Tsunami: Implications for Development and Democracy," January 12, 2005, summary available online at http://aei.org/events/eventID.984,filter.all/event_detail.asp.
- . "Can Foreign Aid Help Win the War on Terror?" June 8, 2006, summary available online at http://aei.org/events/eventID.1335,filter.all/event_detail.asp.
- . "De-Ba'athification Programs and the Dismantling of the Mukhabarat," December 16, 2002, summary available online at http://aei.org/events/eventID.24,filter.all/event_detail.asp.
- . "The Future of Iraq: Fighting an Insurgency While Building a Nation," July 27, 2005, summary available online at http://aei.org/events/eventID.1110,filter.all/event_detail.asp.
- . "Iraq: Lessons Learned," June 3, 2003, summary available at http://aei.org/events/eventID.337,filter.all/event_detail.asp.
- . "Iraq: What Lies Ahead?" April 15, 2003, summary available at http://aei.org/events/eventID.273,filter.all/event_detail.asp.
- . "Whither Nation Building?" May 14, 2005, summary available at http://aei.org/events/eventID.818,filter.all/event_detail.asp.
- . "Leave No Continent Behind: U.S. Interests in Africa," April 13, 2004, transcript available online at http://aei.org/events/eventID.786,filter.all/event_detail.asp.
- . "Toward Democracy: A Briefing by Ahmad Chalabi, Member of Iraqi Governing Council Delegation to the United Nations and United States," January 23, 2004, summary available online at http://aei.org/events/eventID.739,filter.all/event_detail.asp.
- . "Winning Iraq: A Briefing on the Anniversary of the End of Major Combat Operations," May 4, 2004, summary available online at http://aei.org/events/eventID.811,filter.all/event_detail.asp.
- . "Winning in Afghanistan," October 19, 2005, summary available online at http://aei.org/events/eventID.1159,filter.all/event_detail.asp.
- The Brookings Institution. "The U.S. and U.N. Roles in Nation-Building: A Comparative Analysis," February 18, 2005, uncorrected transcript available online at <http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20050218.htm>.

Publications

American Enterprise Institute in conjunction with the United Nations Development Program, "Whither Nation Building? Can the United States and the

United Nations Harmonize Their Efforts?" event held at American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, May 5, 2004, with transcript summary available at http://aei.org/events/eventID.818,filter.all/event_detail.asp.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) publishes an impressive array of analyses on national security issues, including nation-building and stability operations. The CSIS Significant Issues concentration of analyses provides a broad range of assessments of stability operation/nation-building concerns applicable to contemporary efforts. Examples would include Anthony Cordesman, *The War After the War: Strategic Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan*. CSIS Significant Issues Number 26. Washington, DC: CSIS, 2004, and Robert C. Orr, *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*. CSIS Significant Issues Number 26. Washington, DC: CSIS, 2004.

The RAND Corporation, originally an Air Force research arm, remains heavily involved in analyzing nation-building in its widest contexts. It attracts a wide range of analysts who offer perspectives on the Services' role in issues, for example, but also simply national security concerns writ large. One of the most influential analysts in the nation-building field, former Ambassador James Dobbins, is a RAND analyst on nation-building but he is only one of many. RAND has considered nation-building from the Iraq perspective, the terrorism view, and a variety of other orientations. Its work is cross-cutting in its centers of research, including the Center for Middle East Public Policy, National Defense Research Institute, and the RAND National Security Research Division.

Two particularly influential RAND volumes relate directly to nation-building. RAND, *The UN Role in Nation-Building—From Congo to Iraq* (Santa Barbara, C.A.: RAND, 2005), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG304.pdf, and James Dobbins and others, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (RAND, 2003), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1753/index.html.

RAND publishes its own list of books, its authors also write many op-ed pieces, and through shorter analytical pieces. The RAND Web site, www.rand.org, is an extensive one with many access points. The organization also sends out its publications in a hard copy catalog, which can be ordered through contacting the RAND Web site or writing to the RAND bookstore at 1776 Main Street, PO Box 2138, Santa Monica, California 90407-2138.

BROOKINGS

Brainard, Lael. "A Unified Framework for U.S. Foreign Assistance," no date or publishing information, available online at <http://www.brookings.edu/global/01brainard.pdf>.

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Carafano, James Jay and James Phillips. "U.S. Military Policy in Iraq: 'Cut and Run' a Disaster for U.S. and the Middle East." *Executive Memorandum 1207*, September 8, 2006, available online at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm1207.cfm>.

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INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES

The United Nations is a logical site for nation-building and stability-operations questions. One particularly useful Web site is <http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/kpkeep.htm>.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS

Agency for International Development

The Agency for International Development (USAID), a creation of the Kennedy administration almost half a century ago, is a primary government mechanism for nation-building, stability operations, humanitarian assistance, and the other programs falling under this type of mission. In their publication *USAID Primer: What We Do and How We Do It* (Washington, DC: Agency for International Development, January 2006), the Agency’s mission and activities are outlined. Another indication of the mission for USAID appears in *U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century* (Washington, DC, USAID, 2004) on the Internet at http://www.dec.org/pdf_docs/PDABZ322.pdf.

Further, USAID maintains a Web site dedicated to the work on Iraqi operations at <http://www.usaid.gov/iraq>. On the Web site, numerous links to accomplishments, specific contracts underway and being advertised, job opportunities, and various other current status notes appear. Similarly, the Web site regularly updates the public on work in Iraq by issuing weekly Department of State updates,

financial data, and assessments on the current state of affairs in the Middle East nation. A similar page exists for Afghanistan at <http://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan> as well as for the other three regions in which the Agency for International Development continues engaging in SSRTOs. The overall page to evaluate the U.S. involvement in these efforts under the rubric of this development office is at <http://www.usaid.gov/locations>. This page then goes into regional offices, which each have their own Web pages (Middle East, Latin America, Asia, and Africa) with the links to individual countries.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Defense Department has a wealth of Web pages to give information. One is the defense link at <http://www.defenselink.mil> while another is the Pentagon site at <http://www.pentagon.mil>. A good place to start from is the “Defense 101” site, <http://www.defenselink.gov/pubs/def101/>.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The State Department has a particularly useful Web site with links to organizations engaged in the activities for refugees and assistance, http://usinfo.dos.gov/global_issues/refugees/refugees.org.html. The State Department also has a series of twelve papers on democracy-building located online at <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/democracy>.

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

The Government Accountability Office (formerly General Accounting Office; GAO) regularly considers nation-building efforts, with reports on progress and recommendations for improving U.S. Government efforts. The GAO responsibility is to audit financial matters or programmatic activities. The GAO Web site is www.gao.gov and it has an effective search function. A selection of the Reports include:

- “Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition Strategy of NATO’s Stabilization Force,” October 8, 1998.
- GAO-01-917. “U.N. Peacekeeping: Executive Branch Consultations with Congress Did Not Fully Meet Expectations, 1999–2000,” September 10, 2001.
- GAO-02-294. “U.N. Peacekeeping: Estimated U.S. Contributions, Fiscal Years 1996–2001,” February 11, 2002.
- GAO-4-188. “Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements for the Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, But Issues Remain for Future Brigades,” December 12, 2003.
- GAO-06-331. “Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti,” February 21, 2006.

- GAO-06-852. "Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DoD's Global Posture Restructuring," September 13, 2006.
- GAO-07-40. "Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Competition for Iraq Reconstruction Contracts," October 6, 2006.
- GAO-92-174. "European Security: U.S. and European Contributions to Foster Stability," November 28, 2001.
- NSAID-92-248. "Security Assistance: Observations on Post-Cold War Program Changes," September 30, 1992.
- "Peace Operations: Reservists Have Volunteered When Needed," April 19, 1996.
- T-NSAID-93-15. "U.N. Peacekeeping: Observations on Mandates and Operational Capability," June 9, 1993.

Similarly, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) does shorter, more analytical summaries of specific topics on nation-building and stability operations. CRS works exclusively for the Members of Congress to respond immediately to concerns. A smattering of their analyses include:

- RL30588. "Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," August 23, 2006.
- RL31339. "Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security," August 30, 2006.
- RL31833. "Iraq: Recent Developments in Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance," June 15, 2006.
- RL33467. "A Civilian Reserve for Stabilization and Reconstruction Abroad: Summary of a Workshop on U.S. Proposals and International Experiences and Related Issues," September 12, 2006.
- RL33574. "Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and U.S. Policy," July 27, 2006.
- Serafino, Nina. "Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement," July 13, 2006, available online at http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/peacekeep_stab_ops.htm.

U.S. INSTITUTE FOR PEACE

The Congress mandated the creation of the National Institute for Peace in the 1980s during the height of the Reagan administration involvement in Central American conflicts. The Institute offers grants to scholars and occasionally hosts conferences on the work of its resident or visiting scholars. The Institute also has a thriving press. The Institute has a particular interest in topics relating to SSRTOs, thus publishes a wide range of theoretical studies and state-specific evaluations of these operations. The USIP website is www.usip.org. A smattering of publications on this topic include "The Peacebuilding Toolkit" which can be downloaded from the website, and Daniel Serwer's "Kosovo: Breaking the Deadlock" (2007), Roy Gutman, *How We Missed the Story: Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban, and the Hijacking of Afghanistan* (2007), and the online press guide *Guidelines for Relations Between*

U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Operations (2007). The Institute's studies are thus practical as well as theoretical.

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY AND REPORTS

The various Congressional committees also issue reports on the concern. These result from Congress' oversight function and hence they also almost always involve hearings and a subsequent report on the findings of the Committee based on these hearings. Additionally, Congressional testimony often outlines the views of a current or future administration, illustrated by John Bolton, U.S. Permanent Ambassador to the United Nations, in September 20, 2000, testimony to the House Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, available at http://aei.org/publications/pubID.17076,filter.all/pub_detail.asp.

Roger Bate, "The Blind Hydra: USAID Policy Fails to Control Malaria," testimony to Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and International Security, May 12, 2005, available online at http://aei.org/publications/pubID.22508,filter.all/pub_detail.asp.

Andrew Krepinevich, "The Future of U.S. Ground Forces" prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, 17 April 2007, accessed at www.csbaonline.org.

UNIVERSITIES AND PRIVATE INSTITUTIONAL RESOURCES

The range of academic settings with institutes, large and small, is wide in the United States. Many of them have Web pages listing stability operation links. These are too numerous online and often out-of-date to be useful in this volume. One nongovernmental organization with a useful listing is the George Mason University with a detailed Web site available at <http://library.gmu.edu/resources/peace.html>.

TELEVISION AND RADIO

The C-Span network is a wealth of material on nation-building and stability operations because of the array of events it covers across the nation. The C-Span Web site has a series of types of programs. C-Span has been one of the most thorough media for covering the nation-building efforts underway in Iraq and Afghanistan, as their Web page indicates at under "Defense and Security".

Booknotes is a series where authors discuss their work with prominent interviewers. On March 9, 2003, Dana Priest of *The Washington Post* discussed her book, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with the American Military*.

Washington Journal is a daily show on television, and occasionally on C-Span radio, on a topic of pressing interest on any particular day, allowing a specialist on the topic to speak with the host and take public questions on self-identified "republican," "democratic," and "independent" phone lines. Many of the foci over

the past three and a half years have been on nation-building efforts. On November 24, 2006, C-Span's *Washington Journal* had both Michael Gordon of *The New York Times* to discuss his book, coauthored with retired Marine Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor, *Cobra II*, as well as *Weekly Standard* reporter Michael Fumento. Both speakers took questions and provided analysis on nation-building in Iraq.

The Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) and the Public Broadcasting System (PBS) have a series of outlets, on television and radio, which cover nation-building topics from several perspectives. These may be the National Public Radio (NPR) system stretched from Pacific to Atlantic coasts or local outlet-based shows such as the *Diane Rehm Show* out of Washington, DC, or *Odysseus* from Chicago.

Diane Rehm

"Conversation with Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor," March 27, 2006.

"General Tony Zinni: *The Battle for the Peace*," April 12, 2006.

"T. Christian Miller: *Blood Money*," September 1, 2001.

"Darfur," September 18, 2006.

"Rajiv Chandrasekaran: *Imperial Life in the Emerald City*," September 22, 2006.

"Tsunami Relief and Politics," January 12, 2005.

"Sudan," June 14, 2005.

"Military Service and the War in Iraq," August 8, 2005.

"Robert Kaplan: *Imperial Grunts*," October 4, 2005.

"U.S. Strategy in Iraq," November 22, 2005.

On Point with Tom Ashbrook is a Boston-based talk show

Fresh Air with Terry Gross is a Philadelphia-based talk show

National Press Club broadcasts its speakers, often on SSRTOs

To the Point with Norman Olney, with archives at <http://www.kprw.com/archives>, is a Los

Angeles talk show heavily interested in SSRTOs.

"U.S. Nation-Building," July 31, 2003.

"Is America an Empire in Denial?" June 20, 2003.

"Afghanistan Prepares for its first Presidential Election," September 14, 2004.

"Our Private Warriors," April 5, 2004.

"U.S. Role in 21st Century World," July 10, 2002.

Morning Edition and Saturday Edition

"Interview with Kal Seth of the Naval Post-Graduate School" on training U.S. advisors to Iraq for embedding with Iraqi units in attempting counter-insurgency operations.

The Newshour with Jim Lehrer is a television show on weeknights on Public Broadcasting with longer discussions of SSRTOs and public policy. Its archives is at www.pbs.org/newshour it has a lengthy list of shows on these issues.

VIDEO

"Approach of Dawn: Forging Peace in Guatemala," 1997 (53 minutes), \$149.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.

- "Back to School in Afghanistan," 2002 (14 minutes), \$59.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.
- "Bitter Harvest: The War on Drugs Meets the War on Terror," 2002 (60 minutes), \$129.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.
- "Black Hawk Down." 2001 and can be found at www.sonypictures.com.
- "Building Democracy in War-Torn Afghanistan," 2004 (22 minutes), \$89.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.
- "Cause for Murder: Fighting Corruption in Mexico," 2002 (60 minutes), \$129.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.
- "Coca and the Congressman: Drugs, Farming, and Socialism in Bolivia," 2003 (60 minutes), \$129.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.
- "The Empty ATM: Inside Argentina's Broken Economy," 2002 (60 minutes), \$129.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.
- "Failed Nation-Building: A Case Study of Haiti," 2004 (23 minutes), \$89.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.
- "Haiti: Land of Tragedy, Land of Hope," 2004 (55 minutes), \$149.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.
- "H5N1: Killer Flu," 2005 (60 minutes), \$129.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.
- "An Honest Citizen: Cocaine and Corruption in Colombia," 2004 (60 minutes), \$129.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.
- "Ladies First: Rwandan Women Help Heal Their Nation," 2004 (60 minutes), \$129.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.
- "Meet the Players' The Tijuana Drug Cartel," 2001 (22 minutes), \$89.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.
- "Mexico City: The Largest City," 2004 (26 minutes), \$89.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.
- "Mexico Journal: Life in the Earth," 2003 (28 minutes), \$89.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.
- "One Day of War," 2004 (47 minutes), \$129.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.
- "Refugees in Africa: Another Quiet Emergency," 2004 (22 minutes), \$129.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126 or available at abcnews.com.
- "Road to Riches: Black Empowerment in Today's South Africa," 2003 (60 minutes), \$129.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.
- "Somalia: Good Intentions, Deadly Results," KR Video, (57 minutes), \$19.95, available at <http://inquirer.philly.com/packages/somalia> or at 215.854.4444.
- "To Have and Have Not: Wealth and Poverty in the New China," 2002 (60 minutes), \$129.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.
- "Torture: We Have Ways of Making You Talk," 2005 (53 minutes), \$149.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.
- "Unfinished Country: Haiti's Struggle for Democracy," 2005 (60 minutes), \$129.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.
- "The United Nations: It's More than you Think," 1991 (30 minutes), \$79.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.
- "The UN Security Council: Keeping the Peace," 2004 (16 minutes), \$49.95, available at www.films.com or 800.257.5126.

BLOGS

The Heritage Foundation has a link on its Web site to its national security blogs at <http://www.heritage.org/research/features/nationalsecurity/>.

Blogs are appearing on the web hourly. Some are personal experiences of U.S. forces in theater in Afghanistan or Iraq, although the military discourages these sites. Others are blogs on individuals' or pundits' or politicians' views. These can be found via various internet search engines.

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